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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides a feminist institutionalism analysis of the gendered power structure 
of the U.S. military. It argues that femininity is placed in a disadvantaged position to 
masculinity in the U.S. Armed Forces, even as formal policies evolve and move the 
U.S. military toward formal gender equality. This thesis utilises aspects of new 
institutionalism theory to analyse how institutional change has occurred in respect to the 
gender power structure. It explicates processes of change that have occurred in the U.S. 
military and highlights the role of both agency and structure in the evolution of the 
institution. It also explores what factors of the institution continue to discriminate 
against women in order to explain why more change has not yet occurred, as of 2013.  
In order to evaluate the above issues, this thesis draws on data from interview and 
survey respondents to explicate their experiences in order to provide a clear picture of 
the masculine-oriented informal norms of the U.S. military institution. It also provides a 
case study of sexual assault in the military to evaluate the tension between stagnant 
informal norms and advancing formal policies. This thesis argues that the disadvantaged 
status of women in the U.S. military can be explained by evaluating the past formal 
policies and informal norms and values of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
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Introduction 
Chapter One 
 
1.1 The Research Project  
(i) The Central Issue 
Throughout the 20th century, the American military institution was a central arena for 
social advancement and change in American life. The military’s social equality and 
anti-discrimination policies were often ahead of private industry, and military 
participation by minority groups was an avenue for their social advancement. For 
example, in 1948, the U.S. military integrated African Americans into the armed forces 
and made it illegal for a military member to make a racist remark or comment. This was 
done 16 years before the passing of the Civil Rights Act in civilian society. However, in 
terms of gender equality, the military has been slow to grant women full rights. Women 
were integrated into the general military in 1948, yet it took until 2013 for the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to open all jobs to women. The role of women in the 
military has been a fiercely debated topic in Western governments and society. Through 
the combination of political and legal maneuvers, women worked strenuously to earn 
their way into the military and the positions they hold in 2013. American military 
women have made great progress since their official entrance into the U.S. Armed 
Forces in 1948 and formal policies constraining female soldiers have been removed, yet 
informal norms and past formal policies have placed them in a disadvantaged position 
to their male counterparts in the military institution. 
 
The military has formal policies against discrimination, harassment and assault. It is 
often ahead of civilian organisations in areas of racial and gender integration and equal 
opportunity programmes. Yet all of these problems persist for female service members 
and they are place in a disadvantaged position to male soldiers (Guenter-Schlesinger 
1999, 203). Karen Dunivin argues that the reason for this is that, “the combat 
masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm is the essence of military culture” in that the 
military is shaped by men for men and has often been considered a way to turn boys 
into men (Dunivin 1994, 534).  
  10 
This thesis agrees with Dunivin’s hypothesis and explores it by analysing the informal 
norms and formal rules of the military. It looks to take these ideas further by providing 
a feminist institutionalism analysis of the gendered power structure in the U.S. military. 
It argues that privileging of masculinity in the institution can be explained by evaluating 
the formal and informal norms, values and rules of the armed forces. In order to answer 
why female soldiers are placed in a disadvantaged position to their male counterparts 
and how the gender power structure has evolved to its current state, it explores and 
analyses how a tradition of masculine culture affects the status of women in the 
military. It considers how and to what extent change in the gender power structure has 
occurred up until 2013 as well as elements that have impeded change (Hooper 2001, 
71).  
 
In contemplating aspects discussed above the main research question this thesis looks to 
consider is: To what extent has the gendered institutional culture change? In order to 
answer this, the research looks at why and how change has occurred and why it has 
sometimes not. In order to best explain the process of change, this thesis considers how 
the formal policies and informal norms interact to create or impede change. The 
answers to this question could then be used to shape Department of Defense gender 
policies to ensure the equal treatment of military women, which is necessary to advance 
women’s status in the U.S. Armed Forces. It could also help to provide insight into 
specific factors to consider as the DoD begins opening combat jobs to women in the 
military. In order to answer the above question, this thesis draws on data from 48 
interview and 16 survey responses from female soldiers, as well as six interview 
responses from DoD and Congressional leadership. It also draws on existing statistical 
data, formal military policies, legislation, and literature to triangulate the interview and 
survey data collected for this study.1 Through analysing this new data and triangulating 
it with existing data, as discussed above, this thesis produces original research into the 
study of women’s position in the U.S. military as well as contributing to new 
institutionalism research, specifically the feminist institutionalism body of knowledge. 
                                                        
1 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 60 for further information on the data sources for this thesis.  
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It also adds to the feminist discussion on women in the military by exploring how 
women’s participation has affected the gender power structure of the U.S. military.  
 
(ii) Background of Discrimination and Masculine-Oriented Norms 
Until the beginning of 2013, military women were discriminated against by the formal 
rules of the institution in promotion and job opportunities because they were excluded 
from combat roles. Although former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, made the 
announcement to open all military jobs to women, changes have not yet occurred as the 
branches of service have until 2015 to officially open all jobs to women (Christenson 
2013, 1). Due to the combat ban that was in place against women, female soldiers had a 
more difficult time than their male counterparts in reaching the highest ranks of flag 
officers.2 According to a Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Military 
(DACOWITS) study conducted in 2011, 80 percent of general (flag) officers have 
backgrounds in tactical and operational career fields. These career fields are seen as the 
core jobs of the military and many of the tactical and operational career fields were 
closed to women (Bacon 2011, 1). As Linda Francke argues, “the institutionalised 
gender discrimination that keeps women out of core positions and specialised training 
cast them as secondary players to men” (Francke 1997, 181). The occupations exclusion 
that was in place thereby inhibited their ability to make it to the top ranks as shown by 
figure 1.1 below (Sagalyn 2011, 3). 
 
Figure 1.1 Percentages of Female Flag Officers and Closed Occupations 
 
                         (Sagalyn 2011, 3)                                                         
2 Flag officer is the rank of all generals (one to four stars). 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As the graph on the previous page shows, the branches with the most jobs open to 
women, the Air Force and the Navy, also have the highest percentage of female flag 
officers respectively. The Army and the Marine Corps have the most career fields 
closed to women and also have the lowest percentage of female flag officers. This is 
especially telling of the Army because it has the second highest percentage of women 
officers in its total force. Also, as the Air Force has the least number of jobs closed to 
women, it also has the highest percentage of female officers and flag officers (Sagalyn 
2011, 3). In a 2010 DACOWITS survey of 336 veterans, 70 percent of respondents said 
they believed a lack of combat experience would make them less competitive for 
promotions (Bacon 2011, 2). Although the DoD has a policy against discrimination on 
the basis of sex for job opportunities, the combat ban served as formal discrimination 
and negatively affected women’s status in the military (Hooper 2001, 71).  
 
The problem of sexual assault and harassment in the U.S. military serves as a case study 
that illustrates how a lack of change in informal norms continues discrimination against 
female soldiers. In the U.S. military in 2010, it was reported that one in three women on 
active duty had been sexually assaulted based on reported accounts, which was 
compared to reports that one in six women in U.S. civilian society had been assaulted. 
(Broadbent 2011, 1). Out of the 3,192 sexual assaults reported in the Fiscal Year (FY)3 
2011, 2,016 of these cases were closed in FY 2011, with only 240 cases taken to court 
and 230 cases handled only with administrative action or discharge.4  Many incidents 
continued to go unreported as the DoD estimated there were 19,000 unreported cases of 
sexual crimes in 2010 (Broadbent 2011, 1). This number increased in the most recent 
reports from FY 2012, with 26,000 estimated cases of sexual assault (Herb 2013, 1). 
Secretary Panetta said, “we assume this is a very underreported crime, and that 
incidents of sexual assault are roughly six times as high as reports of the crime” 
(Mulrine 2012, 1). Soldiers who reported cases of sexual assault or harassment were 
often looked at as traitors to their unit and as problem makers (Hansen 2007, 2).                                                         
3 Fiscal Year is the budget term of the U.S. government and begins in October. 
4 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 181 for graphs and statistics on sexual assault in the U.S. military.  
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Statistically, the majority of women who have reported sexual assault left the military 
within three years (Hansen 2007, 2).  
 
The informal norms of the U.S. military institution are based on traditional masculine-
oriented norms, remnants from when the military was first created, that have been 
difficult to change. Although the last formal policy that discriminated against women, 
the Ground Combat Rule, was lifted, the long-term formal discrimination has placed 
female soldiers in a disadvantaged position to their male counterparts. The formal 
policy changes are positive advancements for women and move the gender structure of 
the U.S. military toward greater gender equality; however, many of the masculine-
oriented informal norms have not advanced with formal policy changes. This gap 
between formal policies and informal norms affects women’s status in the military.  
 
(iii) The Main Propositions 
This thesis argues that the gender roles in the U.S. Armed Forces are socially 
constructed by the norms, values and rules of the American military institution and 
favour masculinity over femininity. It contends that the military is a masculine-oriented 
institution and is based on the historical role of the soldier as male, while the woman’s 
role was to be protected. In this thesis, the terms ‘masculine-oriented’ or ‘masculine-
centric’ norms or culture refer to the favouring of masculinity and traditional masculine 
characteristics over femininity and traditional feminine characteristics. In this thesis, 
these terms are used to be synonymous with patriarchical institution or culture in which 
there is an assumption that men and women “are intrinsically and unalterably different 
from on another” and due to these differences they are supposed to “play distinctly 
different roles in society” (Enloe 2007, 67). This ‘masculine-centric’ or ‘masculine-
oriented’ culture is built around an ideal masculine identity of strength and power and a 
belief that “men are natural and superior income earners…security strategists, public 
authorities” and have “greater physical strength” (Enloe 2007, 67), While women on the 
other hand have natural characteristics that “make them valuable in home life and in 
comforting men” (Enloe 2007, 67).  
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In analysing gender, femininity is often countered against masculinity in general. 
However, Charlotte Hooper and J.W. Connell argue that there are hierarchies within 
masculinity that should affect the study of gender. The most dissimilar of these from 
femininity and which all other masculinities are compared to is that of hegemonic 
masculinity (Hooper 2001, 56). Hegemonic masculinity is the form of masculinity that 
at a given time is the most culturally acclaimed (Connell 1995, 77). This group holds 
substantial power and will often have the majority claim to leadership. The 
characteristics associated with the group holding hegemonic masculinity are held as 
superior (Connell 1995, 77). Although Hooper and Connell agree that the characteristics 
of hegemonic masculinity evolve and can be challenged by other male groups and 
women, Connell argues that the reigning group will exert the power they hold in order 
to stay on top of the masculinity hierarchy (Connell 1995, 77). This research 
acknowledges the existence of multiple masculinities, but for the purpose of the main 
ideas in this research, when analysing and discussing masculinity, this thesis is referring 
to the reigning hegemonic masculinity of the U.S. military, or ‘just warrior’ 
characteristics which emphasises strength, power and courage and are traditionally 
considered male characteristics. These ideas are discussed further in Chapter Four.5 
 
Although gender roles and characteristics have evolved since the initial establishment of 
the U. S. military, historical gender ideas that the institution was built on affect the 
institution’s current values, rules and norms. Jean Elshtain argues that political and 
military leaders attempt to maintain the historical gender roles because they depend on 
militarised gender roles in order to promote their interests abroad. She argues that the 
U.S. military associates masculinity with ‘just warrior’ and femininity with ‘beautiful 
soul’6 (Elshtain 1987, 140). Laura Sjoberg argues that political and military leaders use 
the gender roles to present the image that the country is ‘just,’ which she argues is a 
feminine characteristic, while also being ‘all-powerful,’ which is tied to masculinity 
(Sjoberg 2010, 209). As will be discussed further in Chapter Four, in American society, 
the traditional male gender role was to be the ‘all-powerful’ combatant. Therefore, there                                                         5 Please refer to Chapter Four, page 112 for further information on the ideal characteristics of soldier. 
6 ‘Just Warrior’ and ‘Beautiful Soul’ are discussed further in Chapter Four, pages 108-112.  
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is a close connection between the role of the soldier and masculinity (Goldstein 2001, 
253).   
 
This thesis proposes that the gendered culture of the armed forces is built around a 
masculine-oriented model, and that femininity is constructed in a dichotomous 
relationship to masculinity, which makes femininity less-than in the military culture 
(Connell 1995, 77). In turn, the importance placed on masculinity in the institution 
affects its policies and practices. This thesis looks at the values, rules and norms of the 
military institution to explain why men hold a more privileged existence in the military 
than women and how this affects the status of military women. This thesis hypothesises 
that the emphasis on ‘soldier’ as a male role, and as an avenue to prove masculinity, 
perpetuates informal norms that are hostile toward women. Hooper argues that 
denigrating all that is feminine is “a powerful tool in the construction and maintenance 
of hierarchies of masculinities” (Hooper 2001, 71). Women, therefore, are the opposite 
of the coveted masculinity of the military. Not only are they seen as intruders to the 
values, rules and norms of the profession, but their presence also threatens to make the 
profession, and therefore those in it, less masculine. 
 
As this thesis is also concerned with institutional change, it contends that although the 
military is masculine-oriented, the gender power structure in the institution has slowly 
evolved and changed. There has been substantial progress in gender equality in the 
military and in society in the past 20 years that has affected, and continues to affect, the 
norms, values and rules of the institution, as can be seen from the lifting of the combat 
ban on women (Christenson 2013, 1). One theory this thesis employs, in order to 
explain this slow evolution, is James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen’s theory of gradual 
change because it accounts for aspects of both agency and structure when analysing 
institutional change. This theory is discussed further in Chapter Two.7 Another 
important theoretical concept this study employs is that of critical junctures. This thesis 
combines these to ideas to analyse change that has occurred through the interplay                                                         
7 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
gradual change.  
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between critical junctures and the actions of individual actors.8 This thesis provides 
examples of critical junctures, in which the circumstances of the time, usually during 
wars, opened opportunities for women to participate in the military. According to 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory, these women then worked as ‘opportunist’ actors to 
enact change internally or they worked externally on the institution as ‘insurrectionary’ 
actors to lobby for change.9 It also focuses on how change has occurred through the 
‘soft spots’ between the formal policies and informal norms of the institution.10 Formal 
policies and informal norms of institutions do not always align and actors can exploit 
the tension between the two to enact change in the institution (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 
4). In the case of the U.S. military, there is often tension between the advancing formal 
policies and the stagnant masculine-oriented norms that cause tension and have both 
negative and positive effects for female soldiers.  
 
There have also been significant changes in the strategic culture of the U.S. military 
which affect the gender power structure. The new emphasis on the U.S. strategic 
military culture of post-heroic warfare (Luttwak 1995: 2) and the search for bloodless 
wars through the development of technology has evolved the institutional culture of the 
U.S. military. These changes put less strategic significance on ground troops and 
warriors (and therefore the need for a soldier to be physically strong) and more 
emphasis on technological skills. Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq also brought a 
need for different skill sets in the areas of peacekeeping and intelligence gathering. This 
thesis argues that these strategic changes have evolved the military institution to where 
there is less of an emphasis on combat experience for all military personnel, and instead 
many positions require different skills and expertise. As women were not allowed to 
serve in combat jobs until 2013, and the change has not yet been fully implemented, 
women do not have a large presence in combat career fields. Therefore, they had more 
opportunities to excel in non-combat career fields. Also, women’s participation in other 
areas, such as counterinsurgency operations, which will be discussed further in Chapter                                                         
8 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on critical junctures.  
9 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on ‘opportunist’ and ‘insurrectionary’ 
actors.  
10 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 41 for further information on ‘soft spots.’ 
  17 
Six, earned them greater respect and opened doors to more opportunities for them. 
Changes in U.S. military strategic culture helped to change the personnel needs of the 
U.S. Armed Forces, which has affected the gendered power structure.  
 
This thesis argues that some informal norms have positively affected the gender power 
structure, however, it also explores areas in which the informal norms have stayed 
stagnant or evolved very slowly and therefore continue to privilege masculinity. The 
main hypothesis is that even though these positive formal changes have occurred, the 
informal norms of the U.S. military are especially resistant to change and they play an 
important role in the structure of the U.S. gender regime. This tension between the 
formal rules and informal norms is why female soldiers are disadvantaged in relation to 
their male counterparts. There are limited cases of which the informal norms benefited 
women’s place in the U.S. military and these are discussed in Chapter Five.11 However, 
the stagnant informal norms of the military generally negatively affect women’s status. 
One of the main areas in which the tension between the negative informal norms and 
positive formal policies, as mentioned above, can be seen is the problem of sexual 
assault and harassment in the military. Although not all victims of sexual assault are 
women, in the military, of the cases reported, 88 percent of the victims were women 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military FY 2011 2012, 36). An 
overview of the problem is discussed further in Chapter Six.  
 
1.2 Situating the Thesis in the Literature 
This section covers five major areas related to the thesis topic. The first section provides 
an overview of organisational culture, as the ideas from organisational theory are used 
to explain change in the U.S. military throughout the thesis and will be built on further 
in the theoretical framework section in Chapter Two.12 The second section discusses 
issues of gender construction and analysis and explicates how these ideas are applied in 
the thesis. The third section focuses on the gender issues in the military and how 
femininity and masculinity have collided to create a discriminatory environment toward                                                         
11 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 160 for further information.  
12 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 36 for further information on the theoretical framework.  
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women in the military. The fourth section outlines three main arguments of feminist 
researchers regarding women’s involvement in the military and what their participation 
means for feminism. The final section discusses the strategic culture of the U.S. 
military. It provides an overall cultural view of the military from a strategic standpoint 
instead of strictly from a gender point of view. Understanding the background of U.S. 
strategic culture is important to the concepts in this thesis because strategic culture 
affects the institutional culture of the military and therefore its personnel policies and 
the characteristics of ‘soldier’ that it holds most important. 
 
(i) Organisational Theory 
In this thesis, the theoretical framework used is based on ideas of new institutionalism 
theory. New institutionalism is a branch of organisational theory that “attends to the 
deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which 
structures, including schemas, rules, norms and routines become established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behavior” (Scott 2004, 408). These established norms 
and values become institutions. There are varying definitions of institutions but the 
definition employed in this thesis is that an institution is a “collection of norms and 
values whose importance are a function of the material institutions from which they 
emanate” (Lecours 2005, 7). This definition is most applicable to this research because 
it places focus on values and norms, which comprise an institution. These are the areas 
that will be evaluated in this thesis to better understand the U.S. military institution.  
 
In Peter Katzenstein’s edited volume, The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, he contends that organisational studies which use new 
institutionalism follow the idea that the “institutionalisation of ideas in research 
institutes, schools of thought, laws, government bureaucracies” are “a crucial 
determinant of policy” (Katzenstein 1996, 50). In this same volume of work, Elizabeth 
Kier uses this approach to outline the importance of organisational culture for decision-
making and doctrine development of the French military. She argues that the culture of 
an organisation can shape the behaviour and beliefs of its members. She reasons that 
this is particularly true in reference to militaries as, “few institutions devote as many 
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resources to the assimilation of their members as does the military” (Kier 1996, 202). 
Although, in this essay, Kier is specifically discussing effects on military doctrine, this 
point is particularly relatable to this research because it stresses the importance of the 
organisational culture in the choices made by those in the institution. The culture of the 
institution affects the actions of its members. This thesis refers to this concept as 
‘bounded agency’13 which is discussed in Chapter Two, in which institutional actors’ 
actions are constrained by the institutions of the organisation to which they belong. 
 
Richard Scott, in 2001 argued that institutions “connote stability but are subject to 
change processes, both incremental and discontinuous” (Scott 2001, 48). He contends 
that, “although the ostensible subject is stability and order is social life, students of 
institutions must perforce attend not just to consensus and conformity but to conflict 
and change in social structures” (Scott 2004, 410). This research employs both ideas of 
institutional stability and change. It primarily focuses on the importance of institutional 
change by exploring the process of gradual change that has occurred overtime in the 
U.S. military. However, it also considers the characteristics of the military institution 
that make it difficult to modify. These characteristics are based on path dependency 
theory, which studies the inherent stability of institutions.14 Path dependency is 
important to this research because it is essential to the explaining of why 
institutionalised norms are difficult to change and what this means for the gender power 
structure of the U.S. military. In order to further explore the gender issues found in the 
military institution that were discussed in this section, the following section explains the 
background on the construction of gender and how this thesis employs the constructivist 
approach to gender. 
 
(ii) The Construction of Gender 
There has been much debate in the literature about biological factors and social factors 
in the development of gender identities and roles. In 1972, Ann Oakley popularised the 
idea of separating the analysis of biological sex and socially constructed gender in order                                                         
13 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 43 for further information on ‘bounded agency.’ 
14 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 33 for further information regarding path dependency. 
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to be able to better focus on how gender is affected by social, cultural and institutional 
factors (Hooper 2001, 24). Laura Shepherd outlines several different schools of thought 
by feminists on the construct of gender. She explains the constructivist standpoint in 
which it is believed that, “gendered behaviours are largely a product of socialisation” 
and can evolve depending on historical and social circumstances (Shepherd 2010, 20). 
Louise Chappell agrees with this view that gender is a set of norms but is not 
necessarily male or female (Chappell 2010, 184). Hooper also describes the essentialist 
point of view that gender is strictly reliant on biological sex (Hooper 2001, 20). Finally, 
she argues in favour of the performative or discursive view that biology plays a 
distinguishing role but gender is “mediated through social understanding” (Hooper 
2001, 21). This is the perspective this research is based on. As biological differences 
between men and women are often cited as a limiting factor for women in the military, 
biological differences cannot be ignored. However, this thesis works on the belief that 
gender is largely socially constructed because men and women can have what are 
considered to be socially constructed masculine and feminine characteristics. This is in 
line with the equal-rights based feminist argument in the following section that gender 
characteristics are not inherently natural but are due to how gender is socialised (Miller 
1998, 38).  
 
Gender stereotype dichotomies play an essential role in how gender is constructed and 
defined. R.W. Connell argues that gender is “inherently relational,” and that 
“masculinity does not exist except in contrast with femininity” (Connell 1995, 68). 
Gender dichotomies permeate all areas of society. Hooper argues that they can affect 
the practices of institutions and the gendered division of labour of Western society 
(Hooper 2001, 46). Once jobs are considered feminine or masculine, those specific job 
fields then develop a gendered culture (Hooper 2001, 46). As discussed earlier in the 
chapter, the U.S. military is an excellent example of this. Soldiering is widely 
considered to be a masculine occupation. It is based on traits that have been historically 
male, such as “physical strength, action, toughness, and capacity for violence” (Hooper 
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2001, 47). Its culture therefore is masculine and the small percentage of women 
participants has not significantly changed this culture.15  
 
Institutions are also an integral part of the construction of gender identity. Connell 
argues that social science has begun to recognise that institutions such as the workplace 
and the state affect gender configuration (Connell 1995, 73). The institution itself can 
also be considered gendered. Connell maintains that the state is a masculine institution, 
as the “stated organisational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive 
arena” (Connell 1995, 73) and this is why the majority of those in high office are men. 
She believes there is a “gender configuring” of all aspects of the institution, including 
recruitment, promotions, and policymaking (Connell 1995, 73). This thesis contends 
that a similar form of gender configuring takes place on a daily basis through the 
masculine oriented informal norms of the U.S. military. In order to contextualise the 
gender issues pertaining to the U.S. military institution, the following section provides a 
background on literature regarding the roles of femininity and masculinity in the U.S. 
military. 
 
(iii) Gender and the Military 
Gender stereotypes affect the roles men and women play in society. Women are socially 
constructed as ‘naturally’ more nurturing and emotional than men and their roles in 
society often reflect those aspects (Carreiras 2006, 42). On the other hand, the roles of 
men have tended to be in the public sphere of society and they are often thought to be 
more aggressive than women (Tuten 1982, 252). Therefore, men have filled the role of 
warrior and soldier, while women were expected to stay at home and fulfil the role of 
‘trophies’ (Carreiras 2006, 43).  
 
Some critics see the idea of women participating in the military along with men as a 
threat to masculinity. This is perpetuated by the overall culture of the armed forces. For 
example, men in training often chant songs that are derogatory to women16 and are                                                         
15 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples of the masculine culture of the military. 
16 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 139 for example.  
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referred to with girls’ names as insults (Herbert 1998, 8). It is not enough for men to 
show they are good soldiers through the skills of their job and physical ability, “much of 
the strategy seems to rely on being that which is not feminine and, taking this one step 
further, denigrating that which is feminine” (Herbert 1998, 8). This is essential as so far 
as masculinity is defined against femininity. After basic training, gender continued to 
dictate soldiers’ career options, through policies in which career field limitations were 
based on gender (Herbert 1998, 7). Tickner argues that women’s involvement in the 
military is in “strong tension with the culturally embedded view of what it means to be a 
warrior,” and that sexual harassment and violence is likely to continue until this culture 
is changed (Tickner 2001, 58). This argument is discussed further in Chapter Six.17 
 
Linda Bird Francke explains this phenomenon further. She states, “accepting women as 
military peers is antithetical to the hyper masculine identity traditionally promoted by 
the institution and sought by many military men. Only by excluding women or 
denigrating them could men preserve their superiority” (Francke 1997, 157). The 
military depends on the bonding of groups of soldiers for the cohesiveness of their units 
and this is particularly important for combat units. One way to do this was to use gender 
as a basis for bonding. Therefore women were constructed as a threat to the 
cohesiveness of a unit because they were considered outsiders (Francke 1997, 158).  
 
Other critics of women’s participation in the military have feared that females in the 
military will cause women to lose their femininity. As Cynthia Enloe argues, “when the 
states’ military…comes to rely on women inside its uniformed ranks, the military 
provokes wide public concern for the meaning and uses of femininity. This provocation 
in turn makes the content and function of masculinity more problematic” (Enloe 1994, 
83). Women are in the minority of the soldiers deployed and many believe they must 
adapt to the masculine identity of the military culture they are in, and of those who 
surround them. Integrating into the male-dominated military culture makes some 
women feel that, in order to be equal they must be masculine, not feminine (Herbert 
1998, 5). This feeling is often amplified for women in combat zones. Past studies of                                                         
17 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 177.  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female fighters and soldiers have shown that many of them who join the military 
conform to the masculine culture instead of transforming it to change conceptions of 
women, war and the military (Carreiras 2006, 11). This idea is further evidenced in 
Chapter Five18 and adds some legitimacy to an argument by some feminist scholars 
against women’s participation in the military that is outlined in the following section.  
 
Women’s participation in the military has blurred gender roles and norms and has 
caused tension between traditional ideas of masculinity and femininity in the U.S. 
military. Although more women have joined the armed forces, they are still expected to 
act in a masculine way because that is the traditional idea of a soldier. The military has 
held on tightly to its masculine oriented culture, which has made it difficult for women 
to evolve the culture to become inclusive and accepting of femininity or to adjust the 
conceptions of masculinity and femininity. Due to stereotypical aspects of the female 
gender, the ability of female military members to participate in military career fields is 
debated and questioned. The following sections outlines several of the main feminist 
arguments that advocate either for women’s participation in the military or against it 
and tie in the ideas of gender outlined above.  
 
(iv) Feminist Perspectives of Women in the Military 
Feminist scholars have various approaches to understanding and theorising about 
women’s involvement in the armed forces. Three main arguments that emerged from 
the literature ranged from advocating for women’s full participation in all military 
career fields to arguments against women’s participation in the military in any role. The 
first argument discussed is referred to as the liberal or equal-rights based argument. It 
advocates that female soldiers should be treated exactly the same as men and they 
should fully participate in all military career fields with the same rules and policies, 
including those pertinent to combat roles, in order to have full rights and citizenship in 
society (Peach 1996, 174).  The next argument is that of a shared civic responsibility, 
which argues that all citizen’s have a responsibility to participate in the well-being of 
their country but that men and women do not have to do so in exactly the same way                                                         
18 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples.  
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(Snyder 2003, 194). The final argument discussed is based on the gender stereotypes 
laid out in the second section that assumes women are naturally nurturing and men are 
inherently violent. These scholars also look for a de-masculinisation and de-
legitimisation of the military institution.  
 
The equal rights based argument is established on liberal ideas of equal opportunities 
and rights for the individual. Feminists in this school of thought “argue for the fullest 
possible inclusion of women in the military, including eligibility for the draft and 
involuntary assignment to the combat arms” (Miller 1998, 38). They see full inclusion 
and participation as an important right because they believe military service is central to 
full citizenship in a democracy (Cooke 1996, 256). As Peach states “if women are 
denied the obligations of citizenship…they cannot expect equal treatment in other 
spheres of public life” (Peach 1996, 176). The military is an influential institution in 
U.S. society, as is discussed further in Chapter Four, and  “by excluding women, the 
military presents itself as an institution that participates in the hierarchical 
differentiation of gender with the state; citizenship and full democratic rights are 
conceded to those who are the bearers of arms” (Seifert 2003, 212). Therefore, these 
scholars believe that women must exercise the same responsibility as men in protecting 
the nation in order to be equal citizens of the state and to challenge the gender power 
structure of the military (Peach 1996, 176; D’Amico and Weinstein 1999, 254). 
Proponents of this school of thought also argue that military service has been a path 
toward political leadership and women’s inclusion in this traditionally male field 
challenges men’s privileged social status (Cooke 1996, 256; Hillman 1999, 68). This is 
the case in the U.S. and is discussed further in Chapter Four.  
 
The rights-based proponents see women’s full participation in the military as essential 
and a positive enhancement to feminism and equal rights for all women. They contend 
that female soldiers’ participation disrupts the social gender roles and order set forth by 
the military and is, therefore, beneficial to the goals of feminism (Seifert 2003, 214). 
However, critics of these ideas often critisise the concept of the ‘sameness’ of men and 
women and believe that inherent differences between men and women are overlooked 
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in their search for equal rights. Instead, these scholars frame equality, not as sameness, 
but as a shared responsibility (Snyder 2003, 194). They place emphasis on the 
responsibility of all a country’s citizens to participate in civic life but believe that men 
and women can participate in different ways. As Claire Snyder argues, “women can 
equally contribute to the common good of defending American democracy, even if they 
do not do so in exactly the same way as men in every situation” (Synder 2003, 194). 
The main debate between their argument and the rights-based argument is the issue of 
whether or not women should involuntarily be assigned to combat roles and added to 
the draft.   
 
The feminist scholars who make the argument for shared civic responsibility over 
complete gender-neutrality contend that women do not have to serve in combat roles to 
be equally contributing members of society but that they should have the option. 
According to research conducted by Laura Miller of U.S. Army women, she found that, 
“they do not think…that sexual differences apply to everyone in the same way; 
therefore they contend that generalisations should not restrict all members of either 
gender” (Miller 1998, 51). However, the Army women she interviewed also argued 
“that women should not be forced into roles for which they are unqualified or 
uninterested so that proportionate gender equality can be achieved in all fields” (Miller 
1998, 51). In other words, women can successfully contribute to the greater good of the 
country without serving in combat roles but they should not be kept from the right if 
they so choose. As Snyder argues, “the civic approach calls for female citizens to fulfil 
their military obligations to the best of their abilities” (Synder 2003, 198). Miller 
contends that female Army interviewees agreed with this view and “said they would 
prefer that work done predominantly by women be considered as valuable as work done 
predominantly by men” (Miller 1998, 52). This viewpoint acknowledges the importance 
of women’s participation in the military to feminist and equal rights in the U.S. but does 
not agree that female soldiers’ participation in combat roles is the only option or that is 
should be forced without choice on female soldiers.  
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The final major feminist argument put forth regarding women’s involvement in the 
military has two separate strategies for a single goal of deligitimising the military. This 
line of thought is contrary to the first two arguments in this section, which contend that 
women’s participation is positive for feminism and women’s advancement in society, as 
well as a legitimate path toward equal opportunities. Cynthia Enloe refers to the 
proponents of this argument in two categories of ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ (Enloe 
2007, 78-79). The optimists viewpoint contends that women’s participation in the 
military is positive because they believe that more women in the institution will reduce 
the “traditional privileging of masculinity” and therefore, “a less militarised military 
would be one less imbued with an institutional culture of masculinised violence” (Enloe 
2007, 78-79). In other words, it would de-masculinise the military institution and, if 
following traditional stereotypes, would therefore become more feminine and peace-
oriented. Instead of focusing on war and killing, the military would focus on 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Enloe 2007, 79).  
 
However, on the other hand of this argument, pessimists of women’s participation 
believe that “women serving inside the state’s military could cause those women to 
become more militarised” (Enloe 2007, 79). Some feminist scholars fear that instead of 
women’s participation creating a military more focused on peace, that “women in 
combat do not portend a kindler, gentler military but rather prefigure the worst that is 
yet to come” (Cooke 1996, 260). According to some critics of the optimist viewpoint, 
women’s participation instead legitimises the existence of the military intuition and 
serves to further militarise society (Peach 1996, 178; Enloe 2007, 79). Enloe agrees that 
women “are likely to adopt as their own the already established and rewarding 
patriarchal beliefs and values” of the military institution (Enloe 2007, 80). This concept 
is a central them of this thesis and was discussed in the previous section regarding the 
tendency for military women to adapt to the masculine-oriented culture instead of 
changing it. It is also discussed further in Chapter Five.19 
 
                                                        
19 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples. 
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Due to the idea outlined above that women’s involvement in the military provides 
legitimacy to the military institution as a whole, some feminist scholars believe that 
women’s participation hurts the feminist cause. Their argument is based on traditional 
gender stereotypes of men as violent and women as inherently peaceful. Peach refers to 
this argument as the ‘ethic of care’ and explains that these feminists believe “women 
should devote their distinctive moral resources to developing nonviolent alternatives to 
war” and that “combat roles are antithetical to women’s roles as peace workers” (Peach 
1996, 178). Although, as demonstrated by this thesis, female soldiers tend to adapt to 
the masculine-centric culture, proponents of the above argument fail to recognise that 
there is a legitimate need for the military and national defense as well as the civic 
responsibility of all citizens to participate in the security of their country. Also, their 
reliance on traditional gender stereotypes are contrary to the constructivist view of 
gender this thesis is based on, as described in the previous section on gender.  
 
This research adds to the feminist studies of this argument because it explores how 
women’s participation has evolved gender roles. Chapter Four discusses why women 
should be participants, as there is a link between American society and the military, this 
also affects women outside of the military. Chapter Five analyses female soldiers’ 
tendency to adapt to the masculinised military culture. This thesis is based on a 
combination of the equal-rights based and civic responsibility arguments outlined in this 
section. It assumes that women must have the option to be full participants in all fields 
of the military in order to have equal treatment in all aspects of society, as well as in the 
military institution. As explained in the second section, it follows the constructivist 
viewpoint of gender, however, it agrees with the civic responsibility argument that there 
are some inherent physical differences between men and women. Women should not be 
forced to serve in combat jobs but should be allowed to participate on a voluntary basis 
if they meet the standards set forth for the career field. Although it would be beneficial 
to feminism for traditionally female jobs to be seen as equally important in the military, 
as put forth by the civic responsibility argument, there is a significant emphasis placed 
on the importance of combat roles in the current military institutional order. However, 
there are signs that this could change in the future due to technological advancements 
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and the differing roles the modern military institution plays in counterinsurgency and 
peacekeeping operations. These ideas are discussed further in Chapter Five. In order to 
provide context for those discussions, the following section reviews changes in U.S. 
military strategic culture that relate to the status of female soldiers.  
 
(v) U.S. Military Strategic Culture and American Militarism  
In the U.S. military, those in combat roles are held in the highest regard. As women 
were banned from those roles until 2013, they were not allowed to participate in the 
most coveted and highly regarded positions. However, as the strategic culture has 
evolved, there has been a greater emphasis on technology and counterinsurgency 
operations, both of which women have had more opportunities to participate. American 
military strategic culture is a product of history and societal values. Colin S. Gray 
argues that, in order for strategic culture to work, it must be “a fusion of what society 
prefers and what is successful for that society” (Gray 1996, 84). Gray and Edward 
Luttwak state that impatience plays a large role in the strategic culture of the United 
States, due to the fact that the U.S. is a liberal democracy and there is little tolerance 
from the American people for long, drawn out wars with high casualties. The strategic 
culture of the military is closely tied to the culture of the society (Gray 1996, 85).  
 
Luttwak contends that America’s strategic culture is based on a Napoleonic concept of 
war in that it is looking for quick and decisive wars with a clear victory (Luttwak 1995, 
2). Therefore, politicians are not willing to invest in lengthy wars with high casualties 
that are not visibly decisive victories. As Luttwak reasons, since the American strategic 
culture calls for bloodless wars, there is a hesitation to send ground troops into an area 
where there is a likelihood of casualties. Michael Ignatieff provides the example of the 
Gulf War in which “American superiority in precision weapons was plain for all to see” 
(Ignatieff 2000, 168). He believes that the Gulf War changed the expectations American 
citizens had of war because only 293 American soldiers were killed during the Gulf 
War (Rokke 2002, 1). He argues, “having been told to prepare for as many as 25,000 
casualties, the electorate discovered the intoxicating reality of risk-free warfare” 
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(Ignatieff 2000, 168). Therefore, the American public came to expect fast and decisive 
victories fought with technology in order to limit American casualties. 
 
One way the U.S. has faced this challenge in-line with part of its strategic culture is 
through the development of technology and the greater reliance on air power. Gray 
explains that a crucial feature of American strategic culture is the domination of air 
power in its military (Gray 1995, 94). Luttwak makes the point that the use of air power 
comes at the risk of much fewer casualties than committing ground troops to a conflict. 
Therefore, it is a more viable solution politically than other kinds of military operations 
(Luttwak 1996, 3). Ignatieff agrees with this assessment. He states, “technology was in 
search of impunity. War that could actually be fought had to be as bloodless, risk-free 
and as precise as possible” (Ignatieff 2000, 164). Technological advancements make it 
possible for the Air Force to carry out bombings that are precise and do not cause 
damage on a mass scale (Luttwak 1996, 3). Therefore, the U.S. is able to conduct war 
on a smaller-scale with less human investment than in the past (Ignatieff 2000, 166).  
 
The U.S. military has moved toward investing greater resources in technology that can 
safely keep Americans away from the front lines and has developed a new Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA),20 referred to as virtual or robotic warfare (Ignatieff 2000, 
164; Singer 2009, 181). RMAs are discussed further in Chapter Five.21 One example of 
the RMA was the development and usage of drones in the conflict in Afghanistan. 
Advanced technologies such as precision munitions are also part of the contemporary 
RMA (Ignatieff 2000, 164). The guerilla nature of the war in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
has forced the U.S. to rely more heavily on Special Forces units and RMA technology 
for air and space power than large numbers of ground troops.  
 
Andrew Bacevich argues that since the development of contemporary RMAs and the 
greater possibility of a bloodless war on the American side, warfare has become more 
acceptable to Americans. He maintains it is now seen more as ‘coercive diplomacy’                                                         
20 An RMA is an introduction of new technology that changes the way war is conducted. 
21 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 144 for further information on RMAs.  
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rather than war and the civilian population sees the military as promoting American 
values overseas as well as protecting American culture and interests (Bacevich 2005, 3). 
Bacevich believes that this new positive outlook on warfare has therefore built up the 
moral superiority of the soldier. In a poll conducted by the Army Times in 2004, out of 
a cross section of 933 enlisted personnel and officers, two-thirds of the respondents said 
they believed that members of the U.S. military “have higher moral values than the 
civilian population” (Lobe 2004, 1). The military institution is seen as holding 
traditional American values. Bacevich argues that “Americans fearful that the rest of 
society may be teetering on the brink of moral collapse console themselves with the 
thought that the armed services remain a repository of traditional values and old 
fashioned virtues” (Bacevich 2005, 583). This is supported by a Gallup Poll 
administered in 2011 to a cross section of the American public, in which the military 
was ranked first in confidence had by society out of all American institutions, with 78 
percent of respondents saying they had a great deal of confidence in the military 
institution. The military has been ranked first consistently since 1998 and has been 
ranked first or second every year since 1975 (Jones 2011, 1). This positive outlook on 
the military and its traditional values does not necessarily hurt the position of women 
but it shows that military service is highly valued and the U.S. and this is why women 
must be participants. 
 
The concepts of American strategic culture, militarism and the effects of technological 
advancements on the U.S. military are also important to provide a baseline of how the 
American military has preferred to conduct wars from the late 20th century and onwards 
because they provide insight into the general institutional culture. This overall 
knowledge provides a good starting point to then analyse issues of personnel and 
culture through a gender lens. The success of the contemporary RMA, which allows 
soldiers to conduct warfare from a distance, and the U.S.’s search for bloodless wars 
has moved American soldiers further away from the front lines. The ideas of bloodless 
wars, technological advancements and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), in 
particular, are important because of their impact on the military culture which has 
moved soldiers away from the front lines and combat positions, which are strongly 
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linked to masculinity and yet gender discrimination exists. This is one puzzle this thesis 
looks to explain. The effects of advancing technology on the institutional culture of the 
U.S. military are discussed further in Chapter Five.22 
 
The five areas of literature discussed above help to provide context for the research 
question which looks at the development and change of the gender power structure of 
the U.S. military institution. The organisational theory overview is essential to this 
study because it introduces key ideas that this thesis is built on, such as what constitutes 
an institution, the nature of institutions and their affects on actors. While the 
background on organisational theory is needed to explain the new institutionalism 
aspect of this research, the sections on the construction of gender and gender in the U.S. 
military are essential in clearly contextualising the gendered aspects of this thesis. 
Although this research focuses on institutional processes and change, it does so through 
a gendered lens. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss how the construction of gender is 
approached in this study. The section on feminist arguments regarding women’s 
participation in the military is essential because it sets this research in the greater body 
of feminist research. These sections also provide a background on masculinity and 
femininity and the ideas behind women’s discrimination in the U.S. military institution. 
Chapter Four builds on this section by further exploring the issues of gender roles in the 
U.S. military. The final section on U.S. strategic culture contributes to the 
understanding of this research because the evolution of the strategic culture affects the 
way the military conducts warfare, which changes the personnel needs of the institution 
and has provided women more areas for participation. The aspects of American 
militarism discussed in this section also help to contextualise the military’s status in 
American society and therefore, the importance of women’s participation, as is argued 
by both the equal-rights based and civic responsibility feminists.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the key themes of this thesis as well as the literature that was 
essential in providing a background to the arguments made in this study. As was                                                         
22 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 144. 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described in the introduction section, female soldiers have been discriminated against 
by both formal policies and informal norms, which have placed them in a disadvantaged 
position to men in the military institution. One area in which it can be seen that informal 
norms are stagnant is from the high rates of sexual discrimination and assault found in 
the military.  
 
This thesis looks to explore the gender power structure of the U.S. Armed Forces. It 
considers both the formal policies and the informal norms of the U.S. military to 
determine how and why change has occurred as well as to what extent. It also explores 
how the changes ultimately affect women’s status in the military. In answering the 
question outlined in this chapter, it looks to provide a thorough understanding and 
analysis of the gender power structure in the U.S. military. 
 
The military remains a masculine oriented institution but female soldiers have worked 
hard to advance their standing in the U.S. Armed Forces. Change has come about with 
the help of critical junctures, the interplay between informal norms and formal policies, 
and the actions of individual actors who have worked both internally and externally to 
push for change. Changes in technology and strategic culture, with a greater emphasis 
on bloodless wars and counterinsurgency operations have evolved the way the U.S. 
military conducts warfare and have therefore changed the overall culture of the 
institution.  
 
The following chapter explores the theoretical framework upon which this thesis is 
based. It also discusses the methodology as well as the methods used to conduct this 
study. Chapter Three then provides a historical overview and analysis of women’s 
participation in the military and how change occurred in the past. It also provides an 
outline of formal policies pertaining to gender in the U.S. military. Chapter Four 
discusses the military’s place in American society as well as gender roles and provides 
narratives of cases of military participations that were gendered by the military and the 
media. Chapter Five outlines the informal norms of the U.S. military that create the 
masculine-oriented institution. It explores the gender power structure of the U.S. 
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military through data collected from interviews and surveys with military women. It 
also discusses institutional changes in greater detail regarding both technological 
advancements and what they mean for the gender structure of the military, as well as 
changes in U.S. strategic culture. As this thesis argues both that the military continues 
to be a masculine-centric organisation and that there are areas where women’s place in 
the military has advanced, it is essential to choose a thesis structure that clearly links 
these two differing ideas, that could be seen as conflicting if not properly introduced 
and explained. For this reason, Chapter Five includes both information on the current 
masculine-oriented culture of the military as well as what changes have occurred. 
Chapter Six is a case study on sexual assault in the military and provides examples and 
analysis of informal norms that impede institutional change. Chapter Seven concludes 
the thesis with an overview and analysis of the questions asked and answered from the 
research of this thesis.  The structure of this thesis was aligned as described above in 
order to demonstrate the nuances and degree of change that has occurred in the military.  
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Methodology 
Chapter Two 
 
Introduction 
This research project analyses areas of change in the gender structure of the U.S. 
military and the masculine centric culture of the institution. In order to produce 
reasonable claims regarding the gender power structure in the U.S. military institution 
based on the research model laid out in this chapter, the theoretical framework of this 
thesis is based on feminist institutionalism theory. Feminist institutionalism is an 
emerging field that combines concepts from new institutionalism theory and feminist 
political science in order to develop a theoretical approach that considers gender when 
analysing institutional processes and actors. Fiona MacKay argues that “whether ‘just 
borrowing’ or adapting tools, or seeking a deeper synthesis, the added value of FI…is in 
the combination of diverse conceptual frameworks and toolkits in developing deeper 
analyses” (MacKay 2011, 183). In keeping in line with this feminist institutionalism 
approach, which is discussed further in the following section,23 this thesis pulls from 
established frameworks and tools in new institutionalism theory and combines them 
with feminist political science by injecting a gendered analysis and perspective. The 
two main frameworks from new institutionalism that are adapted to feminist 
institutionalism are ideas from sociological and historical institutionalism. This thesis 
also adapts Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney’s theory of gradual change, which is 
outlined below and discussed further in the following section.   
 
This thesis blends ideas from sociological and historical institutionalism, as they both 
are pertinent to the explanation of this research. The sociological institutionalism 
approach calls for a focus on the social norms of an institution. This thesis employs this 
idea by considering not only the formal policies of the U.S. military, but the informal 
norms as well. It considers the importance of the informal norms of the U.S. military to 
female soldiers’ position in the institution and is crucial to understanding obstacles to 
                                                        
23 Please refer to page 36 in this chapter.  
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institutional change. This is an essential concept to the research of this thesis and is 
discussed further in the following section. 
 
Ideas from the historical institutionalism perspective are employed in relation to path 
dependency theory, in order to better understand why some institutions are difficult to 
change, and critical junctures, which are a component to explaining some institutional 
changes. This thesis draws on and combines two main constructs based on path 
dependency theory; Lynne Zucker’s construct of ‘cultural persistence’ and Patricia 
Ingraham, Donald Moynihan, and Matt Weber’s ‘weberian construct’ in order to 
explain why the U.S. military institution is especially resistant to change. These two 
constructs are combined because their ideas are complimentary and both constructs add 
additional layers in order to better understand the specific characteristics of the military 
that make the institution less permeable as well as the institutionalisation process of the 
masculine-centric informal norms of the military.  
 
Ideas from historical institutionalism also provide a historical analysis of past change in 
the history of women in the U.S. military that shows emerging patterns of institutional 
change based on past historical events, or ‘critical junctures’. Although a gendered 
version of historical analysis is useful to this research, its ideas do not fully explain the 
institutional change that has occurred in the gender power structure of the U.S. military 
because it does not account for gradual and incremental change. In order to account for 
this, the main theoretical framework regarding institutional change laid out in this 
chapter, that has been modified to support a gendered analysis, is James Mahoney and 
Kathleen Thelen’s theory of gradual change. Their theory is suitable to this research 
because it looks to explain slow and incremental change, which has occurred in the U.S. 
military. The main concepts and frameworks of new institutional theory discussed 
above are combined with feminist political science in order to provide the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, which is discussed further in the following section. 
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In order to explicate how the thesis looks to answer the main research question laid out 
in Chapter One,24 and employ the theoretical framework laid out in the following 
section, this chapter discusses the methodological approach executed for this research in 
Section 2.2. This study analyses statistics, literature, policies and personal interviews 
and surveys with female military members and Department of Defense (DoD) and 
Congressional officials. As there is no set methodology of feminist institutionalism, 
rather a synthesis of methods and techniques from relevant fields, this thesis constitutes 
a feminist political science methodology. The feminist lens affects my interview 
approach, my own position as an insider/outsider, as well as power relations during the 
interview process.  
 
Feminist research methods are not specific to feminist methodology, however, the 
approach is distinctive and the aims are different from mainstream research. Feminist 
researchers look to “make a difference to women’s lives through social and individual 
change. They are concerned to challenge the silences in mainstream research both in 
relation to the issues studied and the ways in which study is undertaken” (Letherby 
2003, 4). Historically, in mainstream research, women were considered ‘others’ as they 
were not male and were therefore not the norm (Letherby 2003, 6). Feminist research 
changes this by focusing on women’s specific experiences and providing them with a 
voice. This thesis acknowledges female soldiers’ historic, as well as current, place in the 
patriarchal society of the U.S. Armed Forces and seeks to understand their position and 
the broader military institution in order to explain the gender structure of the military.  
 
Politics and mainstream societal ideals have been known to exclude women from 
participation and analysis. This is particularly true in the case of women in the military. 
The military is seen as a traditionally male occupation and therefore women have not 
been included in the study of its history and development. The feminist perspective is 
the best way to approach this study because the point of feminist research is to be useful 
in positively changing women’s position in society by providing an avenue for their 
                                                        
24 Please refer to Chapter One, page 8 for main research questions.  
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experiences to be heard by policymakers. This is precisely what this research aims to 
bring about (Kelly et al. 1994, 40).  
 
A feminist methodology also considers the position of the researcher and how their 
experiences affect the research carried out (Letherby 2003, 6). In this study, my own 
insider status as an American, a former female Department of Defense employee and a 
military spouse, along with my outsider status as a civilian, affects the access I have to 
the respondents and could influence their responses to me. Power relations between 
myself, the interviewer, and the respondents also affect my research. I engaged in elite 
interviewing, therefore, I had to be conscious of time and access restraints of the 
elites.25 I used my insider status through my own connections and those of my father, 
who was a gatekeeper to several high-ranking personnel, to gain better access to 
Department of Defense elites. The interviewees that participated in this study form the 
basis of my knowledge on the informal norms of the military. However, there was a gap 
of knowledge by considering women’s experiences alone, as they need to be 
contextualised into the greater body of knowledge, existing literature and new 
institutionalism theory. I used triangulation of interviews, surveys, literature analysis 
and quantitative data in order to comprehensively analyse women’s experiences to 
determine the connection between their own experiences and the general realities of 
military culture.  
  
This chapter covers two main areas. It first provides an overview of the theoretical 
framework in order to conceptualise the methods employed for this study. It explicates 
the main areas of feminist institutionalism theory this thesis draws on to explain 
institutional change and to draw conclusions regarding the evolution of the gender 
power structure in the U.S. military. The second main section looks at the main research 
approaches. It discusses the methods used for this research and why they are best suited 
for this study. This chapter considers the power relations and ethics in the interviewing 
process. In the positioning component it discusses my self-identification as a researcher 
and my place as an insider and outsider and looks at how my insider and outsider status                                                         
25 Elite status and interviewing will be discussed on page 51 of this chapter.   
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affected the research. It then covers the research process and design of my fieldwork. 
Finally, this chapter examines my interpretation of the data and the importance of 
triangulation in evaluating respondents’ answers. It also discusses the issues of validity 
and reliability as they relate to my study.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework  
This thesis employs a feminist institutionalism approach. Feminist institutionalism is a 
synthesis of new institutionalism and feminist political science. It engages theory and 
concepts from new institutionalism and injects gender into the analysis. Recently, more 
feminist scholars have approached studies through the ideas of new institutionalism. 
Louise Chappell provides an increasingly positive outlook and explanation of feminist 
institutionalism. She argues that the overall point of new institutionalism research is to 
highlight that, “institutions are important in shaping political outcomes” (Chappell 
2010, 184), and that feminist new institutionalism in particular “points to the way that 
institutional norms privilege certain forms of behaviour and certain actors over others” 
(Chappell 2010, 184). Joni Lovenduski agrees with this analysis of gendering 
institutions and emphasises the importance of considering gendered power relations 
within organisations and how gender is embedded in political organisational culture 
(Lovenduski 2011, viii).  
 
In order to understand an organisation’s affects on gender, feminist institutionalism 
argues that there must be a clear analysis of the interplay between formal and informal 
norms, values and rules, also referred to as ‘institutions’ in new institutionalism 
literature (MacKay 2011, 183). As Fiona MacKay explains, “the central insight of 
feminist institutionalism is that formal and informal institutions are gendered. Feminist 
institutionalism analyses how formal and informal institutions interact—in 
complementary or contradictory ways—to shape political outcomes” (MacKay 2011, 
183). Organisations develop frameworks and influence human behaviour based on their 
formal rules and informal culture. An informal culture can be developed that either 
compliments the formal rules of the organisation or is in tension with it. Feminist 
institutionalism argues that the underlying masculine ideal found in both formal and 
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informal institutions reproduces norms, values, policies and laws that marginalise 
women by stagnating change. The masculine ideas are therefore perpetuated and gender 
roles and ideals do not evolve (MacKay et al. 2011, 582). In this thesis, these ideas of 
formal and informal norms, values and rules are important because it is in this 
interaction between them that can explain women’s continued marginalisation as well 
as positive changes in the U.S. military regarding gender structure. The use of feminist 
institutionalism theory guided the decision to employ a feminist research methodology, 
which is discussed further in the following section.  
 
(i) Historical and Sociological Institutionalism 
There are several variations of new institutionalism that feminist researchers have 
adapted in order to create a feminist institutionalism approach. This research is carried 
out using the perspective of historical and sociological (also known as organisational or 
normative) new institutionalism, with a focus on a gendered approach. Within the 
sociological focus, the study will “identify the social norms and explicate their gendered 
effects, producing an account of the mutually constitutive character of the gender 
regime” (Lovenduski 2011, v). This is accomplished through analysing interview and 
survey responses from female military members and DoD leadership, as well as 
analysing information gathered from relevant literature, legislation and policies.  
 
In sociological institutionalism there is a greater focus on the “social and cognitive 
features of institutions, rather than structural and constraining ones” (MacKay et al. 
2011, 575). In this perspective, human behaviour is guided by ‘frames of meaning’ 
based on social norms, values, rules and symbol systems (MacKay et al. 2011, 575). As 
this thesis specifically looks for the gendered effects generated by the norms, values and 
rules of the military institution, this perspective best serves the research goals. An 
understanding of the gendered nature of the organisational culture of the armed forces 
based on an institutional analysis will provide a clear analysis of how those norms affect 
the gender hierarchy and participation and policies for women.  
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The historical new institutionalism focus is also necessary in analysing change in the 
U.S. military because it focuses “on the long-term ramifications of largely contingent 
events” (Krook & MacKay 2011, 9). In an organisation such as the military, where 
history and tradition play a significant role, historical institutionalism can provide a 
clear understanding of how change has occurred over time for U.S. military women and 
is likely to occur in the future based on previous trends. Historical institutionalism also 
embraces “a power-political view of institutions that emphasises their distributional 
effects, and many of them explain institutional persistence in terms of increasing returns 
to power” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 7). Mahoney and Thelen go on to draw the 
conclusion, that if power relations play an important role in maintaining an institution, 
the shifts in power must also be an “important source of change” (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010, 9). This thesis employs the concept of changing power relations as a source of 
institutional change. Due to the rigid hierarchical rank structure, higher-ranking officers 
have substantial power over lower ranking officers and enlisted members. As discussed 
in Chapter One, women are limited in leadership roles in the military and this is a 
contributing factor to their lack of power in the military institution.  
 
This research considers historical institutionalism’s idea of power relations and the 
structure of the U.S. military gender regime through a gendered lens. Gender power 
relations and structures are essential to understanding the “institutional dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion” (MacKay et al. 2011, 583). The arrangements and mechanisms 
of power structures can provide an insight into different ways in which certain groups 
are disadvantaged (Kenny 1996, 462). In an example provided by Kenny, she finds that 
male political elites have switched to informal mechanisms to “counteract women’s 
increased access and presence in formal decision making sites” (Kenny 1996, 462). The 
male political elites attempt to hold on to power although formal rules have changed. 
This thesis explores, through the historical institutionalism perspective, how gendered 
power relations are played out in the U.S. military to provide insight into how women 
are disadvantaged as Kenny explained.    
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Critical junctures are factors of change considered by theories of historical 
institutionalism and are employed in this analysis of change of the U.S. military. 
Critical junctures are periods of time in which actions or circumstances external to the 
institution open up possibilities for change (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, 34). They 
lighten the usual restrictions placed on institutional actors and are periods in which 
actors may force change more easily (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, 34). Several episodes 
of critical junctures are discussed in this thesis in relation to the U.S. military. For 
example, the U.S. participation in wars has been a significant cause of critical junctures 
for women in the U.S. military. However, it is important to remember that critical 
junctures alone are not enough to force institutional change. Institutional actors must 
still exercise agency. The institutional changes assisted by critical junctures are also 
often resisted by the informal norms of the institution. As is demonstrated in the 
following chapter, although formal policies allowed women to participate, formal 
changes were in tension with the informal norms of the masculine-oriented institution. 
Therefore, there are more detailed aspects to gendered institutional change that must be 
explored that involve individual agency and gradual change.  
 
(ii) New Institutionalism Theory of Gradual Change 
In order to account for the limitations of the historical and sociological institutionalism 
ideas discussed above, this research employs a new institutionalism theory of internal 
gradual change put forth by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. The Mahoney and 
Thelen theory focuses on how gradual change in an institution is brought about in order 
to fill the gaps regarding how gradual institutional change occurs in new 
institutionalism theory. Mahoney and Thelen argue that past research has focused on 
institutional stability and has not accounted for the dynamic nature of institutions 
caused by power struggles and individual agency (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 9).  
 
In order to better analyse internal institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen’s basic 
framework begins with understanding the characteristics of the political context the 
institution falls under and the characteristics of that institution (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010, 15). They argue that the characteristics of the institution and its political context 
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will affect the type of change that is found in an institution and the type of actor who 
instigates it. They posit, “political context and institutional form have these effects 
because they shape the type of dominant change agent that is likely to emerge and 
flourish in any specific institutional context, and the kinds of strategies this agent is 
likely to pursue to effect change” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 15). The table below 
presents the framework of Mahoney and Thelen’s theory. For the purpose of better 
understanding the question in this thesis, the main focus will be on ‘opportunist’ actors 
who work for change through ‘conversion,’ and ‘insurrectionary’ actors who bring 
about change through ‘displacement.’ These categories are discussed later in this 
section and their place in the theory can be seen in the table below.26 Although this 
thesis is focused on institutional culture and change, it does not lose sight of the 
important role individual actors, specifically ‘opportunist’ and ‘insurrectionary’ actors, 
play in the institution.27  
 
Figure 2.1 Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change 
                  Characteristics of Targeted Institution 
 Low level of Discretion in 
Interpretation/Enforcement 
High level of Discretion in 
Interpretation/Enforcement 
Strong Veto 
Possibilities 
Subversives 
(Layering) 
Parasitic Symbionts 
(Drift) 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
of the Political 
Context 
Weak Veto 
Possibilities 
Insurrectionaries 
(Displacement) 
Opportunists 
(Conversion) 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 19).  
 
One of the main characteristics Mahoney and Thelen consider for how internal change 
occurs is whether or not defenders of the status quo of an institution are afforded strong 
or weak veto possibilities in the formation of new rules (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 19). 
Those in power or who largely benefit from the rules and norms of the current 
institution are most likely to defend the status quo. In the case of the U.S. military, this                                                         26 Please refer to page 42 in this chapter for further discussion on ‘opportunists’ and ‘insurrectionaries’ 
27 Please refer to page 43 in this chapter for further discussion on agency vs. structure 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thesis will explore if male combat officers benefit more than female military members 
from the status quo (Francke 1997, 181). 
 
As can be seen in the table on the previous page, the other institutional characteristic 
considered in Mahoney and Thelen’s framework is the level of  “discretion in 
Interpretation/Enforcement” that is had by institutional actors (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010, 19). Actors may be forced to follow institutional rules closely or there could be 
room for interpretation of the formal rules and this is where issues of compliance and 
informal norms can arise. Mahoney and Thelen posit that the two characteristics of veto 
possibilities and discretion in rule enforcement discussed above affect the type of 
change agent and the methods. The table on the previous page shows the relationship 
between the characteristics, actors, and types of strategies they use to instigate change.  
 
As can be seen in the table on the previous page in relation to 
‘Interpretation/Enforcement,’ Mahoney and Thelen argue that compliance is an 
important variable when analysing institutional change because “even when institutions 
are formally codified, their guiding expectations often remain ambiguous and always 
are subject to interpretation, debate, and contestation” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 11). 
Issues of compliance are ‘soft spots’ where actors can enact change; this is the gap 
between formal rules and their interpretation and enactment. Mahoney and Thelen posit 
that, “institutional change often occurs precisely when problems of rule interpretation 
and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways” 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4). The gap in the actual rule and its implementation can be 
exploited by actors who want change or it can be a new circumstance the institution is 
in, in which it must “accommodate a new reality” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 11). The 
new interpretation and implementation of the original rule can then be used to instigate 
slow and gradual change in an institution. This is where the tension between formal 
rules and informal norms comes in to play in relation to change in the U.S. military.  
 
Actors working to keep the status quo in the U.S. military range from having strong to 
weak veto powers, depending on their place in the organisation and in the greater 
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political structure. As was mentioned previously, the hierarchical rank structure of the 
military places some actors in positions that hold greater power than others. For 
example, young enlisted men and women could believe they benefit from the status quo 
of the military and may not wish to change the institution, however, they hold little 
power in the high-level politics of the military. While generals who wish to block 
change will hold power in the military institution, but still have to answer to 
Congressional legislation that could affect military policies. In order to best explain the 
gender regime of the U.S. military, this thesis considers only those in the military 
organisation as internal to the institution, and Congress is considered an outside 
institutional actor.  
 
This thesis acknowledges that agents of change in the military can have high and low 
levels of discretion for rule enforcement. Depending on the level of enforcement by an 
actor’s unit and leadership, some actors may have more opportunities for instigating 
change through the ‘soft spots’ between rules and enforcement.  Leadership at unit 
levels all the way up through the DoD play a significant role in the way change is 
conducted in the military and the actors involved may not all fall into the same category 
laid out by Mahoney and Thelen in the table on page 34. However, for the purpose of 
understanding internal institutional change, this thesis focuses on the areas where 
change has occurred, and therefore has the most likelihood of occurring in the future.  
To best explain these areas of change, this thesis focuses on several of the agents and 
methods of change in the table on page 34 that are most applicable to the case of the 
U.S. military, which include ‘opportunists’ through ‘conversion’ and ‘insurrectionaries’ 
through ‘displacement.’   
 
For changes inside the institution, this thesis focuses on change that is brought about by 
‘opportunists’ through ‘conversion.’ Opportunists “exploit whatever possibilities exist 
within the prevailing system to achieve their ends,” often through conversion by 
interpreting and enacting old rules in new ways (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 17). The last 
group that will be considered is ‘insurrectionary’ actors who bring about change 
through ‘displacement.’ This research employs this group when analysing change from 
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outside of the institution. ‘Insurrectionary’ actors “seek to eliminate existing institutions 
or rules, and they do so by actively and visibly mobilising against them” (Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010, 23). Instead of layering rules, they look to completely change the old rules 
of an institution. This group is used in order to analyse actors who take action outside of 
the military because many actors that have been constrained internally by the institution 
and have found it necessary to force change from the outside. Mahoney and Thelen 
posit that, “actors disadvantaged by one institution may be able to use their advantaged 
status vis-à-vis other institutions to enact change” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 9). This 
thesis shows how military women have done this in the past, and are currently.28 
 
The utility of Mahoney and Thelen’s theory is demonstrated repeatedly in Chapter 
Three when analysing the ways in which change in the gender power structure has 
happened in the past as it applies to actors who have worked for change both internally 
and externally to the institution. It is also demonstrated again in Chapter Five through 
the exploration of policies on Female Engagement Teams and women in combat29 as 
well as Chapter Six in the discussion of the problem of sexual harassment and assault in 
the military.30  
In evaluating change in the institution and the interactions between actors and the 
institution, as discussed above, this thesis does not lose sight of the importance of 
actors’ agency. Feminist institutionalism provides a useful framework for analysing the 
interactive nature of the relationship between structure and agency known as ‘bounded 
agency’ (MacKay 2011, 190). Women are not without agency, even as a member of an 
organisation. They “demonstrate agency as institutional and extra-institutional actors 
working in, through, and against state and political institutions to effect social and 
political change, but they exercise their agency within institutional, cultural, and 
discursive constraints” (MacKay 2011, 190).  
 
                                                        
28 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 79 and Chapter Six, page 197.  
29 Please refer to Chapter Five, pages 155.  
30 Please refer to Chapter Six, pages 177.  
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As was discussed in Chapter One in the organisational theory section, individual actors 
are not free from choice; rather they are conditioned and constrained by membership of 
the institution. New institutionalism theorists follow the idea that the culture of an 
organisation can shape the behavior and beliefs of its members (Kier 1996, 202). 
However, individuals interpret informal norms, values and formal rules differently and 
therefore make their own decisions based on individual interpretations of these aspects 
set forth by the institution (Peters 2005, 43). Therefore, this thesis suggests that 
individual military members have the ability to bring about change and make individual 
decisions, however, the pressures and constraints of the reigning norms, values and 
rules of the military institution influence them and their capacity to bring about change.  
 
(iii) Exploring Obstacles to Change 
In considering institutional change, it is essential to understand the aspects of the 
institution that constrain actors and limit change. Chapter Six of this thesis demonstrates 
and explains why the informal norms of the military have been especially resistant to 
change. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this research employs the path dependency 
theory of historical institutionalism, combined with a feminist political science analysis, 
to explain why informal norms in some gender aspects of the U.S. military have stayed 
stagnant. This section specifies two specific constructs based on the theory of path 
dependency employed in Chapter Six to explain how the institutionalisation of informal 
norms occurs in the military.  
 
Path dependency is often used to explain why institutions are difficult to change. It is 
based on “the premise that organisations and actors are part of institutions that structure 
and channel their behavioural standards and activities along established paths” (Trouve 
et al. 2010, 5). Lynne Zucker argues that values, norms and rules are institutionalised by 
being passed down through generations (Zucker 1977, 85). She maintains that, “each 
actor fundamentally perceives and describes social reality by enacting it, and in this way 
  47 
transmitting it to the other actors in the social system” (Zucker 1977, 85). The 
institutionalisation process is discussed further discussed in Chapter Six.31 
 
Under the historical institutionalism perspective, institutions are believed to be 
‘isomorphic’ in that, even as change occurs, the emerging institutional ideals will be 
similar to the existing framework because “political actors extract casual designations 
from the world around them and these cause-and-effect understandings inform their 
approaches to new problems” (Thelen 1999, 386). Even as institutions change or are 
replaced by new institutions, the framework behind them will often be similar. Ian 
Greener argues that “choices formed when an institution is being formed, or when a 
policy is being formulated, have a constraining effect into the future” (Greener 2005, 2). 
This idea is the logic behind the following chapter in which the historical development 
of policies regarding women’s participation in the military is the key point. As Greener 
maintains, “history matters because formations put in place in the early stages of an 
institutional or policy life effectively come to constrain activity after that point” 
(Greener 2005, 2-3). This thesis argues that this is the case regarding the gender power 
structure of the military. The military was created as a male institution and although 
some change has occurred, it has been stymied by former formal policies and 
institutionalised norms.  
 
Chapter Six employs two main constructs to explain why the U.S. military has been 
especially susceptible to the institutionalisation of its norms. The first specific 
framework based on path dependency theory that is employed is Lynne Zucker’s idea of 
‘cultural persistence,’ and the second is Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrew’s ‘weberian 
construct.’32 These two constructs are combined because they are complementary and 
both bring ideas that are applicable to the case of the U.S. military. Zucker outlines 
three aspects of persistence that drive cultural persistence in an institution to include 
transmission of cultural ideas, maintenance, and resistance to change (Zucker 1977, 83).                                                         
31 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 173 for further information on the institutionalisation of informal 
norms.  
32 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 173 for further discussion on how these constructs relate to the case of 
the gender structure of the U.S. military.  
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Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrews’ ‘weberian construct’ goes into greater detail 
regarding the characteristics an institution should have to be especially susceptible to 
institutionalisation of its informal norms. The characteristics they posit promote 
institutionalisation are a strong hierarchy, resilience to change through “the bounding of 
the organisation from the environment,” and the neutrality of experience between the 
actors in the institution (Ingraham et al. 2008, 72). These concepts are illustrated in 
Chapter Six when applied to the case of the U.S. military.    
Feminist institutionalism provides the most advantageous approach to this study 
because its frameworks and concepts focus on the study of formal and informal 
institutions, institutional power relations, and institutional change and obstacles. The 
question of this research focuses on the evolution of a gendered institution, therefore a 
feminist institutional approach is most appropriate. It allows for the institutionalised 
values, rules and norms to be analysed and, through the merging of ideas from new 
institutionalism and feminist political theory, can provide the framework needed to 
understand the marginalisation of women in the U.S. military. The following section 
discusses the methodology employed to carry out this study and why it was the best 
choice for the successful completion of this research. 
 
2.2 Research Approaches 
To further examine the research question and women’s involvement in the military, this 
research employs mainly qualitative methods, supported by limited quantitative data. 
Gelsthorpe and Morris argue that quantitative data can provide useful background 
information for researchers. Although feminist research is generally carried out with 
qualitative methods, quantitative methods should not be discounted (Gelsthorpe & 
Morris 1990, 86). Although quantitative data can be useful in determining the scope of a 
problem, statistics alone cannot provide complete comprehension of a given situation 
and are “divorced from the context of their construction and thus lose the meanings they 
had for the people involved” (Farran 1990, 101). Qualitative methods are then essential 
to provide a full understanding of the problem behind the numbers. This is why I used 
mainly qualitative methods supported by quantitative data in this research.  
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In order to answer the research question, I analysed statistics on women’s involvement 
in the U.S. military since the integration of female soldiers in 1948. Statistics were 
particularly useful for the discussion of the problem of sexual assault in the U.S. 
military in Chapter Six because they provide a better understanding of the breadth of the 
problem for military personnel. For the majority of the quantitative data, I used existing 
statistics on female military members that have been collected by the DoD. I decided to 
analyse existing data because there have been DoD surveys carried out recently that are 
applicable to my research. These surveys have been administered on a large scale and it 
would be difficult for me to receive the same number of respondents due to timing and 
funding restraints of this PhD research. Therefore, the existing data provided me with a 
bigger picture and more quantitative data than I would be able to attain on my own. I 
also employ limited statistics from the primary data collected from interview and survey 
respondents in order to address aspects in which existing poll data was not available.  I 
use other secondary data, such as military and civilian polls and policy statements to 
help triangulate my data and provide background for the information I gathered from 
personal interviews and surveys.  
 
The majority of my research was conducted using qualitative methods. I reviewed 
available literature and current DoD policies concerning female military members. The 
analysis of the formal rules and policies of the DoD was an essential starting point in 
analysing the construction of the masculine military culture. I also analysed previous 
and current legislation on the matter to look at how the legislation has evolved into the 
current policies that govern women’s involvement in the armed forces. The historical 
analysis of how women’s participation in the military began and their evolving roles 
since then was essential in order to contextualise women’s current position in the armed 
forces, as discussed in the previous section through the historical institutionalism 
approach.33 
 
                                                        
33 Please refer to page 37 of this chapter for information on the historical institutionalism approach.  
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I conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews of female soldiers to gain first hand 
accounts of individual women’s experiences in the institution thus far and to build an 
illustrative picture of the gender power structure in the U.S. military by learning about 
the informal norms of the military. Personal interviews were the best way to gain 
answers for this research because they provided me with clear qualitative data on the 
informal norms of the military, the problems female soldiers face, and the ways in 
which they have tried to advance their place in the institution (Kvale 1996, 1). 
Examining with participants, “why they think and act as they do enriches our 
understanding, and is a far stronger base from which to explore potential change than 
knowing only what they think and do” (Kelly et al. 1994, 39). I also conducted a limited 
amount of surveys of female soldiers in order to reach out to those who were in 
locations in which they could not be interviewed.  
 
When considering the methodology for this research, I considered interviewing male 
military members as well as female soldiers. Although I did interview several men for 
the elite interviews, I decided, for the scope of this PhD research, that it was best to only 
interview female soldiers for the non-elite interviews. This research is based on feminist 
political research methodology, which, as is discussed later in this section,34 looks to 
emphasise the experiences of women because they are often overlooked in political and 
historical accounts. In order to ensure the success of this, I felt that it was most 
important to highlight women’s experiences in the military institution. This does not 
mean that this research could not benefit from interviews with male soldiers in the 
future, but in order to conduct the interviews properly, with a sufficient number of data 
points, including male soldiers as well as female would not have been feasible for the 
limited time afforded for this PhD project.  
 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format in order to provide the 
respondents with the opportunity to expand on their experiences, while also ensuring a 
similar outline of questions were discussed during all of the interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews are believed to be useful in feminist research because they help to build a                                                         
34 Please refer to page 46 of this chapter for further information on the feminist methodological approach.  
  51 
closer emotional bond between the researcher and the participants and therefore make 
the power relationship between the two more equal. This can make the participants feel 
comfortable about sharing their experiences (Jayaratne 1983, 145). This approach 
proved effective in conducting the interviews for my research. The semi-structure 
format allowed me to collect data on the topics pertinent to my research, while also 
giving military women and the elites interviewed the chance to expand on the questions. 
Many of the women interviewed did this and brought up interesting topics that I had not 
originally asked about. I interviewed a total of 48 military women with representation 
from each branch of service. Respondents were both officers and enlisted personnel35 
and their years of experience ranged from 6 months in the military to 30 years.36 The 
surveys were conducted in the same format and with the same questions as the semi-
structure interviews. I created an anonymous website online where respondents could 
type extended answers to the questions addressed but did not have to answer all of the 
questions listed. Survey respondents also had the opportunity to contact me directly and 
sign consent forms, as was done by interviewees. There were a total of 16 surveys 
conducted and the respondents were both officers and enlisted personnel. Their 
experience in the military ranged from 2 months in the military to 22 years.37  
 
I also carried out a small number of semi-structured elite interviews with high-ranking 
government and civilian DoD and Congressional officials regarding policies for military 
women in order to contextualise female soldiers’ experiences in the military institution. 
I decided on the semi-structured format interview with these participants as well 
because there could have been some aspects of the subject matter they were not willing 
to talk about or could not talk about. Semi-structured interviews are the best option to 
avoid DoD constructed answers to questions about policy, while also gathering 
information they are ready to share. I found all of the interviewees to be open and 
willing to converse on the different questions I had asked as well as offering their own 
personal insights. There were two elite interviewees that chose not to answer some of                                                         
35 The military is split into an Officer group and an Enlisted group. The Officer group is higher ranking 
and fill leadership positions while Enlisted members perform the majority of the daily tasks of the 
military. Please refer to Annex B for information on the rank structure of the military. 
36 Please refer to Annex A for information regarding the representativeness of interview respondents.  
37 Please refer to Annex X for further information on the representativeness of survey respondents.  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the questions and I respected their decision according to best ethical practice (Better 
Evaluation, 2013: 1).  
 
(i) Power Relations 
In feminist methodology, the interviewing process is different from mainstream 
research techniques in that mainstream techniques indicate there should be a 
hierarchical structure during the interview in which the interviewer is in charge and the 
interviewee is a passive respondent. This is not the case in feminist research. Instead, it 
is believed that the best way to gather information through the interviewing process is 
for the relationship between interviewer and interviewee to be non-hierarchical (Oakley 
1981, 41). Oakley argues that the best way to establish this non-hierarchical relationship 
is for the interviewer to be ready to share their ideas and beliefs with the interviewee 
and to conduct the interview as a flowing conversation. This in turn allows the 
respondent to become an active participant through mutual interaction and should 
provide them with a better opportunity to open up about their own lives and experiences 
(Oakley 1981, 26).  
 
Power is an important aspect of the research process and must be properly 
acknowledged. It is often assumed that the researcher is in power because they are in 
control of the questions. Although it is important to acknowledge those interviewed 
may not all have equal background knowledge on the subject at hand, the power 
relationship between the interviewer and interviewee becomes much more complicated. 
It has been noted that the power relationship between interviewer and interviewee is 
fluid throughout the process. The feminist approach is to empower the respondents to 
express their experiences by making the relationship non-hierarchical, but it is 
ultimately the respondent’s decision on how much they want to divulge. However, in 
the end, the analysis of the data is the responsibility of the researcher, therefore at that 
stage, they have the authority (Letherby 2003, 114). 
 
The researcher’s power position in relation to the respondents will partly determine the 
interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee, therefore affecting the data 
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gathered. Letherby points out that, “researchers do not always hold the balance of 
power or even have control over their own involvement, let alone the respondent’s 
involvement” (Letherby 2003, 115). This was particularly interesting in relation to my 
research, as the interviewees represented a broad range of social status, power, and 
educational backgrounds. Several of the respondents in this study were considered elite 
interviews because of their high-ranking status in the Department of Defense and the 
legislature. However, the female soldier respondents were not considered elite 
interviews.38  
 
There are several significant obstacles to elite interviewing. To begin with, access to 
these respondents is usually limited because of their position, power and constraints on 
their time. They often have gatekeepers, who filter communication and interactions. 
They may not receive a message sent directly to them if their staff decides they do not 
have time for the request. Therefore, it is very difficult to go directly to the respondent 
for a possible interview if there is no personal connection. In setting up interviews with 
these elite respondents, mainly high-ranking Department of Defense officials, my 
father, through professional connections, acted as a gatekeeper to provide me with 
access to the elite respondents that would have been difficult to have otherwise. This 
had the possibility to constrain me in that they could hold an even greater amount of 
power because they could be talking to me as a favour to my father. It could also have 
limited the kinds of questions I asked because I wanted to make sure I would not 
damage their relationship with my father. However, I counteracted this by ensuring I 
worded the questions I needed to ask respectfully. I did not find that I felt they held the 
power in the interview; rather, it was a conversational process with all of my elite 
interviews.  
 
In preparing for my interviews with the elite respondents, I considered that time could 
be an important limiting factor. It was necessary for me to fit into their schedules and 
identify the key questions in order to maximise the minimal amount of time I had with 
them. Although I flew from overseas to meet with them, I had to be able to conduct the                                                         
38 For further statistics on respondents, refer to Annex B, Table 1, page 234. 
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interview whenever they could make time and be flexible in case they had to change the 
date or time. In order for this to be practical, I stayed with friends in Washington D.C. 
for around two weeks to carry out as many interviews as possible with flexibility. Two 
of the elite interviewees had to reschedule for a different time, and I was able to make 
those changes by staying in the area. However, I found once I was in the interview, I 
had their full attention and was not cut short of time.  
 
As I prepared the interview questions for the elite respondents, it was important to 
consider they could provide me with standard answers and may not be fully honest 
because they have to be conscious of how they portray the military to the public. 
Williams discusses the importance of this as many elite interviewees often speak to 
journalists and may interact with researchers in the same way by providing pre-scripted 
and official answers to questions (Williams 1980, 310). In my prior experience working 
in Public Affairs for the Air Force, I had worked to construct statements for military 
members to give to the media and the public. This experience provided me with the 
insight needed to find the right questions to ask in order to bypass this problem. I knew 
I would also be able to identify when I was given the standard DoD answers. David 
Richards, in 1996, addresses this as one disadvantage of elite interviewing. He argues 
that in order to avoid standard answers, the interviewer should attempt to establish a 
rapport with the respondent before asking difficult or controversial questions. He also 
points out that respondents could be deceitful for various reasons, and it is therefore 
essential to triangulate the data derived from the interviews with other sources of data, 
which is why I used a mixed methods approach with my sources (Richards 1996, 204). I 
found with the small number of elite interviews I conducted, that all respondents were 
forthcoming and candid. There were several questions that two of the respondents did 
not wish to answer and I had provided them with that choice at the beginning of the 
interview. I had also provided the elite interviewees the option of remaining 
anonymous, but none of them chose to do so and they all signed consent forms before 
the interview.  
 
  55 
The elite interviewees’ power was their social status, therefore they dictated the time 
allotted to me. They also ultimately decided how much information they shared with 
me. They had power in that I provided them with a copy of the transcript from their 
interview afterwards in case they wanted to make any changes or had any areas they 
wished to have kept off of the record. In these interviews, I recognised the elites as 
possessing the power. However, my power with these elite respondents was that I 
analysed and interpreted the information they provided. Therefore, I had the ability to 
draw my own conclusions from the material and determine what was important to my 
research. 
 
My interviews with the main respondents in this study, the female military members, 
were not considered elite interviews. It was possible to keep a non-hierarchical structure 
in the interviews with female military members. I am close in age to many of them and 
this provided me with the opportunity to enact an interactive interview approach. I 
asked open-ended questions in order to establish a conversational tone for the 
interviews. Many of the interviews with the military women lasted longer than expected 
and were less formal than interviews with the elites. Like the elite respondents, these 
women held power because they also decided what information to share with me, 
therefore determining how much I could learn about their situations. All of the women 
were forthcoming and answered the questions I asked.  
 
The respondents also held power because I used the snowball method to gain access to 
more participants. Therefore, the participants chose whether to give me additional 
names of female service members to interview. However, I had the power, with the 
semi-structured interview, to direct the conversation and to draw conclusions from the 
information provided. In a case study provided by Jeffery Berry consisting of interviews 
he carried out with political lobbyists in Washington D.C., Berry explains that the 
interviewer holds power as long as they can direct the questions and keep the 
respondents on track. He also argues that it is the power of the researcher to interpret 
and analyse the information given to them (Berry 2002, 680). 
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It was important to ensure that the interview process did not in any way oppress the 
interviewee (Oakley 1981, 41). There is a feminist concern regarding the impact of the 
interview and research process on the respondents. This depends specifically on the 
nature of the research (Kelly et al. 1994, 38). This pertained to my study in that all of 
the respondents are still a part of the organisation about which I was asking them 
questions and they could possibly have negative comments to make. Military members 
are often coached to be very careful of how they speak in public about the military and 
their experiences with it. There could be negative effects on their careers if they shared 
unflattering information. This is why I allowed respondents to remain anonymous in my 
research and provided them the opportunity to review the interview transcript if they 
wished. All of the names of the female soldiers included in the following chapters have 
been changed to protect the participants’ identities.39 All female soldier respondents will 
remain anonymous and the interview data will be destroyed after completion of this 
project. Ethical approval was granted through the ethics committee of the university.40  
 
(ii) Positioning  
Self-identification is essential in carrying out feminist research in order to understand 
the process of analysing gathered data. In the gathering of information, understanding 
one’s own position in the process positively affects the approach taken. It is necessary 
then for me to distinguish my position in relation to the respondents. By approaching 
this study through feminist research techniques, I am positioning myself as a feminist 
from the beginning. My position then as a feminist provides a different view than what 
mainstream researchers may be able to provide. As Stanley notes, feminist researchers 
are, “perpetual strangers, but strangers from within” (Stanley 1995, 185). By 
distinguishing myself as an academic feminist researcher, I am positioning myself as 
both an insider and an outsider.  
 
By enacting a feminist methodology based on women’s experiences of the informal 
norms in the military, I look to provide current military women with a voice in a                                                         
39 Please see Annex D, page 237 for consent form provided to participants.  
40 Please refer to Annex D, page 237 for paperwork on ethical approval. 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hierarchical, male-dominated, gendered institution in which they are underrepresented 
in the upper-echelon. Women have therefore been considered as ‘others’ in prior 
research into the military. In analysing women’s positions and experiences from their 
own points of view, it repositions them into the forefront of the research and provides 
them with the power necessary to understand and possibly change their place in the 
institution. In speaking for ‘others’, it is especially important to identify my own place 
in relation to this research. Mies notes that identifying our shared experiences with 
those we are researching better enables us to recognise what ties us to the respondents 
but also what separates us from them (Mies 1991, 135). It is essential then to consider 
my position as an insider/outside in relation to those I am researching. My 
insider/outsider status also played a role in the access I had to respondents. Female 
soldiers were more willing to speak with me because I am a woman, and I am part of 
the military institution.  
 
Although traditional research methods place importance on the total objectivity of the 
researcher, this is not true in terms of feminist research. Instead, it is believed that it is 
not possible for the researcher to be completely objective. As Westmarland argues, 
“humans, be they female or male, are not computers, and are unable to process 
information without some degree of subjective interpretation” (Westmarland 2001, 2). It 
is essential therefore to identify one’s own position regarding politics, power, and 
beliefs in order to properly understand and articulate how the researcher has drawn 
conclusions. Considering this approach, Mills notes, “the social scientist is not some 
autonomous being standing outside of society. No one is outside society, the question is 
where he stands within it” (Mills 1959, 204). This approach allowed me to distinguish 
my position as a researcher in relation to the respondents in order to better understand 
my interpretation of their shared experiences. 
 
The insider/outsider dilemma was a significant factor to consider as it played an 
essential role in the development of the research project. Carrying out a study in which 
the researcher is an insider can be beneficial in that it provides a significant insight into 
a culture or group. This can give the researcher important knowledge needed to 
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determine the right questions to ask and a sensitivity that could possibly help to build 
rapport with the respondents. As Westmorland states, “a close and equal relationship to 
the researched can actually lead to an acquisition of more fruitful and significant data” 
(Westmorland 2001, 8). The concern here however is that the researcher may lack 
enough objectivity to properly analyse the data gathered. Therefore, it is essential for 
the researcher to be aware of what bias they may have toward the group studied in order 
to provide an accurate analysis. An involvement with an issue “on whatever level does 
not disempower us intellectually, as it is still possible to be critical and analytical about 
the issue. But involvement does make a difference and it is important to 
acknowledge…” (Letherby 2003, 131). However, as close to an insider status as a 
researcher may have, ultimately, the researcher at some level will always remain an 
outsider. In distinguishing insider/outsider status, it is vital to determine the factors that 
provide us with those different statuses.  
 
In reflecting on my fieldwork, I entered the field as both an insider and an outsider. I am 
American, the same nationality as those researched, and I therefore speak the same 
language. My gender provides me with an insider status because all of my interviewees 
except for a few of my elite respondents were also female and this allowed them to 
better relate their personal experiences to me. I am also an insider because of past work 
for the military. Although I was a civilian employee, I worked extensively with military 
personnel. I have all of the background knowledge of the different branches of the 
armed forces and I am able to speak the same military jargon as the female service 
members and the elite interviewees. I am also well aware of military policies, guidelines 
and procedures, and I understand how the military operates as an institution. This is 
especially helpful because this knowledge provided me with better insight into the 
obstacles that females face in a large, masculine-oriented institution.  
 
My prior government employment also helped significantly with access to respondents. 
Respondents I identified to speak to in the United States came from networking with my 
prior military coworkers. I found this personal connection played a key role in 
determining which women were willing to participate in the study. I also gained more 
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access with an insider status at a high level through my father. The high-ranking 
Department of Defense officials that participated in this study agreed to take part 
through working relationships with my father, who is currently an Air Force civilian.  
 
Considering that I place myself as an insider as outlined above, it can be difficult to 
separate my own experiences with the military institution. Letherby notes that it can be 
easier for the researcher and the respondents if the researcher is an outsider because 
closeness to the given subject may not always be desirable (Letherby 2003, 131). 
Although it can be helpful when carrying out the study to have insider knowledge and 
access, it is also possible to be too close to the given subject. There must be some 
objectivity and an outsider status of the researcher could be helpful to properly identify 
important issues that may have otherwise gone unnoticed.  
 
The ‘outsider within theory’ of Collins (Collins 1999, 168) applies to my position in 
this study. It looks to identify the understanding of one’s insider position in a 
community that is also excluded from a specific group. In my case, although I am a part 
of the military community due to my past employment as well as being a military 
spouse and ties to my father; I am also undoubtedly an outsider as I am not in the 
military. I do not have the same experiences as military women, as DoD civilians have 
very different rules in terms of how they are expected to treat high-ranking military 
officials.  
 
Rules and policies regarding clothing, appearance, and behaviour are more relaxed for 
civilian employees. One very important separating factor is that of deployments. 
Military members are expected to deploy41 at some point in their careers and must take 
the jobs the military gives them. There is a hierarchical structure to DoD civilians but it 
is significantly looser than the hierarchical structure of the military. Therefore, female 
soldiers could have easily automatically classified me as an outsider because I had not                                                         
41 ‘Deploy’ is a term used when military members are assigned to an overseas location for approximately 
6-18 months. A deployment differs from a Permanent Change in Station (PCS) in that the military 
member is deployed without family members and is not moving to the new location, rather temporarily 
assigned there.  
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encountered the institution in the same way as them. I have not experienced the same 
kind of military, masculine culture as female soldiers because I have not been a part of 
what specifically makes them soldiers. However, I did not face this issue during my 
interviews. All of the women were friendly and wanted to help with my research 
project. Several of the women said they were interested in the subject and thought it was 
positive that attention was given to researching women’s position in the military. Other 
respondents were a part of the same social network as me and wanted to help on a 
personal level. 
 
These different aspects of myself, as an insider and an outsider, had beneficial effects 
on my research. I was provided with insider background knowledge and access. I also 
share the same gender as the majority of the respondents, which provided me with the 
means to build a rapport with them when asking them about gender issues. While on the 
other hand, I am not a part of the specific subculture I was studying; therefore, I had a 
greater ability to retain objectivity when considering the data I collected. 
 
(iii) Research Process 
My fieldwork was carried out mainly in the United States and several interviews were 
conducted in the United Kingdom. It consisted of interviews with American military 
women from each of the service branches: the Air Force, Army, and Navy/Marine 
Corps, in order to provide a perspective that is not biased by the branch of service. This 
is important as each branch of service carries with it a stereotype of the kind of people 
that join that branch and the level of masculinity associated with it, which is discussed 
further in Chapter Five.42 Also, many of the jobs are very different and this affects the 
experiences of the women involved (Manning 2010, 21-22).  
 
I divided my fieldwork into two main parts. The first was the pilot field study of six 
U.S. military women stationed in the United States. It also encompassed five elite 
interviews that included two high-ranking DoD officials in Washington D.C., one 
Congresswoman’s legislative director and one lobbyist for women’s rights in the                                                         
42 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 128 for examples.  
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military, who is also a retired Navy 0-6.43 In this part, I carried out several face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews. The second, and main part of my fieldwork was completed 
in Washington D.C., Ohio at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and at Royal Air Force 
Base Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. This is where I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with more U.S. military women. The majority of my interviews were carried 
out in Washington D.C., as there are a high number of female soldiers residing in the 
greater Capital area. I was able to find more participants by employing snowball 
sampling.  I selected this tactic because it is “effective in the research of organic social 
networks” (Noy 2008, 15) such as the social network of female military members. This 
was the most effective way of gaining more participants as I had an initial connection to 
the network through my former coworkers.  
 
For the pilot field study, I interviewed six female Air Force officers. These initial 
interviews gave me a chance to find a flow to the interview process and questions. They 
also allowed me to receive feedback on my questions to ensure they were all understood 
properly. I started with women in the Air Force because this is the branch of service I 
have the most experience working with and have built a professional network in. I also 
interviewed five high-ranking elites in Washington D.C. who all play a role in law and 
policy for military women. These interviews allowed me to obtain a high-level 
perspective while beginning my research.  
 
My main fieldwork was carried out over a longer time period and encompassed more 
female service members. My goal was to have at least 45 female soldier respondents for 
personal interviews, and I was able to interview a total of 48. Although it was not 
possible to have the same number of respondents from each branch of service, each 
branch had proper representation. I aimed for at least 15 of the respondents to be female 
officers and I was able to find exactly 15 female officers to participate. I did not expect 
there to be an even number of female officers and enlisted respondents as there are over 
100,000 more enlisted women than female officers in the military as a whole (Manning                                                         
43 An 0-6 is a Navy Captain or an Army/Air Force Colonel. Please refer to Annex B for further 
information on the rank structure. 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2010, 25). I found this to be true, and 33 of the female soldier interviewees were 
enlisted.  
 
In addition to the interviews conducted, at the request of one interviewee who was 
interested in asking other female soldiers to participate, I set up an anonymous website 
with the interview questions listed so additional women could respond. The interviewee 
suggested the idea because she was aware of several women who she thought would 
like to participate but were not in the area to be interviewed as well as one female 
soldier who was deployed overseas. She provided me contact information of possible 
respondents in order to distribute the website link and ethical paperwork provided to all 
of my respondents. Seven female officers responded along with nine additional enlisted 
personnel to make a total of 16 survey respondents. I found the answers provided in the 
survey responses, although helpful, were not as in-depth as the responses from those 
interviewed. I expected this to be the case because respondents had to type their 
answers instead of discusses them in a conversation. However, the responses were 
beneficial in that they helped to provide a larger pool of data to derive conclusions 
from.   
  
(iv) Interpreting the Data 
The interpretation and analysis of the data collected is a process of selecting and 
rejecting data, finding the important trends on which to expand and ultimately finding 
the best way to portray the data. Letherby notes that any researcher who attempts to 
theorise another’s experiences will be involved in carefully selecting and rejecting the 
data in order to create a clear picture of the research topic (Letherby 2003, 78). As I 
discussed earlier in the chapter, my self-identification, insider/outsider status, and 
power position all affected the data I chose to select and the approach I took in 
analysing the research.  
 
Validity and reliability are concerns that need to be addressed, especially when 
interpreting data collected from interviews. The respondents did not have to tell the 
truth if they wished. As Berry argues, “interviewers must always keep in mind that it is 
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not the obligation of the subject to be objective and to tell us the truth. We…ignore the 
reality that subjects have a purpose in the interview too: they have something they want 
to say” (Berry 2002, 680). There was no way to tell for certain if a particular respondent 
was answering dishonestly. This is of particular concern as discussed above regarding 
interviews with elites. It is possible that the elite respondents may have had agendas 
which caused them to decide it was better to provide institutionally influenced answers 
than to be completely forthright.  
 
The interviews were organised ahead of time therefore, the respondents would have had 
time to think about the subject matter and how they would like to answer possible 
questions on that topic. This makes it possible for their answers to have been 
constructed rather than completely honest. This is why it was especially important for 
me to determine the differences between the shared experiences and actual knowledge 
and to effectively discover the important trends that appear through analysing the data.  
 
In order to counter the problems of validity and reliability, I used triangulation in the 
interpretation of the data I collected. Reinharz notes that using multiple research 
methods allows feminist researchers to “line the past and present and relate individual 
action and experience to social frameworks” (Reinharz 1992, 197). Due to the fact that 
not all respondents would be fully honest all the time, the use of different methods 
provides a tool in selecting the valid and reliable information. As Richards argues, “If 
the political scientist can combine the information gained from elite interviews with 
other sources of data, such a combination produces a powerful research package” 
(Richards 1996, 204). This strategy produced more reliable data for my research 
project.  
 
The different research methods of the interviews and the analysis of documents and 
other qualitative and quantitative data provided me with the variety of comparative 
sources to properly and accurately triangulate the data I collected. Secondhand sources 
played an important role in this aspect of the research process. By analysing (1) existing 
statistics on women in the military, (2) literature on gender issues, women’s 
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involvement in the military and politics as well as new institutionalism analysis 
products, (3) Congressional legislation - both previous legislation and current bills, (4) 
DoD policies and (5) prior interviews with female soldiers, it was possible to 
contextualise my respondents’ answers and to provide a larger picture of the issue from 
multiple sources. This process was also helpful in identifying important trends in the 
data collected from the respondents of this study. The breadth of the research conducted 
in this study allows me to draw conclusions concerning the informal and formal norms 
of the military as well as processes of institutional change. However, conclusions made 
concerning the effects of institutional changes on the future status of the military are 
speculative.  
 
Conclusion 
Under feminist institutionalism, this research blends the sociological and historical 
approaches because they are both needed to provide a clear picture in analysing the 
gendered dynamics of the U.S. military. Sociological institutionalism places a greater 
importance than the other prevailing approaches on the cultural and societal norms and 
roles in an organisation, which accounts for the importance of culture in the military. As 
the affects of the values, rules and norms on the military institution must be evaluated in 
order to answer the research question, it is essential to work from a theoretical 
framework that accounts for the importance of culture. In order to better understand the 
gendered culture and informal norms of the military, I interviewed and conducted 
surveys with female soldiers and several members of DoD leadership to gain 
information on their own experiences. Although literature on women in the military can 
provide useful background in this area, first-hand data on women’s experiences was 
especially helpful because they were able to describe aspects of the informal norms that 
have personally affected them.  
 
Another important aspect of this research is to explain how the gendered power 
structure of the U.S. military has come to its current state in 2013. The use of historical 
institutionalism supports this approach and analysis because it considers the historical 
path the institution has taken over time. I employed this concept by reviewing news 
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articles and policy documents concerning the past history of women in the U.S. Armed 
Forces. Both of these approaches also assisted in explaining ‘path dependency’ and the 
difficulties of changing institutions. In order to further explain what characteristics 
make the U.S. military susceptible to the institutionalisation of informal norms, 
Zucker’s ideas of ‘cultural persistence’ and Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrew’s 
‘weberian construct’ are combined. These two constructs are based on historical 
intuitionalism’s path dependency theory and are needed to explain why the gendered 
power structure of the U.S. military has not advanced more quickly toward gender 
equality. Understanding why change has been inhibited in the military institution is 
essential in order to understand the entire institutional change process.   
 
In order to analyse institutional change, this thesis employs historical institutionalism’s 
concept of critical junctures. As is shown in the following chapter, critical junctures 
were an essential part of the process of change in the U.S. military. Although historical 
institutionalism is especially valuable when considering periods of change to 
institutions, it does not account for gradual processes of change. Therefore, Mahoney 
and Thelen’s theory of gradual change is also employed to explain gradual processes of 
institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen’s framework of ‘opportunist’ actors who 
invoke change through ‘conversion’ is most applicable to the case of internal change in 
the U.S. military, while ‘insurrectionary’ actors who promote change through 
‘displacement’ are important to consider when looking at change that is provoked from 
outside the institution. Examples of ‘opportunist’ actors were found through the 
interviews conducted with military women, while the majority of examples of 
‘insurrectionary’ actors were found through researching news articles and information 
concerning Congressional legislation and court cases.  
 
The use of feminist research ideas to enact the theoretical framework, as described 
above, enabled me to extract and interpret the necessary information to accurately 
answer the research question and add to the current body of knowledge on women in 
the military and political institutional change. Although this methodology is not specific 
to feminist institutionalism, the questions and processes were guided by its theoretical 
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ideas. My hope was to provide a thorough institutional analysis that can be useful to 
understanding and informing about women’s rights and place in society without placing 
the female respondents at a disadvantage for participating in this study. The non-
hierarchical structure of feminist interviews allowed me to gather the essential data 
from the respondents and provided me with a better understanding of their experiences.  
 
Self-identification and reflection on my position as an insider and an outsider, as well as 
my power position are all key elements in determining how I carried out and interpreted 
the data. I am aware of how my own values, beliefs and status affected my research and 
my ability to be an objective researcher and identify my own possible research bias. My 
insider status provided me with specific access to some of my respondents. 
Triangulation allowed me to best describe and identify trends in the personal 
experiences of women in the military and to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
research I produced. Contextualising data from the respondents of my study into the 
existing literature and known experiences of military women ensures this reliability and 
ultimately makes my research more useful.  
 
The following chapter draws on the historical institutionalism approach to provide a 
historical overview and analysis of women’s participation in the U.S. Armed Forces. It 
illustrates theories of change discussed in this chapter and shows the importance of 
individual agency in enacting institutional change.  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Historical Overview 
Chapter Three 
 
Introduction 
This chapter offers a historical perspective on how female soldiers have come to their 
current positions and the effects of their service on formal military gender policies and 
the gender power structure of the U.S. Armed Forces. The historical background of 
women in the military is essential to the gendered institutional analysis of the U.S. 
military because it is important to “understand gendered patterns and effects” in order to 
analyse institutional change (Krook & MacKay 2012, 8). This chapter employs the 
historical institutionalism perspective discussed in Chapter Two44 to show the processes 
of formal policy changes that have occurred overtime. These processes are telling 
because a pattern of change emerges that can be applied to the U.S. military in 2013. 
Also, the historical institutionalism approach utilised in this chapter is necessary to 
showcase previous policies because path dependency argues that past formal policies 
affect the policies and informal norms of the contemporary U.S. military institution. 
Chapter Five discusses the current, as of 2013, masculine culture of the U.S. military, 
but this chapter first needs to provide a historical background of women’s position in 
the U.S. military in order to explicate how past changes have structured gender power 
relations in the military.  
 
Women pushed for equality in the armed forces for seven decades. The core military 
culture has obstinately resisted social change, yet women have made substantial 
political and legal progress. Their first steps came during the First and Second World 
Wars and they have lobbied throughout the decades to reach their current positions. 
Over approximately a 60-year period, women went from adjunct members of the 
military in mainly secretarial and nursing roles to, in 2013, being allowed to participate 
in all jobs, including the core combat roles. As of the beginning of 2013, the military 
lifted all policies that once barred women from specific jobs in the military. The paths 
                                                        
44 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 37 for further information on historical institutionalism.  
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of the women discussed in this chapter can shed light on the existing gender structure 
and show ways in which change was enacted in the past.  
  
3.1 Women in the First World War  
Women had been participating in wars and the labour workforce for centuries, but the 
United States’ entrance into World War I in 1917 opened up space in the labour market 
for more women to work outside of their households and in varying roles. During the 
war approximately “20 percent or more of all workers in the wartime manufacture of 
electrical machinery, airplanes and food were women” (World War I and the Interwar 
Years 2014, 1). This is compared to the late 1800s and early 1990s where it was 
uncommon for women to work in heavy industries. Instead many worked as teachers, 
dressmakers, tailors, and in the textile industry (1870 Census Report; Kim 2014, 1). The 
personnel demands of the war for men to be soldiers left thousands of jobs open. 
Women joined the workforce in greater numbers and in varying industries due to the 
personnel shortages in the military and private industry in order to help the war effort 
(Binkin & Bach 1977, 2). This was the first critical juncture point in the 1900s in which 
the circumstances of the time and the personnel needs of the war opened up an area for 
women to participate in more roles outside of the home.45 
 
The military also needed women to work in non-combat roles, such as secretaries, 
nurses, and phone operators, in order to free more men to fight. Many women saw this 
as an opportunity to help their country and husbands during the war and volunteered 
(Doyle 2011, 1). They served in the Army and Navy Nurses Auxiliary Corps that had 
already been established at the very beginning of the decade. Close to 12,500 women 
were enlisted in the Navy and Marines Corps reserve due to vague wording in the Naval 
Reserve Act, which allowed for the enlistment of able-persons, not specified by gender 
(Manning 2010, 2). These women were referred to as ‘Yeomanettes’ and they carried 
out administrative work and received equal pay and benefits to military men (Murnane 
2007, 1).  However, the majority of women who served at this time, many working for 
the Army as clerks and operators, were considered military contractors and did not                                                         
45 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for information on critical junctures.  
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receive equal pay or benefits to male military members (Binkin & Bach 1977, 2). Yet, 
they were able to gain experience working in the public sphere, which was unusual at 
the time (Murnane 2007, 1).  
 
After the war, there were no positive changes brought about as a result of these 
women’s participation. Instead of sustained progress, Congress took a step back. They 
realised after the war that the language of the Naval Reserve Act, which had allowed 
over 12,500 women to enlist, was not specific enough to exclude women. Therefore, 
Congress modified the language to ensure women could not enlist again. They changed 
the wording of the Act, which originally stated that able-bodied citizens were allowed to 
enlist, to then state only able-bodied male citizens could join (Murnane 2007, 1062).  
 
By the end of the war in 1918, the women’s suffrage movement was in full swing in the 
United States. The women’s movement advocated for their right to vote by asking why 
did they had helped in the efforts of the war when the United States could not bring a 
fair democracy to close to half of their own citizenship. In 1919, bowing to political 
pressure from the National Women’s Party, Congress passed the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, granting them the right to vote (Hakim 1995, 29).  
 
In 1925 women found a champion in Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, who was 
elected into her husband’s chair in the House of Representatives after he died. She 
served in Congress for thirty-five years and was a strong supporter of women’s rights in 
the military and for military veterans. Her husband had served in the Army during 
World War I and Rogers volunteered with the Red Cross at veteran hospitals. Through 
her volunteer work during the First World War she established bonds with military 
veterans and witnessed the unfair treatment of women working for the military during 
that time. There were cases of women who had served in the war as telephone operators 
overseas being wounded. These women did not have military status and therefore did 
not receive disability benefits after the war. This problem in particular drew the 
attention of Congresswoman Rogers and led her to sponsor the Women’s Auxiliary 
Army Corps (WAAC) Bill in 1941 during World War II (Treadwell 1991, 5).  Although 
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she thought women should always put their families and children first, she believed in 
equal pay for equal work and that those who decided to work should be given equal 
benefits (Hakim 1995, 29).  
 
3.2 World War II 
The outbreak of World War II once again brought problems of male personnel 
shortages for the military and U.S. industry. This was another instance of a critical 
juncture in which the personnel needed for the war opened up a space for women to 
participate in more public roles than they would have normally in U.S. society at the 
time (Murnane 2007, 5). Women began filling these roles much as they did during the 
First World War but in greater numbers. Their participation would likely have been 
very similar to their limited job opportunities during World War I, except they had an 
advocate in Congress, Representative Edith Nourse Rogers. She was able to work with 
the Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, in order to push through legislation 
to provide women working for the military with better pay and benefits than they 
received in World War I. She created legislation, which first brought women in as 
auxiliary members of the military in 1941, and then new legislation in 1943 to move 
their status up to a reserve unit. Although women were once again expected to return to 
the private sphere of their homes after the war, they had gained political ground through 
Rogers’ legislation (Hakim 1995, 10).   
 
(i) Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps Legislation 
Women wanted to be a part of the war effort by joining the military. Therefore, in May 
of 1941, Congresswoman Rogers introduced a Bill to the House of Representatives to 
establish the WAAC. The Bill’s purpose was to create a corps of 25,000 women that 
could fill non-combat roles while providing them with equal pay and benefits, unlike 
what was done for the majority of women during the First World War. Rogers said she 
believed the only way to ensure female service members received equal pay and 
benefits was to provide them with an official status (Morden 2000, 3). Although she 
originally wanted women to be full members of the military, she decided she had to 
settle for an auxiliary corps. Rogers stated, “I wanted very much to have these women 
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taken in as a part of the Army…I wanted them to have the same rate of pension and 
disability allowance. I…realised that I could not secure that. The War Department was 
very unwilling to have these women as part of the Army” (Treadwell 1991, 8).  
 
Rogers’ Bill was introduced before the U.S. officially entered World War II because she 
believed the United States’ entrance into the war was imminent and that women would 
be needed to fill jobs in the military. However, the personnel shortages in the military 
were not yet there to motivate Congressmen to vote in favour of adding women, even as 
auxiliary members. The Bill did not get much attention and was met mainly with 
indifference because Congress did not believe it to be a pressing issue (Morden 2000, 
4). There were enough men to fill the jobs the military needed due to conscription and 
the military was not yet overstretched. Also, many Congressmen were opposed to the 
idea of women in the military. (Murnane 2007, 7). In discussion of the Bill, 
Representative Fulmer argued, “I have been here more than twenty one years and it is 
the silliest Bill offered yet” (Treadwell 1991, 6). He went on to say that the majority of 
those in the House of Representatives felt the same but may not vote their true feelings 
(Treadwell 1996, 6).  
 
Congresswomen Rogers’ first attempt to push the Bill through was stalled. The War 
Department and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall had originally wanted 
more time to develop their own plan so they could control the aspects of the auxiliary 
corps if the legislation was passed. The main aspect of the War Department’s proposal 
was that, “it will tend to avert the pressure to admit women to actual membership in the 
Army” (Treadwell 1991, 7). The Bill was continuously referred to the Bureau of the 
Budget where it received no attention or action, effectively holding up any possibility of 
it passing (Treadwell 1991, 7). However, according to Colonel John H. Hilldring, the 
Director of Army Personnel, General Marshal became more enthusiastic about pushing 
the legislation through as it looked more certain that the U.S. would enter the war 
(Murnane 2007, 10). General Marshal did not want to be rushing at the last minute to 
fill personnel shortages. According to Hilldring, “the Chief of Staff was also influenced 
  72 
by the fact that the ladies wanted in; he literally has a passionate regard for democratic 
ideals” (Treadwell 199, 9).  
 
In order to help push the legislation through the Bureau of Budget, General Marshall 
hired Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, a newspaper editor and the future director of the 
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, to establish a Women’s Interest Section of the War 
Department Bureau of Public Relations. Hobby worked with First Lady Roosevelt and 
Congresswomen Rogers in negotiations with the Bureau of the Budget and 
Congressional hearings (Treadwell 1991, 10).  
 
General Marshal and Congresswoman Rogers were making significant progress with 
the WAAC legislation but the attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese on 7 December 
1941 and the government’s decision to enter World War II moved the WAAC Bill 
through the legislative process quickly. Suddenly, the U.S. was once again facing 
personnel shortages in the military and the war effort in general. Congresswoman 
Rogers reintroduced the Bill to form a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps to Congress 
after adding the recommended changes from the War Department (Morden 2000, 6). 
Due to the circumstances of the war, the debate on the Bill in Congress was fast, 
however, it also was difficult. Several in Congress, including Representatives Fulmer, 
Vincent and Somers, were concerned that developing a women’s Corps would reflect 
negatively on the manhood of the United States’ military (Sadler 1942, 1). Senator 
Maloney of Connecticut argued that the Bill cast a “shadow on the sanctity of the 
home” (Sadler 1942, 1). The specifics of women’s rank and pay and benefits were also 
difficult for Congress to agree upon. The issue of women’s rank was debated during 
hearings on this Bill. Their potential to reach the highest ranks, those of flag officer 
ranks, such as general or admiral was discussed and it was decided that women should 
not be able to reach these (Murnane 2001, 1063).  
 
Opposition to their ability to earn flag officer ranks was not only from the military 
leadership and Congressmen, but also from many of the women fighting for female 
members’ rights. They believed that if they fought to give female members the right to 
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make flag officer, they would be asking for too much too soon and it could possibly 
hurt their chances of getting women admitted to the military in the first place, therefore 
the law was left in place that the highest permanent rank a Women’s Army Auxiliary 
Corps (WAAC) member could reach was that of lieutenant colonel46 (Murnane 2001, 
1064). This is an example of bounded agency, as discussed in Chapter Two.47 Military 
women and their advocates were constrained both internally and externally. Internally, 
WAAC members were constrained in their military service because they could not 
reach the same ranks as male soldiers and therefore had limited chances for promotion. 
Women’s advocates were constrained externally due to some of Congress’s negative 
feelings regarding women in the military. Therefore, they did not want to push too hard 
and risk women’s complete exclusion. Benefits for WAAC members were also debated 
and it was ultimately decided that Corps members would not receive death benefits or 
retirement and disability pensions. Their benefits for insurance and hospitalisation were 
also slightly lower than for male military members (Sadler 1942, 1). 
 
The majority of Congress was not ready to have women in their male military, yet they 
understood the personnel shortfalls. This is why the WAAC Bill passed in the House of 
Representatives with a vote of two hundred and forty nine to 86, and then passed the 
Senate 38 to 27 in 1942 (Sadler 1942, 1). President Roosevelt signed the legislation into 
law on 14 May 1942 to create the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (Murnane 2007, 
1062). This represented a significant change in that it was the first time women were 
legally recognised as part of the military institution. Although they were not integrated 
members of the Armed Forces and did not receive any of the death or retirement 
benefits of male soldiers, they were for the first time officially recognised as adjunct 
members to the U.S. Armed Forces and therefore received some insurance benefits 
which were not afforded to those who had served in World War I.  
 
 
                                                         
46 An Army Lt. Col. is equivalent to a 0-5 on the officer scale. Please see Annex B in Chapter 1 for 
further information on the rank structure.  
47 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 43 for further information on bounded agency. 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(ii) Concerns and Double Standards 
Even after the passing of the WAAC Bill, many in Congress had concerns about what 
types of women would join the female corps. The perception that those who wanted to 
enter the military were not ‘good girls’ was widespread (Herbert 1998, 2). American 
society believed women who would be interested in the military would be either too 
masculine acting or too feminine to be useful in the armed forces (Herbert, 1998: 2-3). 
Some were concerned that ‘trouble-women’ would want to join in order to escape 
family obligations or to mingle with military men (Herbert 1998, 2). To overcome these 
perceptions, Congress and the War Department wanted to portray WAAC members as 
women of superior quality and morals. Therefore Congress set much higher standards 
for women to enter the Corps than that of men conscripted. They specified that women 
in the WAAC unit had to be of high moral character and possess technical competence 
(Murnane 2007, 1062). Female cadets joining the corps were expected to meet higher 
educational standards than men joining the military but the women were extremely 
limited in the jobs in which they could take part.  
 
Even with the restrictions and high standards outlined above, women joined the WAAC 
unit. Many of the WAAC women filled administrative jobs, but there was a group of 25 
women in 1942 who were trained as pilots to escort combat planes across the ocean 
(Women Pilots of World War II 2013, 1). Other WAACs were trained in maintenance 
of airplanes and weapons systems. This gave some of the women unique skills and 
experiences they could not find anywhere else during this time (Manning 2010, 1). The 
WAAC units also provided them with on the job training and helped them gain skills in 
the workplace in traditionally female roles as secretaries and administrative assistants. 
They supplied an avenue for them to have a career during the war that was especially 
hard to find in the civilian workforce for women and provided them with a career path 
and the opportunity to progress to the leadership of the WAAC unit itself.  
 
The WAAC units showed they could perform exceptionally in the work they were given 
(Treadwell 1991, 190). The different units received numerous positive reports and 
endorsements. Commanders who had previously fought against having WAAC units on 
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their posts, requested more units once they saw the quality of the work the women were 
producing (Treadwell 1991, 191). An Army Services Inspection Report in May of 1943 
reported, “The conduct of the WAAC personnel both on the job and after working hours 
is satisfactory…The using people heartily endorse the use of WAACs and want to know 
when they are going to get more”  (Treadwell 1991, 192). In October of 1942, after 
hearing reports of women’s successful performance as auxiliary members, and further 
urging from female service members, Congresswoman Rogers introduced a new Bill to 
take the WAACs from an auxiliary unit to a reserve unit of the Army. This was the next 
step toward achieving full military status. The critical juncture of the war provided 
women with the opportunity to participate in military support roles. The women then 
acted as internal agents of change or ‘opportunist’ actors, as discussed in Mahoney and 
Thelen’s theory in Chapter Two, by performing successfully in their given jobs.48 Their 
successful performance and the work of external actors, such as Congresswoman 
Rogers who acted as an ‘insurrectionary’ to create change through the ‘displacement’ of 
old laws, helped to bring about more positive changes for women in the military.  
 
(iii) WAC Legislation 
The War Department was facing further personnel shortages and Army Chief of Staff 
General Marshall worked with Congresswoman Rogers and Oveta Culp Hobby to draft 
the legislation to move the WAAC status up from an auxiliary unit to a reserve unit 
(Brown 1996, 6). With the backing of the War Department, the WAC Bill was 
introduced to the House of Representatives. On July 1, 1943 Roosevelt signed the new 
law establishing the WAC unit (Brown 1999, 6). The new legislation was a positive 
advancement for WAC women because they began receiving pay and international legal 
protection equal to that of their male counterparts, while discarding the 150,000 
maximum on the number of women allowed in the corps. However, the legislation 
discriminated against them in that it did not grant WAC women benefits or the ability to 
achieve the same rank as men. The law did not specify that women could not fill 
combat jobs, but legislators, including Rogers, had made it clear during hearings that                                                         
48 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
incremental change. 
  76 
their intention for the WACs was not for them to be combatants (Brown 1999, 6). It was 
still believed at the time that women did not have the mental or physical strength 
required to be successful soldiers (Tuten 1982, 248).  
 
The personnel shortfalls created by the U.S.’s involvement in World War II were a 
critical juncture in which women were able to move from their private roles in the home 
to fill jobs in the public sphere. Through the work of ‘insurrectionary’ agents, such as 
Congresswoman Rogers and Oveta Culpa Hobby, the WAAC units were created. 
Women’s successful participation in the war and the continuing personnel needs of the 
War Department paved the way for the WAACs to transform into the Women’s Army 
Corps (WACs), which made military women no longer auxiliary members of the 
military, but full reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 
3.3 Policy Changes after the Two World Wars 
After the war, the 2.2 million women who worked in the public domain were expected 
to return to their lives at home. As the view of society at the time stipulated, “women’s 
new roles were only for the duration and that wives and mothers must make heroic 
sacrifices for the nation in this time of need” (Higgonet 1987, 7). Those working were 
pressured by their employers to leave their jobs to make room for the men returning 
from the war (Higgonet 1987, 7). Those that did not want to stop working were often 
looked down on by society and considered rebellious. Many of the women who refused 
to leave were pushed out or criticised for taking the jobs of soldiers, the heroes 
returning from the war (Higgonet 1987, 7). Women’s contributions to private industry 
during wartime were also quickly forgotten once the war had passed (Carreiras 2006, 
9). Despite the expectation of the American public that women would return to their 
lives in the home after the war, many wanted to continue in the careers and jobs they 
had found (Carreiras 2006, 10).  
 
(i) Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 
Over half of the Corps women wanted to stay in the WAC organisation after the war but 
the military had no personnel shortages and therefore no need for them to fill military 
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jobs (Murnane 2007, 1062). Despite the WACs’ ultimately successful performance in 
the war, during a massive armed forces reorganisation, efforts by Chief of Staff 
Eisenhower to establish a place for them as regular and reserve divisions during 
peacetime were initially stalled before Congress in both 1946 and 1947 (Murnane 2007, 
1064). Congress was concerned about integrating the WAC unit into the armed forces 
because they received many complaints and negative opinions on the idea from male 
military members (Herbert 1998, 2). Representative Dewey Short stated, “as far as high 
officers are concerned, and from Major down to Second Lieutenant, and an 
overwhelming majority of the enlisted men, they are against the Corps” (Treadwell 
1991, 747.) Their main concern was that they would one day have to take orders from a 
woman (Treadwell 1991, 747). This opposition from the general male population of the 
military was the main aspect of opposition to the Bill in Congress. 
 
The highest-ranking military leadership did not agree with the general population of the 
armed forces and offered their support for the Bill (Treadwell 1991, 747). Numerous 
top War Department officials, including Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and 
Generals Eisenhower and Vandenberg, testified before the Armed Service Committee 
of Congress in favor of integrating the WAC unit into the armed forces. According to 
General Eisenhower, “In tasks for which they are particularly suited, WACs are more 
valuable than men, and fewer of them are required to perform a given amount of work” 
(Treadwell 1991, 748). Conscription of men was put on hold after the war and the War 
Department leadership was concerned about meeting all of their personnel needs, even 
during peacetime (Brown 1999, 8). This fear of personnel shortfalls and the WACs’ 
successful performance in the war meant they received the support necessary from the 
War Department command to push the legislation through Congress.  
 
There was tension internal to the military regarding the Armed Forces Integration Act 
of 1948, between internal opposition from men inside the ranks, as well as their 
Congressional representatives and support for women’s integration from high-ranking 
War Department officials. Although military men were concerned they may eventually 
have to take commands from women, the War Department officials were instead 
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concerned with personnel shortfalls and they believed that a woman’s service could 
continue in a similar fashion to their service during World War II if they became fully 
integrated members (Brown 1998, 8). There was a tension between the formal policies 
and informal norms of the military. The formal policy was to allow women to be a part 
of the service, while the informal norm was that men held a more privileged status in 
the institution than women and they did not want their place to be threatened.  
 
As the expiration date for the authorisation of the WAC unit drew closer, political 
pressure was building from women who had been in the WAC during the war and from 
their former director, Oveta Culp Hobby and Congresswoman Rogers (Treadwell 1991, 
747). They felt the WACs had worked hard to earn their place in the corps and it was 
unfair for them to be barred from service if they wanted to continue in the military 
(Treadwell 1991 748). For these purposes, Congresswoman Rogers, with the help of 
Oveta Culp Hobby, reintroduced the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 before 
Congress (Binkin & Bach 1977, 6). With the backing of War Department leaders and 
President Truman, the Armed Forces Integration Act was passed on June 12, 1948 and 
officially admitted women into the general military. Although the successful passing of 
this Bill was a significant step toward change and women’s integration into the military, 
it was very restrictive of women’s roles (Binkin & Bach 1977, 7). As was discussed in 
Chapter Two, according to the historical institutionalism approach to path dependency, 
the initial policies set forth in an institution affect new policies in the future (Greener 
2005 2). This was the case in the U.S. military because the 1948 legislation set the 
precedence of allowing women entrance to the military, but it also constrained their 
roles and the last formal policy that constrained female soldiers’ career field choices 
was not lifted until 2013 (Christenson 2013, 1). The discriminatory policies are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
(ii) Discriminatory Policies of the Armed Forces Integration Act 
The legislation specifically stated that women could not command men in answer to the 
male military population’s fears of taking orders from women (Manning 2010, 4). 
Female military members were as limited in rank as during the World Wars. The 
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highest rank they could achieve was colonel, directly below the coveted flag officer 
ranks (Morden 2000, 14). Yet, even if they reached colonel, they could only hold it for 
four years and only one woman from each unit was allowed to hold it at one time. After 
the four years, they were downgraded an entire rank to lieutenant colonel (Manning 
2010, 4). Therefore, although a military woman had worked hard to earn the rank of 
colonel, she would eventually be demoted, even if her performance were exemplary.  
 
The limitations on rank also negatively affected women’s pay. While they did earn 
equal pay to men according to the 1948 Act, they did not have the same opportunity to 
rise through the ranks because of the limit placed on the rank they could achieve and 
their exclusion from many of the core military career fields. They were also barred from 
many combat and weapon related jobs. Combat experience and leadership positions 
were essential to promotions in the military and female members were not given the 
opportunity to have either (Binkin & Bach 1977, 8). Therefore, the military women, 
under the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, were formally discriminated against 
by official policies, which set them at a disadvantaged position in relation to male 
service members.  
 
A further problem was that under the new legislation, it was illegal for a female in the 
armed forces to have a career and a family. Women were kept from having dependent 
children and discharged for becoming pregnant. This was due in part to the perception 
of the American public at the time that women’s first place was at home with her 
children (Murnane 2007, 1066). It was also partly because it was not cost effective for 
the military. The government would lose money from having female soldiers on paid 
maternity leave, or missing work to deal with the needs of a child (Discrimination in the 
Air Force 1970, A20). Therefore, under an Executive Order of the President allowed by 
the Armed Forces Integration Act, it was specified that female service members had no 
choice but to be discharged from the military once they became pregnant (Binkin & 
Bach 1977, 11). They were also to be discharged if they became the legal guardian or 
had ongoing custody of a child under the age limit set by the Secretary of the War 
Department (Murnane 2007, 1066).  
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These specific pay, role and family limitations extremely inhibited women’s 
advancement between 1948 and the 1970s. Also the precedence set of constraining 
women’s roles in the military continues to affect women’s status in the military in 2013. 
Instead of moving toward equality, they were allowed barely minimal entrance and no 
opportunity to have similar careers as their male counterparts. They could not hold 
many of the same jobs, did not have access to the same educational opportunities and 
could not have a family and a career, unlike male service members (Murnane 2007, 
1067). The only considerable benefit that women gained in the 1948 Armed Services 
Integration Act was that they were finally officially recognised as a part of the United 
States Armed Forces.  
 
3.4 The Civil Rights Act Era 
There was a new focus on anti-discrimination and equality for all Americans in the 
1960s and 1970s. This was due in part to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Bill was 
intended to establish specific protections for all American citizens in different areas, 
including employment (Civil Rights Act of 1964 Explained 2013, 1). The evolving 
societal norms at this time also had a positive effect on women’s participation in the 
armed forces. It was becoming socially acceptable for them to work outside of their 
homes. Therefore, more women were looking at the military as a possible career path to 
gain better skills and education. But, ingrained prejudices from the 1948 Armed 
Services Integration Act were hard for military women to overcome with the passing of 
the Civil Rights Act legislation alone (Murnane 2007, 1063). Female service members 
saw they were not afforded any changes from the Civil Rights Act, so they, along with 
women’s groups, moved externally to the institution and applied political pressure on 
Congress and the president (Murnane 2007, 1065).  
 
Along with the pressure from female military leaders and women’s rights groups to 
enforce the Civil Rights Act, the drawn out continuation of the Vietnam War meant the 
military was suffering personnel shortfalls. This was another critical juncture that 
affected women’s participation in the military. The Vietnam War created a greater need 
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for military personnel. This caused the Department of Defense (DoD) to open more 
opportunities to women. With these combined pressures, after three years, in 1967, 
President Lyndon Johnson signed Public Law 90-130. The major changes of this law 
included the lifting of the two percent restriction on women allowed in the military. It 
finally permitted them to reach colonel and flag officer ranks permanently (Murnane 
2007, 1064-1065). This case is further evidence that women only made major progress 
in the armed forces when military leaders were concerned with personnel shortfalls 
during periods of war. Therefore, the critical junctures that occurred due to wars were 
essential to women’s progress in the military.  
 
(i) Legal Battles for Military Mothers’ Rights 
The Civil Rights Act did, however, provide female service members with the legal 
platform necessary to fight for their rights. More women began using the Civil Rights 
Act in their favour and for forcing legal change to occur (Murnane 2007, 1067). Due to 
the hierarchical culture of the military, which calls for strict adherence to the policies, as 
discussed in this section, many women felt they could only force change by going 
outside of the military institution and to the U.S. court system. In reference to Mahoney 
and Thelen’s theory of institutional change, women looked to cause change by working 
as ‘insurrectionary’ actors by displacing the old policies with new policies that would 
not discriminate against female military members.49  
 
The first of these cases was that of Tommie Sue Smith, an Air Force Judge Advocate 
General Officer, who had joined the Air Force with a four-year-old son. As the policy at 
the time stated, Smith had to give up legal custody of her son to join the military and 
could not have him live with her for more than thirty days during the year, or she would 
be discharged (Murnane 2007, 1071).  The old regulation was “designed to make 
certain that a woman granted a commission in the Air Force would not be distracted 
from her duties by family obligations” (Discrimination in the Air Force 1970, A20). In 
Smith’s case, she first requested a waiver to have her son live with her and therefore 
have physical custody, without legal custody. However, her waiver was denied because                                                         
49 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for explanation of Mahoney and Thelen’s theory. 
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she was unmarried (Claiborne 1970, A1). She solved this problem by signing custody of 
her son to her parents and sending him to a military academy within weekend 
commuting distance of her home (Claiborne 1970, A1).  
 
However, in 1969, Smith received an assignment to go to the Philippines (Claiborne 
1970, A1). Smith addressed the issue with her command and she was told she could not 
take her son with her and if she did not take the assignment she would automatically be 
discharged from the military.  Smith filed suit in the U.S. District Court against the Air 
Force. In her suit she pointed out that, “no such regulation applies to male officers and 
that the restriction is prejudicial to all women officers of the Air Force under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution guaranteeing equal rights to women” 
(Claiborne 1970, A1). The Air Force changed their policy the day after Smith filed, 
allowing women to then be legal guardians of minor children and for the children to 
accompany their mothers overseas. This was a major win for military mothers. It also 
proved that women could push change externally when they felt they were 
discriminated against by the institution. In this case, Tommie Sue Smith acted as an 
insurrectionary and worked externally to displace the discriminatory formal policy. 
Although this change was significant, Smith’s case was special because she had joined 
the military after her son was born. Automatic discharge of pregnant women policies 
were still in place, so female members could not start to have children of their own 
whilst in the military (Seigel 2010, 776).  
 
In 1971, a second case came about that further emphasises my argument. Captain Susan 
Struck, an Air Force officer, raised the issue of automatic discharge for women who 
became pregnant in the military. She was a career officer and after she became 
pregnant, she told a disposition board that she intended to give up her child for adoption 
(Captain Asks Judge 1970, A38). The Air Force left her with the choice to either have 
an abortion or leave the military. Captain Struck was a strict Roman Catholic and 
refused to have an abortion (Siegel 2010, 776). She filed suit against the Air Force to 
reverse the policy of automatic discharge for pregnant women because the regulation 
was, according to her suit, “a violation of (1) equal protection, (2) Captain Struck’s 
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right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life, and (3) her free exercise of religion” 
(Siegel 2010, 777). Her case made it before the Federal District Court in Seattle 
(Captain Asks Judge 1970, A38).  
 
The first two decisions on her case ruled in favour of the military, justifying their 
decision by using the military necessity rational, stating that the discharge of pregnant 
women was in the best interest of the military, trumping any discrimination the policy 
brought about (Siegel 2010, 777). However, the initial rulings were overturned in 1972 
and the last Federal District Court to visit the case ruled that the policy deprived women 
of the due process of law (Captain Asks Judge 1970, A38). The court instead suggested 
that pregnant service members should be reassigned in the military if their pregnancy 
interfered with their jobs (Captain Asks Judge 1970, A38). In 1972, two weeks before 
the Supreme Court was able to make an official ruling on the case, the military gave in 
and changed the policy, no longer automatically discharging women who became 
pregnant during their service (Manning 2010, 1073). This was a landmark decision that 
finally allowed military women to start families during their career. Captain Struck was 
another ‘insurrectionary’ actor who had to move her case external to the institution in 
order to enact changes to formal policies that were discriminatory to female soldiers.  
 
The military could also discharge women for immorality (Double Standard 1970, B2). 
During the same time as Susan Struck’s case was winding through the courts, Seaman 
Anna Flores filed suit against the Navy in the U.S. District Courts when she was 
referred for discharge after becoming pregnant out of wedlock in 1970 (Double 
Standard 1970, B2). The father of her child was also in the Navy and no action to 
discharge him was taken. Flores believed the Navy’s policy to discharge un-wed 
mothers was unconstitutional because it discriminated against women by holding them 
to different standards than their male counterparts (Double Standard 1970, B2). Her 
complaint stated, “Miss Flores maintains that she and the class (women) she represents 
are being deprived of due process and equal protection of laws under the Fifth 
Amendment and of the right of privacy under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments of the Constitution” (Double Standard 1970, B2).  
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The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel in 1970, Admiral Plate, testified that he did not 
accept “the rationale that men and women should be held to a single standard of 
morality” (Murnane 2007, 1076). He argued that, “to do so would enable those men 
seeking to find a way to avoid their obligation under the Selective Service Act to find 
women willing to assist them in achieving violations of the morality standard to which 
military members were already being held” (Murnane 2007, 1076). Flores’s 
commanding officer, Capt. C.H. Sigley also believed she should be discharged despite 
her excellent job performance. He stated, “to do otherwise would imply that unwed 
pregnancy is condoned and would eventually result in a dilution of the moral standards 
set for women in the Navy” (Double Standard 1970, B2).  The court found in 1971 that 
the Navy was holding their female members to a double standard and ordered that men 
and women should be held to the same moral standards (Double Standard 1970, B2). 
They ruled the retention of pregnant women should be based solely on their ability to do 
their jobs (Murnane 2007, 1077). However, weeks before the court’s ruling in 1971, a 
new admiral took the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and the Navy 
changed its policy to no longer automatically discharge un-wed pregnant female service 
members effective in 1972 (Murnane 2007, 1077).  
 
Although the court did not rule on Seaman Flores’s case, her action, as an 
‘insurrectionary’ actor who challenged the discriminatory policy external to the military 
institution, forced change in the formal policy internally. The policy formally 
discriminated against women and placed them at a disadvantaged status to male soldiers 
because it held them to a different moral standard for no other reason than their gender. 
This formal policy was a remnant of the unequal gender policy set forth initially in the 
Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948. Therefore, Seaman Flores’s case was 
particularly important because it caused the military to acknowledge and remove the 
formal double standard regarding morals for women in the military. Women’s rights as 
mothers were not the only inequalities challenged by military women in the 1970s. 
Female service members also fought for their entitlements to equal benefits from the 
military.  
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(ii) Women’s Rights for Equal Benefits 
In 1973, the case of Frontiero v. Richardson brought about positive changes for women 
and their families in the military. The policy up to that point was that wives of military 
men automatically received benefits from the government, but husbands of military 
women had to show they were more than fifty percent financially reliant on their wives 
to receive benefits (McFadden 1970, C4). This was due to the belief of society at the 
time that the husband was automatically the breadwinner for the family. Air Force Lt. 
Sharon Frontiero believed this was unfair. Her suit pointed out, “that if her husband 
were the officer and she were the college student the allowances would be paid” 
(McFadden 1970, C4). She filed a class action suit to find the gender-based regulations 
on benefits unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled this policy was unconstitutional 
and the military could not allocate family benefits based on gender (Binkin & Bach 
1977, 45). The court’s majority opinion found that gender could not be used as a 
classification.  It states, “we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and 
must, therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated 
by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is 
unconstitutionally invalid” (Murnane 2007, 1071). The plurality of the court asserted 
there was no reason military wives needed benefits more than husbands in a similar 
situation. The original policy was overturned in 1973 and equal benefits were then 
given to all military members’ spouses (Binkin & Bach 1977, 45).  
 
The Supreme Court made it clear in this case that it is illegal to use gender as a 
classification. The opinion of Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall argued, 
“since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members 
of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our 
system” (Murnane 2007, 1070). The suits filed by Air Force Officers Smith, Struck and 
Frontiero and Navy Seaman Flores collectively were able to overturn military 
regulations that stipulated family rules and benefits by gender. All three of the women 
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discussed above had to act as ‘insurrectionary’ agents in order to displace the 
discriminatory policies externally through the U.S. judicial system. Due to the nature of 
the military institution, in which members often have ‘weak veto powers’ internally, 
their best option was to enact change by external avenues.50 
 
(iii) Changes in Higher Education Laws 
In the early 1970s, women also began to fight military education policies that stipulated 
their exclusions based only on their gender by working as ‘insurrectionary’ agents and 
causing displacement of formal policies by using institutions outside of the military. In 
this case they were able to work through Congress (Murnane 2010, 1075). Education 
benefits were an important advantage of military service and were often used as an 
incentive to join. Women were excluded from military academies, which were 
completely tax funded. Therefore, they were not allowed to have the same education as 
military men. Denying women access to military academies was not only keeping them 
from free education, but also from career opportunities and the ability to become 
officers. The military academies for each service were the premier route for a military 
service member to become an officer (Murnane 2010, 1075). Graduating from one of 
the military academies was looked upon positively for promotion and leadership 
opportunities. As Murnane argued, “since the founding of the U.S. Military Academy in 
1802, the military service academies were long considered to be extraordinarily elite 
educational institutions for men destined for positions of leadership in the U.S. Armed 
Forces” (Murnane 2007, 1075).  Therefore, not allowing female cadets into the military 
academies was starting them out at an unequal and lower level to male service 
members.  
 
Senators Jacob Javis and Jack McDonald began receiving an increasing number of 
requests from women who wanted to attend military academies (Barker 1973, C1). In 
1971, they wanted to nominate women from their states (Barker 1973, C1). They 
proposed a resolution that stated women should not be kept out of the military 
academies because of their gender (Barker 1973, C1). The resolution passed easily in                                                         
50 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 40 for further information on ‘weak veto powers.’  
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the Senate but did not pass the House Armed Services Committee (Murnane 2007, 
1075).  
 
The end of compulsory service for men in 1973 meant there were personnel shortfalls 
that needed to be filled. This was another critical juncture for military women to make 
progress in the military. The end of compulsory service greatly increased the demand 
for women in the military and DoD leadership began actively recruiting them for the 
armed forces (Binkin & Bach 1977, 14). With this new demand, and the end of the 
unpopular Vietnam War, more women became interested in joining the military (Binkin 
& Bach 1977, 14). With this in mind, the Congressmen reintroduced their proposal to 
allow women entrance to the military academies. They believed they would have 
greater support because Congress and the military would be concerned about filling 
their needs for personnel. The House Armed Services Committee once again turned 
down their proposed resolution. However, the committee agreed to hold hearings on the 
issue (Murnane 2007, 1076).   
 
Up to this point, military academies refused to allow females entrance as they were not 
thought of as soldiers and critics feared they would bring down the caliber of the 
training at the academies because women were believed not to be as physically as 
strong as men. During the hearings, the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, Lt. 
Gen. A.P. Clark, testified, “it is my considered judgment that the introduction of female 
cadets will inevitably erode this vital atmosphere” (Murnane 2007, 1076). Military 
leaders were concerned the addition of women would negatively effect male students 
and they did not want women to distract the men during their training by fraternising or 
for women to fill men’s places. General Westmoreland argued that it was “silly” to 
allow women admittance to West Point and that, “it’s depriving young men of the 
limited places that are there” (Women at West Point 1976, 15). There was apprehension 
from the House Armed Services Committee that those women wanting to attend these 
academies may just be looking for husbands and have no interest in soldiering 
(Murnane 2007, 1077).  
 
  88 
The main debate on whether or not to permit women to attend the military academies 
was closely tied to the debate on women in combat. According to the Army’s Vice 
Chief of Staff at the time, General Weyand, on the subject of female academy cadets, 
“the issue of whether women should become cadets at West point is tied directly to the 
basic question of whether Americans are prepared to commit their daughters to combat” 
(Binkin and Bach 1977, 43). Many military leaders believed that women should not be 
admitted to the academies because they were not allowed in combat (Binkin & Bach 
1977, 44). As General Westermoreland argued, “the purpose of West Point is to train 
combat officers, and women are not physically able to lead in combat. Maybe you could 
find one woman in 10,000 who could lead in combat, but she would be a freak and 
we’re not running the military academy for freaks” (Women at West Point 1976, 15). 
Howard Patton, the DoD official in charge of processing congressional nominations for 
the military academies, supported General Westermoreland’s views. He stated, “until 
the enemy hits our shores or if the Commies were at our northern border, maybe we’d 
think about committing women to combat, until then, forget it” (Barker 1973, C1). This 
was one side of the argument against permitting women to attend the military 
academies.  
 
However, this argument for barring women from the military academies because of 
their restriction from combat was countered by Representative Samuel Stratton. He 
issued a press release outlining a government study that found 3,777 out of 30,576 
military academy graduates had never held combat assignments (Murnane 2007, 1077). 
The House Armed Services Committee could no longer use women’s exclusion from 
combat against them and Public Law 94-106 was signed into law in October 1975, 
finally allowing women access to free education at the military academies (Murnane 
2007, 1078). However, the rationale that admitted them showed that Congress and 
society were both still not ready for women to be combatants.  
 
(iv) Opposition to Women’s Equality Laws 
The new laws in favour of women’s equality discussed above were not without 
opposition. There were cases brought before the courts by men that looked to find the 
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new laws passed for the equality of women unconstitutional. In the case of Schlesinger 
v. Ballard, brought before the Supreme Court in 1975, a naval officer forced to retire 
after nine years of service due to two passed over promotions, challenged the law that 
women could stay in the Navy for thirteen years before they were forced to retire if they 
had missed two promotions. The Chief Lawyer for the Appellant, Harriet S. Shapiro 
argued, “where women and men fill substantially the same types of jobs…all officers 
are subject to the basic statute. The special thirteen year statuette applies to women line 
lieutenants and certain staff women…competing for jobs against men but the statute 
provides that women may not serve on naval vessels except hospital and transport 
ships” (Oyez Project, 2011). The thirteen-year statue for some women, therefore 
attempted to make up for their disadvantage when competing for jobs and promotions 
against men with experience on combat ships (Binkin & Bach 1977, 45).  
 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court decided that the law was constitutional 
because women were restricted from sea duty and they therefore had fewer promotional 
opportunities than men (Binkin & Bach 1977, 45-46). The case of Schlesinger v. 
Ballard showed how women’s inequality in one aspect needed to be compensated for in 
some way in order to level the playing field between the sexes. Although this Navy 
policy attempted to make men and women equal, women were still at an apparent 
disadvantage. The four-year extension for them could not make up for the importance of 
sea and combat duty in counting toward promotions, and this was what women in the 
Navy and other branches of the armed forces were missing on their records. Therefore, 
women were in a disadvantaged position in relation to their male co-workers due to the 
formal policy restrictions. The policy acknowledged that male seaman had more career 
opportunities and therefore greater chances for excelled careers.  
 
(v) DoD Policy Changes 
Before the 1970s, the percentage of women in the military remained below two percent. 
By 1975, the number rose to over five percent. At the beginning of the decade, they 
were only one in thirty of the total number of service members recruited. By 1976, that 
ratio had been increased to every one in 13 service members recruited being a woman 
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(Binkin & Bach 1977, 14). With this substantial rise in the numbers of female service 
members during the 1970s and their entrance into the federal military academies, there 
was growing pressure from more female soldiers for the Department of Defense to 
make meaningful changes to personnel policies. Slowly, the military began changing 
several policies. Women were no longer banned from command positions in which they 
would be commanders of both males and females. Aviation training was opened to them 
although they were still banned from flying combat aircraft (Manning 2010, 6).  
 
Female service members were continuously fighting for the right to participate in more 
career fields however, DoD leadership only made small concessions in return. Due to 
the end of conscription and the greater need for personnel, by the end of 1976, all jobs, 
except combat positions, were then unrestricted. As mentioned above, the end of 
conscription was another critical juncture in which the lack of military personnel 
encouraged the DoD to allow women more opportunities in order to meet their 
personnel goals. This changed the gender structure of the military institution because, as 
additional occupations became available, more women began filling non-traditional jobs 
in the military.  
 
At the beginning of the decade in 1972, less than ten percent of female service members 
were assigned to non-traditional jobs. By 1976, that percentage rose to 40 percent of 
women in the military as more career fields were opened (Binkin & Bach 1977, 17). 
Female soldiers used agency and acted as ‘opportunist’ actors to enact institutional 
change by working in the new career fields that were opened to them. In this case, the 
gender structure of the institution changed because individual actors (DoD leadership) 
due to a critical juncture, opened more jobs to women and some female soldiers moved 
into the new career fields, therefore, advancing women’s place in the military. Military 
policies were changing but because women continued to be restricted from the core jobs 
of the military, combat jobs, their promotional and career opportunities were limited. 
Society continued to hold the idea of combat soldier as a male-only right.   
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3.5 The U.S. Invasion of Panama and Military Combat Policy  
Women’s role in the armed forces continued to be a hotly debated topic into the next 
decade. In 1988, in an attempt to standardise what jobs female service members were 
excluded from across the branches, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci created a DoD 
task force to reevaluate women’s roles in the armed forces (Restrictions on Assignments 
of Military Women 2012, 1-2). There was confusion between the branches about which 
jobs women were excluded from because each branch had their own policies, however, 
the task force enacted a new standardised policy for their exclusion in combat. The 
policy, referred to as the DoD Risk Rule, specified that units at high risk to come in to 
combat were officially closed to female members (Restrictions on Assignments of 
Military Women 2012, 2). The DoD Risk Rule perpetuated the ideals behind the 1948 
Armed Forces Integration Act in which women could be military participants as long as 
their exposure to combat was constrained. However, it was still possible for women to 
come in to combat through jobs that the military believed would not be high risk for 
combat, such as in Military Police units (Manning 2010, 7).   
 
The new policy “set a single standard for evaluating positions and units from which the 
services can exclude women. As a result, 30,000 new positions were opened to women; 
however, units supporting ground combat operations remained closed” (Manning 2010, 
7). Public attention was brought to this rule with the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. 
Female Army Captain Linda Bray commanded close to 200 soldiers in Operation Just 
Cause. Her troops were brought in after ground combat troops had cleared much of the 
area. However, her group was sent to neutralise a dog kennel with Panamanian ground 
forces hiding inside. Captain Bray planned a strategy of attack on the dog kennel and 
led her soldiers into fire from the Panamanian troops (Ruffin 2009, 62). In this case, 
Captain Bray was an ‘opportunist’ actor who was able to challenge standard military 
practices by taking the opportunity to lead her unit in a battle.  
 
(i) First Woman Commander in Battle 
Controversy arose when it was heard that Captain Bray had been the first U.S. woman 
to lead troops into battle (Ruffin, 2009: 62). Critics of women in combat thought that 
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this had been done illegally because the public believed it was against Army policies for 
women to participate in combat in any way, let alone leading men into combat (Bruen 
1990, 1). Critics were upset a woman had given an order to kill another human being 
and they accused the DoD of secretively defying the public and sending female soldiers 
to fight (Bruen 1990, 1). However, it was not illegal for women to be in combat and 
about ten percent of the American soldiers entering Panama after the initial invasion to 
patrol dangerous outposts were women because of the wording of the 1988 DoD Risk 
Rule (Manning 2010, 7). These female soldiers, including Captain Bray’s unit were 
assigned to Military Police companies that did not constitute front line units under the 
rule. Therefore, despite the policy exclusions, female soldiers participated in combat 
operations in Panama (Ruffin 2009, 63-64). This is one example of how the 
interpretation of a formal policy can be used to create opportunities for institutional 
actors to cause change.51  
 
Captain Linda Bray received both praise and great criticism from the media and the 
public for doing her job (Bruen 1990, 1). She had fought discrimination from her male 
commanding officer in order to be able to go to Panama with her unit, and wanted 
nothing more than the right to lead her own troops in whatever task she was given by 
the military (Ruffin 2009, 64). When asked her feelings about women in combat, Bray 
stated, “before all this started, I had always wondered what would happen. After this, in 
my opinion, there is no difference [between men and women]. They worked together as 
a team, all my soldiers” (Ring 1990, A1). Women’s rights activists looked at Captain 
Bray’s efforts as evidence that women were capable of performing well in combat 
(Bruen 1990, 2).  
 
Critics of Captain Bray’s participation in combat asserted that the media had 
misrepresented Bray’s accomplishments and went as far as saying Bray herself had lied 
to the media about how large a part she played in the capture of the dog kennel (Ruffin 
1999, 64). Critics looked to discredit Bray in order to argue that women were still                                                         
51 This idea is discussed further in Chapter Five, page X in relation to a loophole in policy that allowed 
women to participate in combat during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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incapable of filling combat positions. As Susan Guenter-Schlesinger argued, “even 
when women enter into more combat-related roles, as they did in…Operation Just 
Cause, they are still encapsulated in a culture that defines their character in oppositional 
terms (nurturing, passive) to the more highly valued character traits (competitive, 
aggressive) of men” (Guenter-Schlesinger 1999, 204). Although Captain Bray had been 
the first to break the combat barrier for female soldiers, no military policies were 
changed in response to her actions and the media attention surrounding her but 
significant changes were visible during the Gulf War in 1990 and those are discussed in 
the following section.  
 
3.6 The Gulf War and Further Integration of Women 
In the next phase, female soldiers’ involvement in the Gulf War, carried out from 1990-
1991, was seen as successful. They were operating under the same DoD Risk Rule as in 
the struggle in Panama, but it was the first time U.S. female service members were 
publically seen close to combat in large numbers (Lancaster 1994, A1). Their successful 
involvement in the war showed DoD leaders, specifically Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin, that women were capable of performing well in forward-deployed jobs. After the 
war in 1993, this led to the opening of more traditionally male military jobs to women, 
including positions on combat aeroplanes and ships (Lancaster 1994, A1).  
 
(i) Women’s Service in the Gulf War 
The U.S. Armed Forces continued to be an all-volunteer service and the Gulf War was 
the first large-scale military operation the U.S. had entered since the end of conscription 
(Persian Gulf War 1992, 1). Therefore more women were needed to participate in the 
military and to be available to deploy to the Persian Gulf. Many female soldiers 
involved in Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War had already been in the armed 
forces as career members (Manning 2010, 7). Female soldiers worked in many different 
jobs and were no longer limited to support positions, although the 1988 Risk Rule on 
combat jobs continued to hold. More women came into combat in their units just as 
Captain Bray had in Panama the year before (Persian Gulf War 1992, 1). They worked 
as truck drivers transporting troops and supplies. They flew helicopters and one woman 
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led a group of Chinook helicopters in Iraq on the first day of the war. They were flying 
non-combat aeroplanes and launching Patriot missiles (Persian Gulf War 1992, 1). They 
also served on Navy hospital and destroyer ships and commanded units of both male 
and female soldiers (Women’s International Center 2011, 1).  
 
The U.S. public began seeing female soldiers in combat-ready uniforms holding guns 
and driving trucks (Enloe 1994, 80). The image of soldiers as male continued to stick 
but the American public was inundated with stories of military women deployed to the 
Persian Gulf. The extensive deployment of female troops and positive media coverage 
of women in the Persian Gulf War helped to change public opinion in the United States 
regarding women in combat roles. Slowly, the public began seeing female soldiers as 
more acceptable. They were performing well in their jobs and receiving positive 
recognition for their actions (Enloe 1994, 80). The media focused on these women with 
human interest stories, showing the female soldiers as patriots fighting for their country 
and as good mothers concerned about their children’s future (Enloe 1994, 81). There 
were 40,000 U.S. women deployed to the Persian Gulf at this time, which made it the 
largest U.S. military deployment of women ever in the world. Out of the eleven percent 
of female service members, close to seven percent were actually deployed to the Persian 
Gulf in support of the war (Enloe 1994, 81).  
 
However, not everyone’s perceptions were changed. Many people in power continued 
to believe that morally women had no place in combat. One critic was General Merrill 
A. McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff at the time. In his testimony before the Senate, 
although he admitted that women were capable of flying combat aircraft, he added, “I 
would personally choose a male pilot over a more qualified woman. I have a very 
traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people” 
(Murnane 2007, 1091). Other critics were also concerned about how women’s 
involvement on combat aeroplanes and ships could affect society. They believed that it 
could open traditionally male jobs to women and move them further away from the 
private sphere of the home (Vobejda 1993, A6). As Kate O’Bierne, vice president of the 
Heritage Foundation argued, “if women are now expected to kill and be killed….we 
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can’t pretend it won’t have a very broad impact on the general society. The feminists 
would have achieved their gender-blind nirvana” (Vobejda 1993, A6). However, the 
positive perceptions of women from the Gulf War were enough for President H. Bush to 
convene a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 
in 1993 (Murnane 2007, 1082).  
 
The commission was established to reevaluate women serving on combat aeroplanes 
and ships. One of the commission members, Marine Corps Brigadier General Thomas 
V. Draude, in regard to his daughter who was a pilot in the Navy, said, “I’m asked 
would you let your daughter fly in combat with the possibility of her becoming a 
P.O.W.?...And my answer is yes, because I believe we should have the best” (Enloe 
1994, 104). In 1993, based on the commission’s positive recommendations, Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin ordered the services to open combat aircraft jobs to women and to 
repeal the exclusion of women on combat ships (Manning 2010, 7). In this case, the 
Gulf War was a critical juncture in which female soldiers and pilots had the opportunity 
to prove they could be successful participants in war. They acted internally as 
‘opportunist’ agents and brought about change by their successful participation in 
varying roles in the war.  
 
(ii) The DoD Ground Combat Rule 
After the Presidential Commission, external pressure from military women and 
women’s rights activists to lift the exclusion policies on all combat jobs grew rapidly. 
Due to the media and senate pressure on the DoD leadership, they made a smaller 
concession and in 1994 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin officially rescinded the 1988 
DoD Risk Rule for women in combat (Lancaster 1993, A1). Aspin stated, “the results of 
this will be that the services will be able to call upon a much larger pool of talent to 
perform the vital tasks that our military forces must perform…right now we’re not able 
to do that” (Lancaster 1993, A1). With this change, 32,700 positions in the Army were 
then opened to female members along with 48,000 more positions in the Marine Corps 
(Manning 2010, 7). A new DoD policy regarding women in combat was established, 
known as the Ground Combat Rule.   
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The new policy stated, “service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for 
which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units 
below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the 
ground as defined below” (Direct Ground Combat Definition 1994, 1). Secretary Aspin 
went on to define direct combat as, “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual 
or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of 
direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes 
place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to 
defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect” (Direct Ground Combat Definition 
1994, 1). The basis of this new policy was to attempt to keep female soldiers out of way 
of an attack by the enemy because it was not acceptable by society to see women dying 
in wars overseas (Burrelli 1996, 13). The policy also tried to keep women from directly 
engaging in fire with the enemy, as it was believed by many that women should not be 
asked to kill (Burrelli 1996, 12). This updated policy was once again based off of the 
original sentiments of allowing women entrance into the military in 1948, in which 
women were allowed to participate in support roles but not take part in the core jobs 
(combat).  
 
There were, however, several exclusions to the policy. Women were barred from jobs in 
which it was not cost effective for the military to pay for separate housing areas. It 
specified that they could not be in units which must physically be attached to ground 
combat troops and they were not allowed to be part of special operations or long-range 
reconnaissance operations (Direct Ground Combat Definition 1994, 1). The last 
restriction policy dictated that all female soldiers were to be excluded from physically 
demanding jobs in which it is believed the majority of women would not be able to 
qualify, therefore continuing to use gender as a job specification (Manning 2010, 8) 
With this Ground Combat Rule, the ban on women in combat jobs persisted and they 
continued to have a more difficult time advancing in rank than their male counterparts 
because they were kept from the elite positions (Manning 2010, 8).  
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The Ground Combat Rule policy also showed that women were not seen as equals in 
the eyes of the DoD and, therefore, had a difficult time being seen as equals by their 
male counterparts. As an article from the Washington Post stated, “it is easier for 
military men to dismiss women as unequal partners with lesser responsibilities when, in 
fact, they are just that” (Moving Military Women Ahead 1993, A20). The career fields 
covered in the exclusion part of the policy were the most highly sought after positions 
in the military, and were also considered the most masculine. The exclusion policy 
effectively stopped any female soldier from reaching the combat status of her male 
counterparts, and therefore, by the military culture, an equal status in the culture of the 
armed forces.52  
 
3.7 Formal Gender Policies in the 2000s 
(i) Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
At the beginning of 2003, as the U.S. military became over-stretched in two wars, there 
was a continuing demand for all recruits, both men and women. This was another 
example of a critical juncture caused by personnel needs for war in which women were 
given the opportunity to participate in more roles and subsequently advance their place 
in the military. As of January 2011, 200,000 female military members had deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan in support of all male combat units (Wood 2011, 1). This was the 
largest deployment of women into war as soldiers in modern times, far surpassing the 
number of female soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm 
(Manning 2010, 10). Many military women from the U.S. and other NATO countries 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have seen and participated in war firsthand (Natalie, 
Interview, October 2012). They have received high military awards and honours, many 
of which were awards saved for those who have been in combat situations (Harrel 2007, 
5). The actions of these women have been publicised and praised in the media, helping 
to slowly evolve public belief that only men can be soldiers (Alvarez 2009, A1). As one 
retired Army Colonel who served as an executive officer for General David Petraeus in 
Iraq stated, “Iraq has advanced the cause of full integration for women in the Army by 
                                                        
52 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 128 for information on military culture.  
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leaps and bounds. They have earned the confidence and respect of their male 
colleagues” (Alvarez 2009, A1).  
 
Due to the guerilla nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the specification between 
the front of the war, and the back, or “behind the lines” (Afshar 2004, 3), has become 
increasingly blurred. It is no longer easy to say that women in support units will not be 
prone to combat situations and attacks because the fighting is taking place in the streets 
of the cities and villages, so the environment of war is changing. The Ground Combat 
Rule governing female assignment policy became obsolete because of the lack of 
distinction between the front lines and the back-lines of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Military women in support positions were continuously exposed to 
combat. The assignment policy did not allow women to be assigned to combat units. 
However, commanders were able to circumvent the policy by temporarily attaching 
women in support roles to combat units, which ultimately became an informal norm and 
practice (Alvarez 2009, A1).  
 
Female soldiers in support positions were often called on to fill positions within the 
combat unit. As one reporter wrote in the New York Times, “Army commanders have 
resorted to bureaucratic trickery when they needed more soldiers for critical jobs, like 
bomb disposal and intelligence. On paper, for instance women have been ‘attached’ to a 
combat unit rather than ‘assigned’” (Alvarez 2009, A1). Therefore, women were 
serving in combat jobs, but were not receiving the credit for it on their military records. 
This case and its theoretical implications are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.53 
Female soldiers, once again, worked as ‘opportunist’ change agents by taking the 
opportunity to fill non-traditional female roles in the military, either willingly or 
unwillingly. Although women performed successfully in combat roles and were not 
receiving official credit because it was against the formal policy, their efforts helped to 
enact change in 2013, with the lifting of the Ground Combat Rule. 
 
                                                         
53 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 161.  
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(ii) Combat Policy 
The overall concern of those opposed to women in combat was that women in combat 
could decrease military capabilities and effectiveness. The critics argued that, “if two 
ground combat forces meet in battle and one is composed, in part, of physically inferior 
personnel, the other force has a distinct tactical advantage. The physically weaker unit 
will be defeated. Equal opportunity on the battlefield spells defeat” (Tuten 1982, 248).  
Critics argued that the perceived weaknesses of women would ultimately be detrimental 
to the effectiveness of the U.S. military and that equality should not play a role in the 
national security of the country. Those in favour of female service members in combat 
roles and other occupations in the military pointed out that many women are capable of 
doing men’s jobs just as well, if not better then many men (Segal 1982, 271). This 
argument was made by both the equal-rights based and civic responsibility feminists 
who argued that gender should not be the basis of exclusion for combat jobs.54 The 
debate on the combat exclusion for women was particularly important because combat 
jobs in the military are considered the elite career track. These jobs are the core of the 
military culture and the majority of the highest-ranking officers come from a combat 
background.  
 
As was discussed in Chapter One,55 a popular argument that was made by advocates for 
opening all military jobs to women was that female military members would not be able 
to be equal members unless combat jobs were opened to them (Guenter-Schlesinger 
1999, 204). Female military members would not gain full acceptance in the military 
until the policies reflect equality. As Representative Schroeder stated, “there has been 
such a feeling that, well, we don’t have to do as much for women, because what have 
they done for the country?” (Vobejda 1993, A6). It was not only women’s exclusion 
from combat that was the problem but also the importance placed on combat jobs and 
their perceived superiority, as was argued by civic responsibility feminists in Chapter 
One. 
                                                         
54 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for equal-rights based and civic responsibility arguments.  
55 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for feminist arguments.  
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Women’s participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan prompted a new commission 
to reconsider women’s roles in the military. President Obama created a commission in 
2009 to examine the Ground Combat policy in place (Bennett 2011, 1). The Military 
Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), made up of active and retired military 
officers, senior enlisted personnel and civilian employees, made their recommendation 
that women should be allowed to fill combat roles in the military. The Obama 
commission reasoned that, “given the nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
women are currently engaged in direct combat, even when it is not part of their formally 
assigned role” (Bennett 2011, 1) They argued the Ground Combat rule should be 
rescinded “because, given current practices for employing women in the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, it seems obsolete” (Bennett 2011, 1). There was no action concerning 
their recommendations from the DoD, Congress, or the President for two years.  
 
At the beginning of 2013, with the US weighed down in Afghanistan, Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta announced that the DoD was going to lift the combat ban on 
women in the military (Military Leaders Lift Ban on Women 2013, 1). Secretary 
Panetta made the decision after receiving a recommendation from The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, wrote in a 
letter to Secretary Panetta that the chiefs all agreed that “the time has come to rescind 
the direct combat exclusion rule for women and to eliminate all unnecessary gender-
based barriers to service” (Bumiller & Shanker 2013, 1). This changed opened 230,000 
positions in the military for women, including those on the front lines (Brook 2013, 1).  
 
According to the media, it was unclear why the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the decision 
at the time. However, the lifting of the ban shows the importance of ‘opportunist’ actors 
and the agency of female soldiers internal to the institution. The lifting of the ban was 
praised by Representatives on the House Armed Services Committee as Representative 
Buck McKoon commented, “after a decade of critical military service in hostile 
environments, women have demonstrated a wide range of capabilities in combat 
operations and we welcome this review” (O’Toole 2013, 1). Secretary Panetta set a 
deadline of November 2013 for the services to provide the new Secretary of Defense, 
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Secretary Chuck Hagel, with “an assessment of the remaining barriers to full 
implementation of a gender-neutral assignment policy” (O’Toole 2013, 1). The 
overturning of the combat ban on women was a  significant accomplishment and a 
move toward greater gender equality in the U.S. military. The following section outlines 
another formal policy in which its overturning also benefited gender equality in the U.S. 
military.  
 
(iii) Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
The Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy against openly gay men and women serving 
in the military is not considered a policy specifically against women, but it is important 
because it affects the gender power structure of the U.S. military. The DADT policy 
was first enacted for the military in 1993. It was set into place for two major reasons. 
One was to attempt to stop discrimination by other service members towards gay men 
or lesbians. The other was to ban openly gay members from serving in the military 
because their presence “would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of 
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military 
capability” (Public Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C. 1993, 1) It is not a coincidence that this 
reasoning was also the basis for excluding women from combat jobs. Although, with 
this law, legally “voluntary admission of homosexuality is not grounds for discharge in 
the absence of sexual conduct that interferes with the mission. In practice, individuals 
with exemplary service records have been involuntarily separated as a result of their 
admission alone” (Segal et al. 1999, 250). It created a culture suspicious of men that did 
not act masculine enough or were not married. Women were also given an especially 
hard time with DADT because their participation in the military alone was enough for 
many to question their sexuality.  
 
DADT created an environment in which gays were not allowed to be open about their 
sexual orientation, and it clearly legitimised the idea that homosexuality had no place in 
the military. It allowed service members to openly categorise gays and lesbians as 
‘others’ and, therefore, as the enemy. Now that DADT was overturned in 2011, gay 
men and women are legally allowed to be open about their sexuality. However, as one 
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female soldier stated, “of course people are going to be nervous about coming out when 
the trend for so long has been to hide who they really are” (Rina, October 2012). The 
discriminatory climate perpetuated by DADT in the first place has made it difficult for 
homosexual service members to feel comfortable being open without fear of 
discrimination (Rina, October 2012).  
 
One female Air Force lieutenant said that she believed the repealing of DADT has 
moved the military culture in a positive direction that will be more accepting of 
differences. She thought that this could help the acceptance of women in the long term 
(Nancy, October 2012). She said, “it shows that we’re moving in the right direction. 
We’re moving away from the ideal notion of the jock football player. This can only be 
good for women too” (Nancy, October 2012). By repealing DADT, the military no 
longer formally sets gay men and lesbians apart as others. The informal norms that 
developed towards homosexuals continues in some instances, but the DoD is moving in 
the right direction to rid the institution of formal discrimination against gay men and 
lesbians by removing the formal ban on their open participation.   
 
The policies of women’s exclusion from combat and DADT set women and gay men 
and lesbians apart from the mainstream male members and openly classified them as 
‘others.’ These formal policies then affected the informal norms of the military 
institution and made it harder for those groups to fit in completely. The military system 
is built on conformity, and for these groups to be visibly set apart, this makes it harder 
for them to be accepted in the culture of the mainstream military.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a historical institutionalism analysis on how formal policy change 
has occurred in the gender power structure of the U.S. military since women’s initial 
inclusion during World Wars I and II. It highlighted the processes of change that have 
occurred in the past as well as the important roles of the actors who were essential in 
forcing change for military women. This chapter is important because it also showed the 
regulations of the initial gender discriminatory policies that were in place and 
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constrained women’s participation and actions in the U.S. military. As was described in 
Chapter One,56 ideas in this thesis are based on path dependency theory, which argues 
that original informal norms and formal rules shape the institution and reproduce similar 
norms and policies over time. This aspect is especially important to consider in Chapter 
Six when obstacles to change are discussed and it is argued that initial discriminatory 
policies and informal norms continue to negatively affect military women in 2013.57  
 
There has been a great deal of social change in the U.S. military since women began 
their integration in 1948. As of 2013, women make up 14 percent of the total active 
duty force and the policy barring women’s job roles in ground combat career fields was 
revoked in 2013. However, throughout history, each time women were allowed entrance 
into the armed forces, it was due to a critical juncture owing to the fear of meeting 
personnel needs. It was, therefore carried out based on the military’s needs of the time. 
Women were only allowed access when their support was absolutely necessary and then 
their participation was constrained. Once the need for them was there, they were still 
not brought in as equals, but were only allowed to partake in roles that were solely 
supportive, and not in the core jobs of the military.  
 
Due to the active roles of Congresswoman Rogers, Oveta Culp Hobby and General 
George Marshal during World War II, female service members were able to make the 
first major step in legally becoming full members of the U.S. Armed Forces. The 
external actors, or ‘insurrectionary’ actors, were able to force changes in the gender 
structure of the military by pushing for access that advanced women’s place in the 
military. From the starting point of the Armed Forces Integration Act, women built their 
rights and challenged discriminatory laws to work towards an actual equal membership 
in the military by relying on outside institutions such as Congress and the U.S. judicial 
system. They were able to change numerous policies which were originally only made 
for men, or made during a time when women were expected to only work in the private 
sphere of the home, in order to make it realistic for a woman to be mother, wife and                                                         
56 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 33 for further information on path dependency theory. 
57 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 44 for the discussion on obstacles to institutional change. 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soldier. The landmark cases of Officers Smith and Struck and Seaman Flores were all 
essential in overcoming the prejudicial policies that stood in the way of women’s right 
to work and be a mother if they so chose. Although many of these discriminatory 
policies were changed by 2013, the exclusionary policies based on gender that were in 
place continued to affect women’s participation in the military and the masculine-
centric culture of the institution.  
 
The formal policies of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and the combat ban against women also 
demonstrated how past formal policies have privileged traditional ideals of masculinity. 
According to path dependency theory, these formal policies also continue to affect the 
informal norms of the military and propagate the informal norm of placing those who 
do not fit the traditional masculine role of ‘just warrior’ as less-than in the institution.  
There has been significant change to the gender structure of the military since women’s 
introduction, however, there are lasting effects from the original privileging of 
masculinity and the masculine-oriented nature of the institution’s roots, despite nearly 
60 years of changes in formal policies. The following chapter discusses in greater detail 
the development and maintenance of gender roles in the U.S. military and American 
society.  
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Militarisation and Gender Roles 
Chapter Four 
 
Introduction 
The first chapter proposed that a feminist institutional analysis would provide a better 
understanding of “the formal architecture and informal networks, connections, 
conventions, rules and norms” of the military institution, and this is essential in 
answering the main research question of this thesis (Kenny 2011, x). This chapter 
begins to build on the feminist institutionalism branch of new institutionalism to 
consider how the interplay of the formal rules and informal norms affect the gender 
power structure of the U.S. military institution and in turn determine to what extend the 
gender institutional culture has evolved. In order to fully answer this question, the 
following chapter provides an overall cultural view of the institution which identifies 
“the social norms and explicates their gendered effects” (Kenny 2011, x). However, to 
best identify this, it is first necessary to provide context of how the U.S. Armed Forces 
fits into American society and the relationship between the two, as “institutions reflect 
political values held by society” (Franceschet 2011, 63). Also, the needs of society 
affect the gender roles of actors in the society. This provides the framework by which 
institutional actors are constrained. Therefore, this chapter looks at the role of American 
society’s culture of militarisation and the military’s prominent role in society. It also 
provides a better understanding of why women’s participation in the military is 
necessary.  
 
This chapter analyses the construction of gender roles in U.S. society and the military 
specifically. It provides examples of the constructed gender roles through narratives of 
women and men whose stories were told in the media during the U.S.’s involvement in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two of the most infamous stories that will be 
discussed are those of Lyndie England, a U.S. enlisted Army clerk that participated in 
the degradation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004, and Pat Tillman, an all-
American football star that gave up a multi-million dollar contract to serve in the 
military and was killed in the Iraq war in 2004.  
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4.1 Militarisation and U.S.  Society 
(i) Normalisation of War 
Militarisation in the United States has permeated American society and culture. War 
became normalised by the standing of a professional, all-volunteer military force, and is 
considered more tolerable because of advancing technologies (Maddow 2012, 20). The 
creation of the all-volunteer, professional military means the United States is no longer 
dependent on reserve units in times of war. The development of a standing army makes 
it easier for Congress to decide to go to war because they are calling on a pool of men 
and women that are already actively in service (Bacevich 2005, 592). The all-volunteer 
force also allowed for the armed forces to set higher moral standards for entrance while 
advancing technology and the need for related skills attracted different kinds of recruits 
(Maddow 2012, 46).  
 
Along with the development of the all-volunteer, professional force, the military 
devised a moral code and system of core values for their soldiers to follow. Chalmers 
Johnson argues that, “the emergence of a professional military class and the subsequent 
glorification of its ideals,” is a sign of a militarised society (Johnson 2003, 2). The quick 
and successful ending of the Gulf War served to solidify this new image of the military 
as technologically superior, strong and moral (Bacevich 2005, 1102). American success 
in the Gulf War was the beginning of what Andrew Bacevich refers to as the new 
American militarism, which is “a marriage of militarism and utopian ideology of 
unprecedented military might wed to a blind faith in the universality of American 
values” (Bacevich 2005, 1100). He argues, “The war’s [Desert Storm] aftermath found 
the officer corps at peace with itself, held at high regard by the American people, and 
presiding over a well-honed military machine” (Bacevich 2005, 1102). With this new 
American militarism, the mindset of war has changed. It is no longer seen as a 
necessary evil or as a last resort but rather as “standard practice, a normal condition, one 
to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist’ (Pfaff 2010, 3). This attitude, along 
with technological advancements that allow the U.S. to engage in wars with fewer 
American casualties and a greater detachment has led to the ‘normalisation’ of war in 
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American society, in which it is seen as an acceptable necessity of being a superpower 
(Bacevich 2005, 1102).   
 
(ii) Values, Morality and Militarism 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about a period of 
American hegemony and dominance. Although there are multilateral threats to the U.S. 
and rising powers such as China, as of 2013, the U.S. continues to be the world’s 
superpower. With this position in the international hierarchy, there has been much 
debate on how to leverage and to what extent to use American power. One of the 
prevailing ideas during the administration of G.W. Bush was that of benign 
imperialism. This idea is rooted in a neo-conservative belief that, “the U.S. is unique 
because it has overwhelming global power but no imperial ambitions” (Ritchie & 
Rogers 2006, 144). Instead, according to Charles Krauthammer, “its [U.S.] principle 
aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international 
system by enforcing, maintaining and extending the current peace” (Krauthammer 
2003, 14). The belief is that the U.S. is not concerned with territorial gain but looks to 
spread its morals and values of democracy, free trade and religious freedom 
internationally in order to create a safer world order (Krauthammer 2003, 14). This idea 
of ‘benign imperialism’ has lingered and permeates American militarised society, 
painting the U.S. military as the protectors and promoters of American moral standards 
and values overseas. 
 
This new and positive view of war in the U.S. has led to the high regard of soldiers, a 
significant change from the Vietnam War, in which the disapproval of the war by the 
American public negatively affected society’s view of the military (Maddow 2012, 26-
27, 46). This is no longer the case. The mantra ‘support the troops’ is common and “the 
one unforgiveable sin is to be found guilty of not supporting the troops” (Bacevich 
2005, 603). The reverence of troops by the American people is solidified by the creation 
of the all-volunteer force. For many, military members are held in high regard because 
they are volunteering to do the jobs that the majority of Americans do not want to do 
and are seen as upholding traditional moral values (Bacevich 2005, 583). This 
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perception is supported by the Gallup pull mentioned in Chapter One in which the 
military has consistently been ranked first in confidence had by society out of all 
American institutions.58 This poll is evidence of the positive view the American public 
has of military personnel. It shows that military service in the U.S. is highly valued, 
while the following section discusses how military service, due to this positive 
perception, can be a path to successful political participation in the U.S. government.  
 
(iii) Militarisation and the Public Sphere 
Military service and politics are closely tied in American society. Johnson’s additional 
“political hallmark of militarism is the preponderance of military officers or 
representatives of the arms industry as officials of state policy” (Johnson 2003, 121). 
The American president is considered the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
the presidents that have not served time in the military have been criticised that they 
may not have the experience or knowledge to lead a military of which they were never 
members (Nagl 2012, 1). As John Nagl states, “the choice to take the nation to war is 
the most important decision a president can make. A commander-in-chief who has 
actually served on the battlefield has personal experience and can make that decision 
only with greater empathy” (Nagl 2012, 1). 
 
The 2012 Presidential election was the first U.S. Presidential election since 1944 to not 
have one candidate with prior military service (Moody 2012, 1). Although this may 
point to a new trend in which less emphasis is placed on military service for the 
presidency, it cannot be ignored that only 12 out of 43 different presidents had no 
military service (Smithsonian Museum of American History, 2012). Credentials of 
military service are used in political campaigns and even as a way to popularise a 
president’s image. A recent image of this strategy was of President George W. Bush 
during a media campaign in support of the ‘War on Terror,’ in which he wore a military 
flight suit on board the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln surrounded by navy pilots. One PBS 
journalist commented, “he flashed that famous all-American grin as he swaggered 
around the deck of the aircraft carrier in his olive flight suit, ejection harness between                                                         
58 Please refer to Chapter One, page 27 for further information on the poll.  
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his legs, helmet tucked under his arm, awestruck crew crowding around. Maverick was 
back, cooler and hotter than ever, throttling to the max with joystick politics...” (Dowd 
2003, 1) President Bush was a pilot in the Air National Guard and was exploiting this 
image to gain support for the war and his presidency (Dowd 2003, 1).  
 
In order for women to not be at a disadvantage in the wider political arena, it is 
important for them, as militarised as American society is in 2013, to have the option to 
participate fully in the American military, as is argued by both equal-rights based and 
civic responsibility feminists in Chapter One.59 History has proven that military service 
can serve as an important precursor to public service and leadership and can affect 
women’s place in society as a whole. Traditional ideas of citizenship also link to the 
same problem of women’s underrepresentation in the public sphere. Military service has 
“constituted a claim to citizenship” (Peterson 2010, 22). Cynthia Enloe argues that 
because of this close connection between soldiering and citizenship, it places women 
below militarised men in society as a whole (Enloe 1993, 25). The emphasis on the 
militarised culture of U.S. society also affects the construction of gender roles in 
politics.  
 
4.2 Militarised Gender Roles 
Each society has specific gender roles and identities that are created by the needs of a 
society and perpetuated by cultural norms. Although culture and roles change over time, 
“ideal types of militarised masculinity and femininity can be seen as barometers for the 
military and strategic culture of a state in global politics” (Enloe 2010, 215).  In western 
society, particularly in the militarised culture of the United States and with the all-
volunteer force of the military in 2013,60 the state has to use these cultural norms to 
condition citizens to be willing participants in war. War is not necessarily a natural state 
for many men; rather, “war is something that societies impose on men, who most often 
need to be dragged kicking and screaming into it, constantly brainwashed and 
disciplined once there, and rewarded and honoured afterwards” (Goldstein 2001, 253).                                                         
59 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for further explanation on feminist arguments.  
60 Please refer to page 104 of this chapter for explanation on the history of the All-Volunteer military 
force.  
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This is in line with arguments made by both the equal-rights based and civic 
responsibility feminists that men are not naturally violent and women are not inherently 
peaceful.61 One of the main ways men are brought into military service in the United 
States is to closely tie together masculinity and soldiering, along with the enhanced 
status and possible political influence that coincides with military service in a 
militarised society. In order to make the connection between masculinity and soldiering, 
clear gender roles are developed and sustained in U.S. culture.  
 
(i) Beautiful Souls 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, one of the core concepts relevant to 
gender roles in the U.S. military is the role of ‘beautiful souls.’ Jean Bethke Elshtain 
argues in 1987 that women are conditioned to fulfil specific militarised roles in U.S. 
society and women and men’s roles are constructed to be both dichotomous and 
complementary in order to fulfil society’s needs during wartime. Women are “construed 
as nonviolent, offering support and compassion” and are there to protect “the 
appearance of purity by cultivating innocence about the historical course of the world” 
(Elshtain 1987, 4).  Due to this construction, Elshtain refers to women’s role in war as 
the ‘beautiful soul’ (Elshtain 1987, 4). The idea of women as beautiful souls effectively 
sidelines them to roles of non-combatants, whether that is a wife, mother or peace 
activist. As Elshtain argues, “women work and weep and sometimes protest within the 
frame of discursive practices that turn one, militant mother and pacifist protestor alike, 
as the collective ‘other’ to the male warrior” (Elshtain 1987, 1). Therefore, female roles 
are set to be exactly the opposite of male roles in order to reinforce masculinity and 
soldiering. Elshtain’s ideas of beautiful soul are originally built from traditional ideals 
and concepts of war. However, although Elshtain’s theory was written based on state 
versus state warfare, her concepts still apply to American war in the current decade. 
This will be discussed further in the chapter.62 
 
                                                        
61 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for feminist arguments.  
62 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 156.  
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As ‘beautiful souls,’ women are expected to be a soldier’s connection to home. Western 
society has masculinised war and feminised peace making women the symbol for home, 
comfort and peace after the war. Their roles “replicate traditional perceptions of women 
as innocent and defenseless, on the sidelines of conflict” (Sjoberg 2010, 215). The idea 
of women’s roles separate war from peacetime and make it easier for men to disconnect 
from their home lives while fighting. Women as innocent and defenseless also works to 
reinforce the idea of the protection of women from the horrors of war as a motivating 
factor in convincing men it is their duty to fight. As one Vietnam War veteran wrote, 
“I’d like to think something would not be touched by this brutality and vulgarity. Up to 
now, it’s been women” (Goldstein 2001, 305). The expectation of women to be 
innocent and peaceful was contradicted by the case of Lyndie England that will be 
discussed later in this section.63 She was an enlisted Army clerk that outraged the world 
when pictures of her degrading male Iraqi detainees were released. The shock and 
outrage was not only focused on the treatment of the prisoners by U.S. personnel, but 
was to a large extent focused on the fact that the primary tormentor was a woman 
(Zernike, 2005: 1). 
 
The feminine gender role of ‘beautiful soul’ was also constructed to symbolise the 
tender and feminine side of the state. This is particularly true in American society. The 
United States places a strong emphasis on the idea that their wars are ‘just’ and their 
intentions are pure, as discussed above (Enloe 2010, 216). The U.S. does not want to be 
seen as an unfair, aggressive bully (Enloe 2010, 216). In order to balance the war, the 
state must also be concerned with the image of their legitimacy both domestically and 
abroad. Cynthia Enloe argues that, in the United States, “the emphasis on traditional 
femininity shows the need to appear (tender and) just” (Enloe 2010, 216). Keeping 
women as ‘beautiful souls’ perpetuates the image that the U.S. can be both militarily 
strong (masculine) and just and fair (feminine) (Enloe 2010, 216). This is tied to the 
idea of benign imperialism discussed in the first section in which the U.S. has strong 
military power but no imperialistic desires and instead looks to spread peace and liberal 
democracy while promoting ‘just’ principles.                                                          
63 Please refer to page 116 of this chapter. 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American society has evolved since Elshtain originally wrote her theory, women are 
allowed to serve in all positions of the armed forces, the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy 
was overturned and “the end of the Cold War brought a phase of relative peace; society 
got accustomed to less militarised models of masculinity” (Vogel 2010, 3). Vogel 
argues, however, that Elshtain’s gender dichotomy was updated and re-employed by the 
George Bush administration to garner support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Due 
to the changes in American society, she argues that Afghan women took the place of 
Western women and were “conceptualised as a compensatory beautiful soul (pictured as 
helpless women and children tyrannised by the Taliban) to underline the myth of 
protection and closing the gap modern women might create” (Vogel 2010, 4). Vogel 
argues that the ideas of strong, yet just were perpetuated through construction of gender 
roles by the George Bush administration to further justify the war in Afghanistan. She 
states, “all of a sudden Afghan women had to be rescued” (Vogel 2010, 5). President 
and Laura Bush brought the subject of women’s rights to the forefront of justification 
for the war in Afghanistan after it had already begun (Vogel 2010, 5). They were able to 
garner support for the war from groups in the American feminist community, which 
further legitimised their actions.  
 
The feminine gender role of ‘beautiful souls’ is complicated and undermined by 
women’s involvement in the U.S. military. The traditional role is ignored but has not 
fully evolved and therefore causes tension. Some feminists cite this as one reason why 
women’s involvement in the military is beneficial to feminism.64 Since traditional 
gender roles kept women away from combat on purpose to reinforce the link between 
masculinity and soldiering, women’s introduction into the military as equals is 
especially difficult and problematic on many levels. The case of Jessica Lynch 
discussed later in this section, exemplifies the difficulties of female soldiers in relation 
to the ‘beautiful soul’ gender role.65 Lynch was a female soldier that was injured and 
captured while serving in Iraq. The media was quick to emphasise that she had fought                                                         64 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for feminist arguments.  
65 Please refer to pages 114 of this chapter.  
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courageously until the end, while at the same time highly publicising her rescue by male 
Special Forces soldiers (Schmidt & Loeb 2003, A.01). She partially fitted the ‘beautiful 
soul’ role by being a victim at the end, but that was largely contrasted against the image 
of her in combat in the first place. 
 
Although women are now allowed in the U.S. Armed Forces, and many are exposed to 
violence, as Lynch was, the military is very careful about how it “uses and deploys 
women” because it wants to ensure that women’s involvement in the military “will not 
subvert the fundamentally masculinised culture of the military” (Enloe 2000, 238). This 
could in turn cause some young men to not want to join. As Ann,66 an Army Staff Sgt. 
said, “the military has been a male culture for generations, and there are men who don't 
want to give it up, like it's threatening their masculinity to have women in the military” 
(Ann, October 2012). This is one reason why some in the U.S. have fought so hard to 
keep women out of combat jobs.  
 
Although the gender construction and narratives discussed in this section regarding 
Western women continued to occur during both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it 
cannot be ignored that, with women participating in the military and in other public 
spheres, many Western women no longer completely fit the idea of ‘beautiful souls.’ 
This is beneficial to women’s place in society because they are breaking traditional 
gender stereotypes and roles. In some instances, it has also set them in a separate 
category. They do not easily fit the category of ‘beautiful souls’ because they are not 
passive and non-violent observers, but they cannot be seen as ‘just warriors’ either 
simply because they are not male. It seems that instead, Western women, particularly 
those participating in the war, are in a category of their own as a ‘third gender.’ The 
idea of female soldiers as a ‘third gender’ will be discussed further in Chapter Five.67 
 
 
                                                         
66 All names of interviewees have been changed in order to protect their anonymity.  
67 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 156. 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(ii) Just Warriors 
The male role in society and war is less complicated than the various female roles in 
these arenas. However, it is complicated by the evolving expectations of society and the 
all-volunteer force. American society no longer has the expectation for all men to be 
soldiers. The slight fracture between the citizen and warrior is seen in that civilian men 
who choose not to join the military during wartime are not shamed. However, as the 
case of Andre Shepherd discussed below will show, those who desert the military after 
joining in order to avoid war are shamed and seen as traitors (Dougherty 2011, 1). For 
the men that do join the military institution, their role is to be a ‘just warrior’ (Elshtain 
1987, 4). The male gender role is completely opposite that of the ‘beautiful souls’ role 
of women. They are to be tough and not show emotion as their role of warrior “revolves 
around a taboo of tenderness, not a celebration of violence” (Goldstein 2001, 268).  
 
Their role is to display the military values of bravery, courage and toughness. For the 
purposes of this thesis, as was discussed in Chapter One, these values are considered the 
prized ‘just warrior’ characteristics or the traits of the reigning hegemonic masculinity 
in the U.S. military.68 The cases of Pat Tillman and Chris Carter, discussed later in the 
section, demonstrate the characteristics expected of ‘just warriors.’ Pat Tillman was a 
professional football player who gave up a multi-million dollar contract to join the 
Army (Freeman 2002, 1), while Chris Carter courageously helped to save an elderly 
woman in the middle of gunfire (Legon 2003, 1). The characteristics Tillman and Carter 
exemplified are often considered masculine traits by U.S. society, because of their link 
to military practices.  
 
Not all American men serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, in fact only around one third of 
the current male population have spent time in the military (Jones 2004, 1). However, 
all men in American society “are marked by the warfare system and the military 
virtues” (Goldstein 2001, 284). Non-military men are also expected to portray the same 
characteristics and military virtues such as strength (both physical and mental), tenacity, 
courage, and leadership that are expected of soldiers (Goldstein 2001, 284). In other                                                         68 Please refer to Chapter One, page 12 for further information on multiple masculinities.  
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words, the masculine ideals of military men are the standard against which all other 
U.S. males are compared. This is the case because society trains boys to be possible 
soldiers (Goldstein 2001, 285). 
 
(iii) Construction and Maintenance: Gender Roles in U.S. Society 
From a young age, children are guided into gender roles based on both their biological 
sex and social expectations set by their society. As the U.S. is a militarised culture, 
attention is often more focused on moulding the roles of boys as they are assumed to 
possibly become soldiers (Goldstein 2001, 287). Goldstein argues that boys are forced, 
through shame, to toughen-up and to receive harsher punishments than girls. They are 
taught that showing emotion is feminine. Then they are exposed to competitiveness of 
strength through sports. Although many girls in the U.S. also play sports, there is a 
greater expectation for boys to participate (Goldstein 2001, 289).  
 
Boys are often taught what is masculine through dichotomous language and thinking, as 
discussed in Chapter One.69 Charlotte Hooper warns against this dichotomised thinking 
as it enforces gender stereotypes put forth by society (Hooper 2001, 45). She also 
argues that the masculine characteristic is more valued, making the feminine 
characteristic of the pair seems less than. She provides several examples such as 
“hard/soft, rational/irrational and strong/weak” (Hooper 2001, 43). J. Ann Tickner 
maintains that dichotomised thinking can also lead to over simplistic thinking such as 
men are warlike and women are peaceful, which is the line of thought used by the ‘ethic 
of care’ feminists against women’s participation in the military (Tickner 2001, 6). 
Children learn about their own roles by contrasting them as opposite to the other 
gender.  
 
The media also plays an essential role in constructing and maintaining societal gender 
roles. The stories they tell from times of war and how they portray men and women in 
different roles naturalises gender roles in society. They often “depend on the ideologies 
of gender roles” (Peterson 2010, 21), which, in turn, affects the way those roles are                                                         
69 Please refer to Chapter One, page 18 for further information on gender dichotomies.  
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perceived in society. The media helps to promote certain characteristics of different 
gender roles.  
 
4.3 Contemporary Examples of the Construction of Militarised Gender Roles 
To further explain the construction of militarised gender roles through the media, this 
chapter employs five illustrative examples of news stories told during the U.S. wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. These are the stories of Pat Tillman, Chris Carter, Andre 
Shepherd, Jessica Lynch, and Lyndie England. The stories of Pat Tillman and Chris 
Carter clearly promote characteristics of informal and formal ideal military men, or ‘just 
warriors’ while the story of Andre Shepherd illustrates the opposite characteristics. The 
stories of Jessica Lynch and Lyndie England show which characteristics of women are 
prized and accepted in U.S. society and how naturalised these characteristics are by the 
shock and horror of the Lyndie England case. These specific examples were chosen 
because they were all highly publicised in the American media and each case illustrates 
the prevalence of the expected gender roles in the military that were discussed above. 
 
(i) Jessica Lynch 
The story of Jessica Lynch is an excellent example of how the media and the military 
perpetuated the ideas of established feminine gender roles. Jessica Lynch was an 
American female soldier in Iraq. The reported story was that Lynch had been taken 
prisoner by Iraqi forces after her convoy was ambushed in April 2003. It was 
broadcasted that Lynch “fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers after Iraqi 
forces ambushed the Army’s 507th Ordinance Maintenance Company, firing her 
weapon until she ran out of ammunition” (Schmidt 2003, A.01). It was reported that 
Lynch, injured with multiple bullet and stab wounds, was tortured for eight days by her 
Iraqi captors. A daring and publicised rescue was then carried out by U.S. Special 
Forces to save the young, female soldier (Kampfiner 2003, 1). Her rescue was filmed 
and given to media outlets. The rescue “could not have happened at a more crucial 
moment, when the talk was of coalition forces bogged down, of a victory too slow 
coming” (Kampfiner 2003, 1). Her rescue boosted morale and was carried out “in the 
most macho made-for-TV moment of the war by elite teams of hunky U.S. Army 
  117 
Rangers and U.S. Navy SEALs” (Morford 2003, 1).  In the American media, she and 
those who saved her were hailed as heroes.  
 
It was eventually revealed, however, that the story of Jessica Lynch portrayed by the 
media was not based on facts. Lynch had not been shot or stabbed; rather her injuries 
were from the crash of her Humvee. She had not gone down fighting as she was 
knocked out by the crash. She testified before Congress that the “story of the little girl 
Rambo from the hills who went down fighting was not true” (Delong 2007, 1). She 
went on to say at the same hearing:  
 
At first I didn't even realise … the stories that were being told. It was quite a 
while afterwards, and then I found out. It was a little disappointing. And I knew 
that I had to get the truth out there because, one, I wouldn't be able to live with 
myself ... knowing that these stories were portraying me to do something that I 
didn't (Johnson 2009, 1).  
 
It was also found that her captors took her to an Iraqi hospital and then fled. The doctors 
at the hospital said they gave Lynch the best care they could and that the Americans 
were told the Iraqi fedayeen70 had fled the day before the rescue (Kampfiner 2003, 2).  
 
Lynch’s story is of particular interest here, not only because of the deliberate 
inconsistencies of the facts, but also because it delivered clear messages of appropriate 
gender roles in the military. Lynch became an American hero and “was characterised as 
brave beyond her femininity (fighting) but limited by it (needing an elaborate, public 
rescue)” (Sjoberg 2010, 211). The media made it a point to reiterate how abnormally 
brave it was of Lynch that she went down fighting, as was initially reported, as it went 
against the informal norm expected of her femininity, yet this would have been the 
formal expectation for any soldier. This point became special because she was a 
woman. The public rescue reinforced Lynch’s female role of victim, needing rescuing                                                         
70 The Iraqi fedayeen were an irregular unit and paramilitary force under the Iraqi Army. Fedayeen 
means, “Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice.”  
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by male soldiers. There were also male soldiers captured, but all the emphasis was put 
on saving the young, American ‘girl’ (Sjoberg 2010, 211).   
 
Therefore, in one story, Lynch was portrayed as both an especially courageous (female) 
hero and as a helpless victim (Sjoberg 2010, 211). Lynch’s participation in the military 
was the only outlier in the makeup of Jessica Lynch as a ‘beautiful soul.’ Therefore, her 
participation was explained away as “a girl who wanted some adventure and just 
happened to end up in an army supply tank with a gun in the desert in Iraq” (Sjoberg 
2010, 211). Her story was that she was a reservist who had joined to be able to see the 
world. This characterisation of her effectively downplayed Lynch’s image as a ‘soldier’ 
(Sjoberg 2010, 211). One enlisted female Army solider confirmed there was an informal 
stereotype in the military in which women were sometimes seen as only participating in 
the military for a temporary adventure and “weren’t real soldiers” (Connie, November 
2012). She said, “there’s this idea that we [women] only joined because we wanted a 
little adventure, like we think it’s a game and don’t realise we’re fighting a war. I think 
it’s worse when you’re in the reserves. My dad was in the Army. I know how things are. 
I’m not here for a good time” (Connie, November 2012). In Lynch’s case, this 
characterisation of her effectively downplayed her image as a ‘soldier’ (Sjoberg 2010, 
211). 
 
(ii) Lyndie England 
Jessica Lynch’s image of ‘beautiful soul’ was contrasted in the media during the war 
with that of Lyndie England. England’s case was special because she was characterised 
as everything a woman should not be (or as a ‘bad woman’) while at the same time she 
was portrayed as a victim. Lyndie was a private first class, administrative clerk for the 
Army. She was referred to as “a Jessica Lynch gone wrong” (Rich 2004, 1). She was 
divorced, an avid smoker, and had a baby out of wedlock while in the army (Zernike 
2005, 1). The media reiterated these points after the scandal broke regarding Abu 
Ghraib prison (Zernike 2005, 1). England held an administrative role at Abu Ghraib and 
was dating one of the male prison guards, Corporal Charles Graner (Zernike 2005, 1). 
The scandal broke when pictures were revealed of England posing with male, Iraqi 
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prisoners in degrading poses (Rich 2004, 1). The pictures of a young, American woman, 
enjoying the degradation of male prisoners was extremely shocking to the American 
public (Rich 2004, 1).  
 
Lyndie England went against the biological myths of essesentialised femininity and the 
informal role of ‘beautiful soul,’ in which women were seen as peaceful and more 
considerate of others than men (Sjoberg 2010, 212). The men involved in the scandal 
were “instantaneously dismissed as a few rotten apples, with no indictment at all of the 
culture that produced them” (Rajiva 2007, 220). For the women, however, including 
England and two others, Megan Ambuhl and Sabrina Harman (who did not receive as 
much attention because they were not the main focus of many of the pictures, as 
England was) there was much discussion on how these women could have turned 
villainous (Rajiva 2007, 218). Enloe argues that the lack of interest in the male soldiers 
is as telling to the state of gender bias as the intense scrutiny of the female soldiers. She 
states, “women in presumable masculinised places, such as a military prison in a war 
zone, make a better ‘story’” (Enloe 2007, 99).  
 
The women were portrayed in the media as the victims of the patriarchical society of 
the military. Critics of women in the military used their participation in the scandal as 
an argument that women should not be close to the front lines of war. They argued that 
women could not handle full integration because men and women play off one another 
and create sexual tension. As Republican Peggy Noonan argued after the scandal: 
 
Can anyone imagine a WAC of 1945 or a WAVE of 1965 acting in this manner? 
I cannot. Because WACs and WAVEs were not only members of the American 
Armed Forces, which responsibility brought its own demands in terms of dignity 
and bearing; they were women. They apparently did not think they had to prove 
they were men, or men at their worst. (Rajiva 2007, 218) 
 
Noonan’s argument is twofold. On one hand, she is saying that men make women do 
bad things, while also implying that women in today’s military feel like they have to act 
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like men in order to fit in. The first half of this statement is problematic and the second 
half true in some instances. It is the feminine gender role of ‘victim’ that leads many to 
believe women are not responsible for their own autonomy. Chapter Five discusses the 
argument that women feel that they have to behave like men in the military.71  
 
It was argued by England’s defence lawyer that England was the victim of a vicious 
man (Levy 2005, 3). Her defence argument was that Graner had told her to pose in the 
photographs and she was put in a position where she felt like she had to. In her trial, 
when the judge asked her why she had taken part in the degradation of the Iraqi 
prisoners, she stated, “ he [Charles Graner] asked me to…I refused at first…They were 
being very persistent, bugging me, so I said okay, whatever…I was yielding to peer 
pressure” (Levy 2005, 3). Although on a much lesser scale, one of the enlisted Army 
women interviewed supported this argument in that she has felt pressured to fit in with 
the male soldiers in her unit. She said, “I felt pressure to act a certain way sometimes 
and I gave in. My mom would wash my mouth out with soap if she heard the way I 
talked over there [Afghanistan]” (Regina, November 2012). The actions she took were 
her own choices but she acted with ‘bounded agency’ in that her actions were 
constrained by the norms of those around her. England’s defence that men made her 
behave in the way she did, along with many conservative commentators’ argument that 
England’s actions were the product of influence from men at war, shows just how 
deeply ingrained the characterisations of gender roles are in American society.  
 
In American society, only men are seen as capable of violent behaviour. The shock of 
the Abu Ghraib scandal was only partially regarding the inhumane treatment of Iraqi 
prisoners by American soldiers; the main outrage by the media seemed to be that the 
persecutors were women. As Cynthia Enloe argues, the American public was shocked 
because “women were not—according to the conventional presumption—supposed to 
be the wielders of violence and certainly not torture” (Enloe 2007, 100). Conservatives 
such as Rush Limbaugh were quick to blame England’s actions not only on a bad man 
but also on culture. He argued, “I mean, I don’t know if it’s just me, but it looks like                                                         
71 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133.  
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anything you’d see Madonna or Britney Spears do onstage” (Rajiva 2007, 217). 
England herself argued that the environment she was in did nothing to discourage 
degrading the prisoners. She stated, “when we first got there, we were like, what’s 
going on? Then you see staff sergeants walking around not saying anything [about the 
abuse] you think, OK, obviously it’s normal” (Rozen 2012, 1). In both instances, they 
were taking away women’s autonomy, as it was believed that women could not behave 
in such a manner on their own. England’s actions were therefore contradictory to the 
established informal feminine gender role of ‘beautiful soul.’  
 
(iii) Pat Tillman 
Pat Tillman was a professional football player who gave up his $1.2 million yearly 
contract with the Arizona Cardinals in order to join the Army as an enlisted Ranger. His 
brother, a professional minor league baseball player joined him in enlisting after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. His friends and family described him as 
someone who was a “blend of machismo and humility, of ego and selflessness” 
(Freeman 2002, 1). His decision to join the Army had “a lot of people - both in and out 
of the sports world - calling him a hero while simultaneously questioning his sanity” 
(Freeman 2002, 1). Tillman was dubbed a hero before he had even left for the war. 
Tillman’s high school coach said, “he was feeling everyone was making a big deal of it 
and he had not seen a lot of action” (Pennington 2004, 3). The Secretary of Defence at 
the time, Donald Rumsfeld had acknowledged how special and selfless Tillman was for 
joining the military when his country needed him (False Tales of Heroism 2008, 1).  
 
It was reiterated in the media, but not perpetuated by Tillman or his family, how 
selfless, courageous, and tough Tillman was in everyday life. Friends described him as 
someone that was always up for a challenge and wanted to accomplish things others 
could not (Freeman 2002, 2). His coach said he was not surprised when Tillman made 
the decision to enlist because “the essence of the man was to help somewhere else if he 
felt he was needed to help” (Pennington 2004, 2). Tillman perfectly embodied the 
characteristics of ‘just warrior’ the Bush administration was looking to portray. He was 
selfless, strong and courageous (Freeman 2002, 2).  
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The military and media showed just how dependent they were on Tillman’s image to 
boost public opinion and morale for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan by the way 
Tillman’s death was handled (What Happened to Pat Tillman, 2009: 1). Tillman was 
killed in 2004 while serving in Afghanistan with his brother. His unit was attacked and 
separated while on patrol. Tillman led part of his group back to help those in a broken 
down vehicle. In the confusion and ensuing gunfire, another American soldier 
accidentally killed Tillman. From 2001 to 2011, around 50 U.S. troops were killed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘friendly fire’72 (Huddleston 2011, 1). However, Tillman’s 
case was the most publicised and the fact that he was killed by ‘friendly fire’ was 
hidden from the public and his family initially. Members of his unit were told to lie to 
his brother about how exactly Tillman had died (Leary 2004, 1-2).  
 
Tillman was portrayed by the military and the media as a hero who had died for the 
American cause. Details on his death were vague and delayed (What Happened to Pat 
Tillman 2009, 1). Instead, the media reiterated all of his selfless and brave qualities and 
how he had done his part for serving in the war. Through pressure from Tillman’s 
family, however, the true details of Tillman’s death emerged (Luo 2007, 2). His mother 
and brother were upset that Tillman’s story had been used to garner support for the war 
by lying about the circumstances of his death. His brother testified that, “a terrible 
tragedy that might have further undermined support for the war in Iraq was transformed 
into an inspirational message that served instead to support the nation’s foreign policy 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Luo 2007, 2). They testified in front of Congress to try 
to find those responsible for covering up his cause of death. Seven investigations were 
conducted and several military officers, including one, three-star general were punished 
for their roles in the cover up of Tillman’s story (Luo 2007, 2).  
 
Pat Tillman’s case exemplified the ‘just warrior’, masculine role political and military 
leaders looked to portray. Tillman gave up a lucrative sports career and left his new 
wife to go overseas to serve in the war. Tillman’s story aligns with formal core values                                                         
72 Friendly fire is when a soldier is accidently fired upon by soldiers from their own country or an allied 
country.  
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of the military services, which will be discussed further in the following chapter,73 
because he put service to the military and his country before his own desires. The 
majority of the female soldiers interviewed in this study described what they believed 
was both formally and informally the military’s ideal soldier as selfless, just as Tillman 
was described in the media. One female solider, Ronda said, “I think the military would 
even put selflessness above strength. You have to be at least a little bit selfless to put 
yourself through some of this anyway - especially if you know what you’re getting 
yourself into” (Ronda, October 2012). The military covered up the real cause of Pat 
Tillman’s death because they felt it was bad publicity for the war and the military (Luo 
2007, 2).  
 
(iv) Chris Carter 
Captain Chris Carter was another Silver Star recipient whose story and positive 
masculine characteristics were overemphasised in the media. He earned his Silver Star74 
by rescuing an elderly Iraqi woman from a bridge that was caught in the middle of an 
exchange of gunfire between insurgents and U.S. military personnel in Baghdad (Legon 
2003, 1). Carter’s story was heroic but the fact that he rescued an elderly, helpless 
woman was given the most attention. Focus was also then placed on Carter’s own 
personality and characteristics. It was not enough that he had risked his own life to save 
a female civilian, there were also news reports on his compassion, sense of humour, and 
love for country music. A quote from the Senator from Carter’s home state of Georgia 
perfectly illustrates how Americans picture the ideal military man, or ‘just warrior’. 
Senator Chambliss said, “he loves his family, his country, not to mention Hank 
Williams Jr., too. Now that’s my kind of all American hero” (Legon 2003, 1). Carter 
quickly gained semi-celebrity status and many news stories were written on him. Other 
successes of the war in Iraq were also directly linked to him and his unit (Sjoberg 2010, 
213). Stories about Carter “were characterisations of what today’s U.S. soldier should 
be - still virile, strong, and self-sacrificing but also closely connected to the (women) 
civilians who remain the casus belli for men’s wars” (Sjoberg 2010, 213). These aspects                                                         
73 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 139 for further discussion on the core values of the military.  
74 A Silver Star is the third-highest military decoration for value.  
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of Carter were portrayed repeatedly in the media. They supported the informal male 
gender role of ‘just warrior’ in which the soldier was both courageous and 
compassionate to civilian women.   
 
(v) Andre Shepherd 
Andre Shepherd’s narrative sits in opposition to that of Pat Tillman and Chris Carter’s 
stories. Andre was an Army specialist, working on repairing apache helicopters in the 
Iraq War. After one, six-month deployment in Iraq, while based out of Southern 
Germany, he decided that he did not agree with the U.S. war in Iraq and filed for 
asylum with the German government (Meyer & Kaiser 2008, 1). Shepherd’s argument 
for leaving the military was that he believed he would be “fighting for the rights of 
people,” but after his time serving in Iraq, he believed the U.S. military’s involvement 
in Iraq was doing more harm than good (Shepherd 2009, 5). When news of Shepherd’s 
case for asylum in Germany reached U.S. soldiers, other military members quickly 
admonished him. One military website quotes, “some advocated revoking his American 
citizenship. Others said he should be put to death, or, at the very least, endure years of 
hard labour in a military prison. Words such as ‘bad apple’ and ‘coward’ were invoked” 
(Dougherty 2011, 1). Many U.S. soldiers saw Shepherd as a traitor (Dougherty 2011, 
1).  
 
Military leadership made few comments on Shepherd’s case. The DoD and the media 
often play down cases of military deserters such as Shepherd. According to military 
statistics, “between 2001 and 2006 at least 8,000 members of the military had deserted” 
(Dougherty 2011, 1). Although the number of soldiers deserting has been increasing 
since the start of the Iraq war, “Pentagon figures earlier this year showed that the 
military does little to find those who bolt, and rarely prosecutes the ones they find. 
Some are allowed to simply return to their units, while most are given less-than-
honourable discharges” (Army Deserters up 80 Percent 2007, 1). While the cases of 
Tillman and Carter were played up in the media to garner support for the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, in comparison, the case of Andre Shepherd was given only a passing 
  125 
notice and covered mainly by the German media. Many in the institution instead 
dismissed him as a coward and a traitor.  
 
The examples discussed above of male and females’ militarised gender roles illustrate 
how gender roles are constructed and perpetuated through the media in American 
society. War hero, and in England’s and Shepherd’s cases villainous, stories like these 
construct and reproduce expectations of masculinity and femininity in the American 
military. They teach what the norms of the military are and what is honoured or 
abhorred. Laura Sjoberg argues that war stories such as these “form the basis for the 
United States’ (military) identity, both as it prosecutes an uncertain battle and as it 
ventures into he 21st century” (Sjoberg 2010, 217). The story of Jessica Lynch 
reinforced the traditional and informal role of ‘beautiful soul’ by showing a brave, 
feminine girl who needed to be rescued by male soldiers while the case of Lyndie 
England showed exactly the opposite of Lynch’s idealised femininity, while 
simultaneously trying to portray her as a victim of men’s wars. The cases of Pat Tillman 
and Chris Carter constructed idealised characterisations of the modern ‘just warrior,’ as 
all-in-one courageous, selfless, and compassionate men. Andre Shepherd’s case, on the 
other hand, showed the opposite of ‘just warrior’ in that he was formally labeled a 
coward for wanting to leave the military and the war before his enlistment period was 
completed. These narratives promoted specific military gender roles. 
 
Conclusion 
The different aspects discussed in this chapter contextualise the link between American 
society and the military as well as their prescribed gender roles. In the first section, it 
was shown that the U.S. is a militarised society and places significance and honour on 
military service. There has traditionally, and continues to be, a link between masculinity 
and war fighting, and this link, along with the honour of military service, places women 
at a disadvantaged position to men in U.S. society if women are not allowed to be full 
participants in the U.S. Armed Forces. The idealised gender roles of ‘beautiful souls’ 
and ‘just warriors’ in U.S. society and their relation to the military were also discussed 
and showed the expectations for masculinity and femininity. These expectations are 
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especially evident in the U.S. military institution and masculinity with its traditional 
link to war fighting is especially privileged over femininity, this is evidenced further in 
the first section of the following chapter.  
  
This chapter explored the connections between the militarism of U.S. society and the 
gender regime of the U.S. Armed Forces in order to explain how society plays an 
important role in shaping the culture of its institutions. In placing the military in the 
context of the society it serves, it provides a necessary context for the culture that feeds 
into the institution. The military and the militarised aspect of society are tied in an 
interdependent relationship. The military continues to flourish and service members 
enjoy a special status because society itself is militarised. As was discussed in Chapter 
One, this can be dangerous because it idealises the ‘traditional’ values the military 
upholds and can impede advancement for women in the military institution.  
 
The examples of media stories from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan show how 
specific gender roles are portrayed in U.S. society. These roles are perpetuated through 
stories in the media. They provide society driven ‘ideal’ examples of femininity and 
masculinity. In the cases discussed in this chapter, the media and the military both 
played a significant role in how the men and women were portrayed. The ideal feminine 
characteristics of Jessica Lynch not only showed what feminine attributes are desired in 
U.S. society but also gave an example of how society believes women should act. While 
Lyndie England was a prime example of what society believes happens to women when 
they are influenced by men, especially men at war. While on the other hand, Pat 
Tillman and Chris Carter were held up as ideal male warriors of a just democracy, there 
to protect the weak, but Andre Shepherd was set as a coward for wanting to leave the 
military before his time was served. 
 
From a gendered perspective, militarism is closely tied to masculinity however, women 
are now militarised as combatants, contrary to their traditional roles as ‘beautiful souls.’ 
The question then is does women’s mobilisation change the gender regime of the U.S. 
military? This thesis argues that it does not completely change the overall masculine-
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oriented culture of the military because U.S. society follows traditional ideas of the 
dichotomous roles of masculinity and femininity, as is demonstrated in the following 
chapter by the information collected from the female soldiers. However, the 
dichotomous gender characteristics and the formal policies and informal norms fall 
along the femininity and masculinity spectrums, often depending on the branch of 
service and career field, which is discussed further in the following chapter.  
The following chapter also discusses the issue of institutional change in the U.S. 
military. It first provides examples of female soldiers’ experiences in the military 
institution and analyses their experience in order to show the current gender power 
structure of the U.S. military. It then covers ways in which the institution has changed 
and in what direction it is heading. It analyses how and why these changes have 
occurred by looking at the institutional actors involved in influencing the institution. It 
also discusses theories of institutional change as they apply to the U.S. Armed Forces.  
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Evolving Institutional Culture 
Chapter Five 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the informal norms of the U.S. military and discusses the 
evolving gender power structure of the institution. In order to explain and understand 
the institutional change that has occurred, the current gender power structure must be 
explicated. To accomplish this, this chapter builds off of the discussion in Chapter Four 
of the development of gender roles and it provides specific experiences and examples of 
the gendered nature of military culture. It analyses information from interviews and 
surveys conducted with military women to explain the tension between masculinity and 
femininity in the military due to the gender roles of the institution and to show ways in 
which some women have tried to change or adapt to the culture. It also analyses data 
collected from interviews conducted with military women by other authors, literature on 
the subject, and media reports.  
 
This chapter then enacts the theoretical framework of Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
gradual change laid out in Chapter Two in order to analyse the evolution that has 
occurred in the U.S. military. Public organisations, such as the military with a strict 
hierarchical structure and rigid policies based on law have “the effect of rendering the 
organisational structures more impervious to change, and limiting ability to change 
without legal action” (Ingraham et al. 2008, 68).  This idea is discussed in the following 
chapter. However, change is not unobtainable as institutions “are historically variable in 
their composition and effects, and are theoretically open to change” (Krook and McKay 
2011, 3). Therefore, this chapter employs the theories based on new institutionalism 
studies, as discussed in Chapter Two75 and provides examples of how the theories relate 
to changes that have occurred and could affect the future gender power structure of the 
U.S. military.  
 
                                                        
75 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 36 for theoretical framework.  
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The previous chapter showed there is a continuing link between masculinity and war 
fighting. However, this chapter argues that the link has been somewhat weakened by 
changes in U.S. strategic culture. Section 5.2 considers the changes in U.S. strategic 
warfare, specifically the role technological advancements had in changing the strategic 
culture of the U.S. military and how this affects the link between war fighting and 
masculinity. Technological advancements are an important factor to consider when 
assessing change in the culture of the military institution because strategic cultural 
changes affect the priorities of the military leadership and the type of soldiers that are 
needed. For example, technological advancements have put a stronger emphasis for the 
need of soldiers that are technically competent, while physical strength has become less 
important. This affects the link between masculinity and war fighting because 
masculinity has been tied to physical strength. Less emphasis on this requirement for a 
soldier places women at less of a disadvantage due to their size.  
 
This chapter also considers the effects of the U.S.’s implementation of 
counterinsurgency operations and peacekeeping in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Counterinsurgency operations have also changed the culture of strategic warfare in the 
U.S. and has influenced the role of the military to become more than an institution for 
war, but one that also must implement peace keeping and post-war reconstruction 
activities and policies.  Both of these aspects do not only change the strategic culture of 
warfare for the U.S., but they also weaken the link between masculinity and war 
fighting. This chapter argues that these factors have slowly changed the gender power 
structure and opened greater opportunities for women in the military, as is evidenced by 
the lifting of the DoD Ground Combat Rule. 76 
 
The interpretations and implementations of the policies for women in the U.S. military 
also allowed for positive changes in the area of women’s participation in combat. The 
main aspect of this was the lax implementation of women’s ban from combat, before 
the lifting of the ban in 2013. Military commanders found a loophole that allowed for 
women to be attached to combat units instead of assigned to them full-time, which was                                                         76 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 93 for further information on the lifting of the DoD Ground 
Combat Rule.  
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against the DoD Ground Combat Rule set to keep women off of the front lines. The 
practice of attaching women to combat units instead of assigning them was another 
critical juncture for women who wanted to participate in front-line combat roles. This is 
also one area where the space, or ‘soft spots’ between the formal rules and the informal 
norms were exploited to positively change the institution (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 
13). Female soldiers worked as ‘opportunists’ in the gaps and took the opportunity to 
help bring about change. Before analysing changes that have occurred, the following 
section discusses the informal gender norms of the U.S. military. 
 
5.1 Informal Norms: Construction and Maintenance  
In the U.S. military gender roles are closely constrained. This is clear from how long the 
‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy stood for gay and lesbian service members. It is also 
much easier for the military to control gender roles once members have joined the 
armed forces. The military profession requires a great deal of conformity and required 
formal training emphasises the formal policies of the military, while also introducing 
new recruits to the informal norms of the institution. The importance of conformity 
crosses over into how gender roles are constructed and maintained in the institution. 
The construction, or as Lynne Zucker’s theory of ‘cultural persistence refers to it, 
transmission of the informal norms of the gender roles as well as the maintenance of 
them are discussed in this section. However, Zucker’s construct of ‘cultural persistence’ 
is discussed further in Chapter Six.77  
 
(i) Masculine Culture 
In order to understand the current gender roles of the military institution, it is important 
to consider the history of the military profession and its linkages with masculinity 
because this is where military norms originate, as discussed in Chapter One in relation 
to historical institutionalism. The practice of war is tied to masculinity, as was discussed 
in the previous chapter. A combat masculine-warrior culture is firmly implanted in the 
structure of the military and is instilled in its members from the beginning of their basic 
training (Herbert 1998, 7). Susan Burke argues that, “one of the points of male initiation                                                         
77 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 173 for further information on Zucker’s idea of ‘cultural persistence.’ 
  131 
in warrior cultures is to rid the adolescent of all traces of the female. To the extent that 
the military brass have permitted training to operate as a male rite of passage, they have 
furthered a culture hostile to women” (Burke 1999, 60). Masculinising the soldier 
culture “depends on the denigration of anything that could be considered feminine” 
(Tickner 2001, 57). The culture makes it clear that masculinity is preferred over 
femininity.  
 
For this research, 64 military women were interviewed and surveyed in order to 
understand the military culture from their perspective.78 Out of the 64 respondents, only 
one, an Air Force officer, thought the military was not masculine-oriented. The rest of 
the women interviewed, from all branches of service, said that the overall military 
culture was strongly linked to masculinity. Several women described the culture as a 
“good ol boy’s club” (Natalie, October 2012) where there are “mostly men and the 
women strive to be known” (Liz, October 2012). One woman, an enlisted Marine, 
described it as “a he-man woman hater gun club” and that, “all of the issues society 
deals with regarding misogyny are magnified many times over, because it is such a 
smaller microcosm” (Lisa, October 2012). The informal culture also varies on the 
amount of emphasis placed on masculinity in different branches and jobs.  
 
The female respondents all agreed that these aspects were exacerbated in jobs closer to 
combat or in certain branches, specifically the Marine Corps and the Army. Ann, an 
enlisted Army soldier working in vehicle maintenance pointed out that the degree of 
masculinity in the culture “depends on the branch. Marines are all macho and were the 
last to accept females as capable. Infantry units tend to be that way too. The support 
units which have females in them are more accepting” (Ann, October 2012). An 
enlisted female Marine agreed that having fewer women in a group makes it less 
accepting and affects the culture. She said that, “the Marine Corps, especially, is terrible 
about this sort of thing [emphasis on masculinity] because they are only six percent 
female” (Lisa, October 2012).  
                                                         
78 All names of interviewees have been changed in order to protect their identities.  
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Ann also made the point that the Army and Marine Corps were known to be less 
accepting of women, she believed, because of the prevalence of combat jobs in those 
branches and that their link to masculinity affects the type of soldiers who want to join 
the combat career fields. She said, “the guys who join those units [combat] in the Army 
and Marine Corp already think they’re the most macho” (Ann, October 2012). Three of 
the Air Force women interviewed said that their experience with misogyny and 
discrimination depended on the branch they were working with. One Air Force officer 
commented that, “in the Air Force, things were equal, but when I worked with other 
branches, (specifically [the] Army) things were majorly skewed to the men” (Trisha, 
October 2012). The female soldiers interviewed singled out the Army and Marine Corps 
as having a more masculine-oriented culture than the Air Force and Navy due to the 
masculinised nature of the combat jobs in those services. Also, they had fewer women 
because many of the jobs that were closed to women were found in the Army and the 
Marine Corps.79 
 
In many instances, career fields are ranked on importance based on how masculine they 
are. For example, career fields that are closer to combat are often considered the most 
important and most masculine (Hinojosa 2010, 1). In a study conducted to find ideas of 
hegemonic masculinities from new recruits in the military, it was found that one way 
new recruits compared themselves against others was by how close their career field 
was to combat. As one enlistee stated, “the infantry is the military” (Hinojosa 2010, 7). 
It was found that those entering the infantry looked down on other career fields because 
they felt they were not truly fighting the war but were only there for support. Another 
recruit stated, “I just can’t do it. If I go to Iraq, I want to be saying, I fought, not sat 
behind a desk” (Hinojosa 2010, 7). Each recruit had their reasons as to why their chosen 
career field was the best, but proximity to combat and mission was found to be one 
determining factor in their choices.  
 
Inter - service rivalry between the different career fields and branches, as discussed 
above, are not uncommon. The decision to open more career fields to women in the                                                         
79 Please refer to Chapter One, page 9 for graph.  
  133 
military was based on their proximity to combat. Therefore, it has become the norm in 
the military to assume that career fields opened to women are further from combat, 
safer, and therefore less masculine (Manning, April 2012). For example, women were 
first allowed in aviation through electronics and not fighter planes, and male pilots 
derided electronics pilots for being less masculine because women were allowed in the 
career field (Manning, April 2012). Career fields develop their own in-groups and 
women and men outside of the career field, or in one that is considered less-masculine 
are often cast as ‘others’ (Manning, April 2012).  
 
One example of this ‘others’ mentality turning dangerous was the Tailhook scandal in 
1991. As Manning states, “a lot of the tailhook stuff, particularly vis-a-vis the woman 
pilots that were mistreated as opposed to the civilian women had to do with, oh, you’re 
one of those electronic wusses, not a real jock. Even though you’re a tailhooker, you’re 
not a fight jock” (Manning, April 2012). The Tailhook scandal began as a convention of 
U.S. Navy pilots gathered in Las Vegas. While they were there, it was reported that 
around 83 women attending the event were sexually harassed and assaulted by male 
Navy members (Rich 1994, 1). Male fighter pilots created a gauntlet in a hotel hallway. 
They tore at women’s clothes and molested others as the women were forced to walk 
down the hallway (Rich 1994, 1). The investigation of the event by a male admiral did 
not find any fault of the men who attended the conference (Enloe 1994, 92). After a 
high-ranking, civilian woman official heard the same admiral make a sexist comment 
regarding the scandal she insisted the incident was investigated again. This investigation 
found that 14 admirals and over 300 naval aviators either carried out sexual harassment 
or assault or did not intervene to stop others from committing assault (Enloe 1994, 92-
93).  
 
In this case, the senior military leaders in charge of investigating these allegations had 
been involved in the scandal from the beginning. The admiral in question believed that 
women did not belong in the military and had not discouraged any of the harassing 
behaviour he had witnessed at the conference (Rich 1994, 1). The actions of many of 
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the men at the conference were derived from a group mentality that belittled the ‘other’ 
and the feminine (Rich 1994, 1).  
 
(ii) Gender Identity: The Prevailing Gender Regime of Militarised Masculinity 
Due to the link between the overall culture of the military and masculinity, many of the 
women interviewed felt they had to act more masculine and downplay their femininity 
in order to fit in and be accepted as one of the group. An enlisted Army soldier said that 
she had to “do and say certain things to put the guys at ease around me. Trust is hard 
won, and it takes time in the field to actually prove yourself. No amount of paper proof, 
reputation or talk will get a female any respect because it is assumed that we are held to 
lower standards” (Rachel, October 2012). The military puts a positive emphasis on 
conforming to the group. Jane, an enlisted Army soldier, explained that, “those who 
prove themselves, but also do not rock the boat, are favoured” (Jane, October 2012). An 
enlisted Army linguist said that those who do not conform “or immerse themselves in 
the culture, cause problems for the rest of us” (Erin, October 2012). Eighty-nine percent 
of the respondents said that conforming to the masculine culture was the best approach 
in order to be accepted. This supports the argument made by some feminists that 
women’s involvement in the military does little to change the gendered culture.80 
 
Ten percent of the female respondents said that they conformed to the masculine 
aspects of the group because they believe that the culture of the military should be 
masculine-oriented, while others conformed because they felt they had to in order to fit 
in with their male counterparts. An Army officer, in the Transportation Corps argued: 
 
The military is and should be accepted as a male culture and industry. Females 
who serve must, and generally do, I believe, accept and realise they are in this 
environment. (Mary, October 2012) 
 
                                                        80 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for feminist arguments.  
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The majority of the women interviewed accepted the masculine culture and conformed. 
As one enlisted Army soldier who had worked as both a mechanic and in the 
intelligence career field explained that, in her experience, the military: 
 
Rewards and encourages coldness, unemotional states, and aggression. In 
American culture this is more masculine, so I can see how it could be seen as 
male driven. If women can embrace their inner warrior they fit in ok. You 
cannot be cutesy or girly and be taken seriously as a fighter. (Tonya, October 
2012)  
 
Another enlisted Army soldier thought that gender roles from society were too 
restrictive and was proud that women are able to fill traditionally masculine roles in the 
military. She said, “there are plenty of women who are able to conform to these 
masculine ways that our military acts like. We are able to function in the same regards 
as the men have, regardless of the fact that we are women” (Kate, October 2012). This 
example fits with the equal-rights based feminist argument that women can function the 
same as men.81 These three Army women shed American society’s construction of 
femininity and were proud that they could be accepted into the masculine culture of the 
military.  
 
Not all of the women interviewed felt this way. Kerry, an enlisted Army soldier, tried to 
adapt to the masculine culture but felt that she was never truly accepted. She said, “men 
‘accepted’ me because I was a girl. Their fake kindness and manipulation and violence 
toward a fellow soldier and woman was never meant to do anything but hurt me. I was 
never accepted” (Kerry, October 2012). This female soldier consistently felt like an 
outsider. Erin, an enlisted Army soldier, and another enlisted sailor, said that they were 
often given the jobs no one else in the unit wanted to do and were out of the realm of 
their job duties that related to office work and making coffee (Erin, October 2012; 
Jessica, October 2012). They had tried to conform to the group by playing down their 
femininity and acting like one of the guys but were always treated differently despite                                                         81 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for further information on feminist arguments.  
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their attempts to ‘fit in’, and were therefore still cast as ‘others’ despite their 
membership in the group.  
 
Fifty-six percent of the women interviewed believed that the best way to change 
stereotypical perceptions of female soldiers and advance women’s involvement in the 
military was to do the best job they could and that it was their individual responsibility 
to prove themselves. An Army officer said, “if you spoke out too much you were 
ostracised and marginalised. The best you could do was demonstrate that you were 
equal to the men and let your actions speak for themselves. You had to choose your 
fights” (Sharon, October 2012). One female member said that she fought the negative 
stereotypes of women in the military by “never letting a co-worker do my work for me. 
I proved I was able to do my job and earned the respect of the men” (Linda, October 
2012). One soldier said she “learned the phrase ‘success is the best revenge’ years ago 
and I went out to make sure that happened. Everyone who said I’d never make it 
because I was a woman, weak, stupid or too sensitive, well I certainly proved them 
wrong” (Elizabeth, October 2012). One woman said that an important aspect of this was 
to try to counteract the female stereotypes. She said that, “nothing builds resentment 
like some female getting over because she’s a ‘poor helpless girl.’ It makes things 
harder for the rest of us.” That’s why “I insisted that females in the unit got treated like 
everybody else” (Marie, October 2012).  
 
Fifteen percent of the women also pointed out the importance of sticking up for 
themselves, in an attempt to change discriminatory practices and to teach those using 
discriminatory behaviour that it was not acceptable. An Army Colonel said that, “higher 
levels [of sexual innuendo] were verbally challenged to their face. I typically didn’t 
have the face-to-face problems. My demeanor was usually enough” (Emma, October 
2012). An Army member agreed that sometimes face-to-face confrontation was the best 
avenue to get results. She said that, “now and then some [male soldiers] crossed a line 
so when that happened, I told them. I did not report them or go to someone else, but 
actually let them know in a dignified and respectable way how I felt to their face. Most 
men respected that and respected me even more” (Monica, October 2012).  
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This approach worked for some female soldiers but not others, often depending on their 
rank. The above respondents were officers, so they were higher ranking in the 
hierarchical chain than enlisted members. As an enlisted female seaman stated: 
 
I have to just keep my head down. You can create problems for yourself if you 
talk back to the wrong person. Maybe as I move up through the ranks, I’ll be 
able to have a backbone. (Trina, October 2012) 
 
Trina brought up a good point regarding the problems of power, rank and gender. This 
will be discussed further in the section.82 
 
Two of the women interviewed took the approach of ‘weapons of the weak,’ in which 
disadvantaged actors acted out in small ways to fight female stereotypes and 
discrimination (Scott 1985, 3). One female soldier admitted to bringing food in to work 
in order to “break down barriers” (Ellen, October 2012). An enlisted Army woman 
shared one story of how she countered discrimination. She said: 
 
A funny story is when I was told that I, as the only female in my classroom 
[while attending language school], had to make the coffee for everyone else. So 
I made the weakest pot of coffee possible, you could see through it, and happily 
played dumb when everyone complained. I never had to make coffee again. 
(Michelle, October 2012) 
 
Other women were less concerned about discrimination, or changing perceptions about 
women in the military, but were focused on how they could cope with the experience. 
One Army women said, “I was too afraid to speak unless I was spoken to. If I asked 
about anything to take care of myself, or any kind of question about anything, I was 
most often reprimanded. I adapted by literally forgetting what was done to me in order 
to function” (Krista, October 2012). Others described the need to become desensitised                                                         
82 Please refer to page 137 for further information power, rank and gender.  
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to discrimination and said that it was important to “grow a slightly thicker skin” (Rina, 
October 2012). A female enlisted Marine described how she believed it was important 
to ignore the discriminatory stereotypes in order to cope. She said: 
 
I let it roll off my back. You're always going to hear that you slept your way to 
your rank. You're always going to hear that you're a slut if you go out and party 
(even though the men are never ever sluts). You're going to get called a whore if 
you sleep with other guys, and a dyke if you turn guys down. You get ‘special 
treatment’ or ‘favours’ or ‘extra stuff.’ You just have to let it roll off your back 
and ignore the haters. (Danielle, October 2012) 
 
Another female soldier said that she became “desensitised and started acting like a 
man…you have to shrug off things that would be offensive [normally]” (Crystal, 
October 2012). 
 
Three of the women interviewed brought up issues of the tension between women 
trying to conform to the masculine culture and those that exude hyper femininity. 
Susan, an Army Lt. Col., raised the issue that, “the sub culture for women competes 
against itself with drive for hyper femininity encouraged” (Susan, October 2012). There 
are those that do not feel they need to conform to masculine ways and they can keep 
their femininity intact while still being good at their jobs. This is easier for women that 
are in support fields, or jobs further away from combat. One Air Force officer pointed 
out that she does not feel tension between femininity and masculinity because she is, “in 
the Air Force. They are great with women in military intelligence fields” (Trisha, 
October 2012). Another female Air Force member added, “it is different in other career 
fields. The Army and the Marine Corps are the most masculine branches, we’re more of 
a good mix in the Air Force because we’re not so focused on ground combat - we don’t 
have any of those infantry guys” (Linda, October 2012) According to women 
interviewed, there is less tension between masculinity and femininity in the Air Force 
because many of the jobs are not close to the front lines and therefore the culture is not 
as hyper-masculine as the Army and Marine Corps.  
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The examples discussed above show that many female soldiers face discrimination 
based on gender regularly and in varying forms. Formally, women are fully 
participating members of the U.S. Armed Forces and are legally protected from sexual 
harassment and discrimination, as is discussed in the following section. However, 
informally, they are placed as ‘others’ in the institution because of their gender. 
Therefore, they are placed at a disadvantage and are often expected to do tasks, such as 
make coffee, that male soldiers are not expected to perform. All of the women 
interviewed in this section looked to bring about change from the inside of the 
institution. Some preferred to confront the problem, while others felt that their lower 
status due to rank stood in the way of them defending themselves. Still, other women 
employed ‘weapons of the weak’ tactics to counter discrimination in discreet ways. All 
of the women interviewed in this section were enacting agency and working as 
‘opportunist’ actors by attempting to convert informal stereotypes of women. Many of 
the stereotypes and informal norms discussed above were institutionalised during 
training. The institutionalisation process is discussed further in Chapter Six but the 
following section provides a background on training practices for military members.  
 
(iii) Training 
Building up the masculine identity helps the institution gain recruits and “maintains 
self-esteem in institutions where subservience is the norm” such as in the enlisted ranks 
of the military (Tickner 2001, 58). Tickner argues that misogynist training is instituted 
by militaries in order to teach men to fight (Tickner 2001, 57). As is discussed in 
Chapter Six, training is used to institutionalise the norms of the institution.83 This 
training first begins at boot camp.84 This is a nine-week training course which all 
military members have to complete, although individuals are segregated between 
officers and enlisted groups. It is interesting to note that the Marine Corps is the only 
service that has a gender-segregated boot camp and, according to the interviews 
                                                        
83 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 173.  
84 Boot camp is an introductory course that tests physical ability and introduces new recruits to the 
hierarchical system of the armed forces (Martin, 2006: 1). 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conducted with female members, this reflects the view that it is the most masculine-
centric branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 
Boot camp training is the time for the military to break down the individual and create a 
soldier that will conform to the group and follow orders. This is where the military 
“transforms recruits from jocks and nerds, boys from the hood and women from the 
suburbs, into knockoffs of the same model soldier by stripping them of their clothes, 
shaving off their hair, forbidding them their accustomed freedoms, and calling them into 
the second nature of military discipline” (Burke 1999, 54). The process is different for 
officer and enlisted training and this is why they are segregated (Benedict 2009, 50). In 
officer boot camp, recruits are taught about leadership and critical thinking. They are 
rewarded when they show initiative to lead the group (Benedict 2009, 50). However, in 
enlisted training, they are punished for individual thinking and praised for going along 
with the group (Benedict 2009, 50).  
 
In order to break down the individual and to build up the unit drill sergeants often 
denigrate recruits (Benedict 2009, 50). Although the military “now includes women, 
gays, and lesbians, and [there are] rules that now prohibit drill instructors from using 
racial epithets and curses, instructors still denigrate recruits with words like pussy, girl, 
bitch, lady, dyke, faggot, and fairy” (Benedict 2009, 50). The use of this language in 
training in a derogatory fashion situates women, gay men and lesbians as ‘others’ and 
therefore as a lower class in the institution. In a situation such as boot camp, where the 
goal is to build a solidified group, playing these groups as ‘others’ is dangerous and sets 
the tone of gender roles for the military. As one female Army enlisted soldier said 
regarding boot camp, “a single soldier is nothing. It’s all about the group” (Benedict 
2009, 50). The group, however, is not all-inclusive and instilling in recruits that women 
and gays are not part of the group, and worse, less than the group, creates a 
discriminatory and divided culture. It also creates an environment where women, gay 
men and lesbians feel as though they have to conform to the mainstream military culture 
in order to not stick out and endure discrimination.  
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The use of misogynist language to indoctrinate recruits continues in the form of 
‘cadence calls.’85 Boot camp serves as training to harden soldiers to violence so that 
they are able to kill. As Helen Benedict states, “the bottom line is that boot camp is 
about training people to kill” (Benedict 2009, 49). In order to do this, soldiers are 
trained to be dispassionate to killing and death. Cadence calls are used as one avenue to 
achieve this and many of them also denigrate women. For example, below is one 
example of an Army cadence call set to the tune of The Candy Man that recruits march 
to and sing:  
 Who can take a chainsaw 
 Cut the bitch in two 
 Fuck the bottom half 
 And give the upper half to you (Benedict 2009, 51) 
This is only one of many cadence calls that use this kind of language regarding women. 
A chant like the one above not only detaches soldiers from the horrors of killing but 
also can make them callous towards women in particular. Although ‘cadence calls’ with 
sexually explicit language, like the one above, are no longer formally allowed to be 
used by instructors, they are still used informally by some instructors and cadets. As one 
enlisted female solider stated, “they’re not supposed to use that stuff anymore but 
depending on the drill instructor you get and some cadets do them on their own so I 
heard them a lot before” (Connie, November 2012). Although formal policy no longer 
allows ‘cadence calls’ with obviously discriminatory language, informally the explicit 
‘cadence calls’ are still used. This is an example of an informal norm that has not 
changed with the formal policy and is therefore continuing to negatively affect the 
gender culture of the military institution. This is discussed further in the following 
chapter.  
 
‘Boot camp’ is also trainees’ first introduction to the core values of the service they are 
joining. They are made to memorise the core values and repeat them throughout boot 
camp (Benedict 2009, 44). The core values established by the military attempt to bring 
all of the service members together under one umbrella for moral codes to live by with a                                                         
85 Cadence calls are songs or chants that soldiers sing to keep rhythm when they march. 
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strong military identity. They are what each service believes their members should 
strive for. Military leadership lists the characteristics they believe are most important 
for soldiers to have. Each service has their own, but they are all very similar and follow 
the same line of thought, although they are worded differently. For example, each 
service has the core value that service to the country should come before the needs of 
the individual. The Air Force words this as, “service before self,” the Navy as, 
“commitment,” and the Army as, “selfless service,” which was displayed and glorified 
in Pat Tillman’s case (Benedict 2009, 45). The general themes of the core values for all 
services also include courage and honour. This is not surprising as these are traditional 
values of warriors. These core values are given to new recruits as the code they are 
expected to attempt to live by (Air Command and Staff College training manual 2012, 
124). 
 
Boot Camp is not the only place where indoctrination and transmission occurs. Military 
service academies also teach in the same manner and for the same purpose. The 
academies are focused on commissioning officers and, although conformity is still 
important, their goal is to produce service members that will be able to lead troops and 
make decisions. However, each academy has their own traditions, continued from when 
they were all-male institutions, which teach many of the same conformity tactics. For 
example, at the U.S. Naval Academy, incoming freshmen have to take on the role of 
‘slave’ for the older students. This is much like the drill instructor/recruit relationship in 
boot camp. The recruit’s life is completely controlled by the older student and they are 
punished for not conforming (Fiore & Kelly 2003, 1).  
 
For example one female cadet was academically disciplined and not allowed to graduate 
after she reported a case of sexual harassment to her chain of command at the Air Force 
Academy (Fiore & Kelly 2003, 1). The mother of the cadet said, “these boys just don't 
get it. They are being raised to have no respect for women, and the attitude is fostered 
by the male officers in charge.” (Fiore & Kelly 2003, 1). As in boot camp, women are 
often the brunt of jokes and cadence calls in the service academies. As one female Air 
Force Academy graduate stated, “there were a lot of jokes and chants the guys would do 
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that made fun of women in the military. They were basically calling military women 
ugly and weak but that is the way it is…you have to be able to handle the jokes if you 
want to be in the military” (Liz, October 2012). Another female Air Force officer, who 
attended the Air Force Academy provided an example of one of the discriminatory 
jokes she heard multiple times as a cadet. She said, “the joke was, why did the Army 
send so many women with PMS to the Persian Gulf? Because they fought like animals 
and retained water for 4 days” (Brenda, April 2012). Much like the cadence call stated 
above, the jokes and chants were tolerated because they are seen as tradition and part of 
the cultural norm.  
 
Transmission and maintenance of the values, rules and norms of the institution does not 
stop with boot camp or officer commissioning, but continues throughout a service 
member’s career through career-field training and developmental education. Initiation 
into a specific career field is especially important because career fields often have 
culture and traditions of their own. Some career fields have their own entrance 
traditions. In the Navy for example, there is a tradition in which first-voyage sailors 
must perform humiliating tasks in order to be initiated as a sailor. One of the tasks is 
running with barely any clothing “through a gauntlet of wet towels and paddles” (Burke 
1999, 55). Another is where an initiate must, “simulate oral sex by sucking on a section 
of rubber hose extending from the groin of King Neptune [a veteran sailor]” (Burke 
1999, 55). If women choose not to participate in these kinds of ‘traditions’ they are not 
fully initiated into the group. However, it can be a humiliating experience for those who 
do choose to participate (Burke 1999, 55). Not all career field traditions such as these 
are harmful but many were created to show off masculinity and cross the line in an 
institution that now has women that should be seen as equals.  
 
(iv) Family Roles 
The base environment and military family also play a role in constructing and 
maintaining gender roles. Although the military has been affected by social changes, 
such as women playing a greater role in the workforce, “the military still lags behind the 
wider society in accepting new family patterns” (Segal 1999, 251). For example, it is 
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often expected on a base for the wife of an officer to be available to attend events when 
needed. It is normal for her to derive her social status from her husband’s rank and be 
involved in volunteer groups on the base that reflect well on her husband. The higher 
ranking the officer is, the more duties his wife is expected to perform in the military 
community (Segal 1999, 251).  
 
Although it is becoming more common for wives of military men to have careers, the 
tradition of the officer’s wives club is slow in changing expectations for women. 
However, men married to female officers are not expected to perform the same role nor 
do they have the same kind of support structure (Segal 1999, 254). An enlisted Army 
soldier said, “ there were plenty of wife groups for spouses but female soldiers with 
civilian husbands never fit into the picture. It is still geared as a man’s world” (Emily, 
October 2012). The structure is set up for a working husband and stay-at-home wife. As 
a military spouse,86 I experienced problems in which I was expected to attend 
ceremonies, such as change of commands,87 during a weekday. When I did not attend, 
my husband was informally questioned by a higher-ranking officer about why I missed 
the event. My husband was also asked why I did not join the Officer’s Wives Club on 
base. However, as Emily mentioned above, there are not the same expectations for male 
spouses, as the gender structure is geared toward men as the main breadwinner.  
 
There is a double standard for married officers of different genders as well. For 
example, a married male officer is looked on as being stable, while a married female 
officer is often seen as lacking commitment to the institution and her husband is seen as 
an obstacle to her career (Segal 1999, 259). It is also difficult for military women that 
are expected to give more in the home while also being a part of the military, which is 
considered a ‘greedy institution’ (Segal 1999, 259). The military is classified as a 
greedy institution because it requires abnormal dedication to the institution. The 
military determines deployments and moves, and family issues are rarely considered in 
these aspects (Trina, October 2012). Trina, a Navy enlisted member stated,                                                         
86 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 54 for explanation of my insider/outsider status. 
87 Change of Command is an official ceremony in which unit leadership is passed to a new commander. 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“deployments are probably the hardest. It’s difficult to come home after a year and your 
kid grew six inches” (Trina, October 2012). Another female Air Force officer stated, 
“military life is not conducive to having a normal family” (Nancy, October 2012). 
There is a constant pull between dedication to the institution and dedication to the 
family (Nancy, October 2012).  
 
Four of the women interviewed said that they had problems with discrimination when 
they were pregnant because the men in their group either thought that they had become 
pregnant on purpose to avoid a deployment, or that they would not be able to, 
physically or mentally, perform their job as well (Carly, October 2012). Pregnancy 
made the women feel as though they had to prove themselves more while they were 
pregnant and after they had their child. Their pregnancy was seen as a weakness and 
was a reminder to the men they worked with that they were different (Rita, October 
2012) In interviews, there was a feeling that some of the men thought they should be at 
home raising their children instead of working in the military (Rita, October 2012; 
Carly, October 2012). The ideas discussed above show why the military culture often 
views women with a husband or family as less dedicated to the military institution than 
their male counterparts. These clear gender roles and expectations set a tone for military 
life in which men’s careers are most important and women are meant to be there as their 
support system. It is also difficult for some men to adapt to working with women in the 
military, when they expect women’s role to be in the home.  
 
This section argued that the military profession was built on and established by strong 
masculine characteristics and, as such, it is not surprising that the norms and traditions 
established in the military are masculine-oriented and are designed to reinforce 
masculine characteristics and stereotypes. It showed how military training is 
constructed to initiate members into the culture of the armed forces and to teach them 
the formal rules of the institution. However, they are also then exposed to the informal 
norms and the framework of rules that govern their actions within the military. As is 
discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Six, the informal norms are often 
contradictory to current formal policies; instead they are based on a masculinised 
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culture. The mass majority of the military women interviewed made the point that they 
felt the best way to fit in to the armed forces was to ‘become masculinised.’  
 
Many of the women interviewed could not establish their own identity, but instead had 
to work to act like their male counterparts, so the men in their units would not feel 
uncomfortable. Women have not been in the armed forces long enough and in high 
enough numbers to completely move the culture away from its masculine roots on their 
own. Such norms, in an institution as established and large as the Department of 
Defence will not change quickly or easily. This challenge will be discussed further in 
Chapter Six. So far this chapter has discussed the gendered culture of the military 
institution. The first section focused on informal norms that make up the gender power 
structure of the U.S. military and what actions female soldiers have taken to be able to 
function in the institution or even change some of the existing gender stereotypes. The 
following section looks at changes that have occurred in the strategic culture of the 
military and how those changes affect female soldiers.  
 
5.2 Evolution of U.S. Strategic Culture 
(i) Revolution of Military Affairs 
This section argues that advancements in technology have changed the culture of U.S. 
strategic warfare. It discusses how the advancements weakened the link between 
masculinity and war fighting in the U.S. military because it changed the characteristics 
required to be a soldier and has placed a greater significance on technological 
advancements above traditional warfare. In order for the U.S. military to be responsive 
to new missions, difficulties and capabilities, it had to considerably alter its approach to 
war. As discussed in chapter One,88 there was a significant shift in U.S. strategic culture 
from the mass use of ground forces in World War II and the Vietnam War to a reliance 
on technological advancements and air power for a quick victory (Maddow 2012, 22). 
As Gray notes, “it is the preferred American way in war to proceed rapidly with 
overwhelming force against an enemy’s centre of gravity. This thoroughly 
                                                        
88 Please refer to Chapter One, page 26 for further information on U.S. strategic culture. 
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continentalist approach finds a near perfect fit with the promise of victory through air 
power” (Gray 1996, 94).  
 
The ‘victory through air power’ approach to war was used successfully in the Gulf War 
and the U.S. military continued to move in the same direction in the search of fast wars 
with little loss of life for the U.S. Luttwak refers to this as a search for ‘bloodless’ wars 
as post-industrial societies, such as the U.S., are less willing to accept casualties in war. 
He argues, “still less is there such a supply of expendable lives at present, when all 
other low-birth-rate, post-industrial societies refuse to sanction the casualties of any 
avoidable combat” (Luttwak 1995, 3-4). The U.S. has moved in this direction by 
developing what has been referred to as the next Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA), 
of robotic and precision-guided munitions technology that can conduct warfare from a 
distance including the use of drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and smart 
bombs (Singer 2009, 181). It was argued that the development of nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and network-centric warfare have all brought about several 
Revolutions of Military Affairs (RMA). 
 
A RMA is a concept that looks to describe the role advancing technologies play in the 
evolution of war. This section employs the study of RMAs in order to understand the 
significance of technological advancements in the institutional change of the military. 
RMAs “typically involve the introduction of a new technology or organisation, which in 
turn creates a whole new model of fighting and winning wars” (Singer 2009, 181). It is 
a major shift in military strategy, “military doctrine, training, education, organisation, 
equipment, operations and tactics…” that changes the character of war (Gray 2002, 1). 
It has been argued that previous RMAs, after the Napoleonic Era of war, were built on 
developments in technology and brought about change with the “combination of 
fundamental economic, political and social forces” (Cooper 1994, 9). Past RMAs were 
aided by the development of the industrial revolution and “mass production 
technologies” (Cooper 1994, 9). The invention of the combustion engine and the use of 
aircraft in warfare brought about the third major RMA, while the invention and use of 
nuclear weapons were widely agreed upon as an important RMA, after their initial use 
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in 1945 (Cooper 1994, 9).  In more recent history, however, it has been argued that a 
new RMA has emerged from the success of the Gulf War, one based on information 
technology and precision-guided munitions (Ignatieff 2000, 166; Libicki 1996, 1). 
 
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski argues that network technology, or “network-centric 
warfare” fundamentally changes the way the U.S. conducts war and therefore changed 
the strategic culture of the U.S. military. Network-centric warfare refers to the ability of 
the U.S. to virtually connect all aspects of their warfare systems  (Cebrowski & Garstka 
1998, 1). Michael Ignatieff argues that “this revolution in military affairs was not the 
result of a single technological breakthrough, but of many in combination,” which 
included “lasers to improve guidance and targeting” (Ignatieff 2000, 166). As Michael 
Sheehan describes, “future advances in military technology mean that military 
operations will be conducted with such speed, precision, and selective destruction that 
the whole character of war will change and this will profoundly affect the way that 
military/political affairs are conducted in the next few decades” (Sheehan 2008, 217). 
This was the new concept that the U.S. led with in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
The U.S. military found that the network-centric concept did not work as well in the 
‘fog’ of the battlefield in that the advanced technology and computer systems they 
relied on to fight the war did not always work properly. The network-centric warfare 
“strove to shape military affairs into a perfectly modeled and controlled closed world” 
(Bousquet 2009, 125). The network-centric model of warfare did not work exactly as 
expected by leaders in the Pentagon, because in the field, the confusion of battle 
continued to be a problem. The next RMA of robotic or virtual warfare was developed 
from information technology with the purpose to lift the fog of the battlefield through 
the use of robotic technology for reconnaissance as well as warfare (Sheehan 2008, 
217). 
 
One of the prime examples of new robotic warfare technology that has had a 
revolutionary impact on the way the U.S. conducts war is the drone, also known as the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). According to General Allen Jamerson, the former 
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Chief of Staff for Air Force Materiel Command, “UAVS and remotely piloted and 
operated weapons systems have changed the nature of war in that now it is very easy to 
go out and strike a target without human involvement (Jamerson, May 2012). UAVs do 
not only provide reconnaissance for military troops on the ground but also carry out an 
increasing number of sorties and bombing missions in the current war in Afghanistan. 
According to figures released by the U.S. military from 2012, “drone strikes in 
Afghanistan now make up about nine percent of the overall total of aerial attacks. Last 
year, it was a little more than five percent. The UAVs are growing in importance while 
the rest of the military campaign is receding” (Scachtman 2012, 1). UAVs are playing a 
large part in the war, as are the pilots that fly them while located in the United States or 
forward operating bases outside of the warzone. The use of drones not only moves the 
U.S. closer to its goal of ‘bloodless’ wars but also weakened the connection between 
soldier and the actual experience of going to war. Although the drone pilots, engineers, 
and mechanics are playing a key role in the U.S. strategy for war, they are never 
exposed to risk.  
 
UAVs are not the only robotic technology that has moved American military members 
further away from the front lines and looks to lift the fog of warfare in the field. The 
PackBot, for example, has been used extensively by troops in Afghanistan. It is a small, 
durable robot that “performs bomb disposal and other dangerous missions for troops” (I 
Robot 2012). The U.S. military also utilises ground robots for situational awareness, 
including the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) and the 110 Firstlook, which 
can be thrown by troops for reconnaissance in small places and buildings (I Robot, 
2012). 
 
As discussed in the first section, generally in the U.S. military, the most important and 
most ‘masculine’ jobs have been those closest to the danger of death or injury 
associated with combat. However, the technological career specialties have grown 
exponentially since 1995, while the combat arms profession decreased overall since 
1995. The following graphs show both the overall number of personnel in the 
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technological-based and combat at arms occupational career fields, as well as their 
relationship to the total number of personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 
Figure 5.1 Combat Arms and Technology Occupations 
 
(Job Opportunities in the Armed Forces, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011) 
 
As is evidenced from the graph above, there was a reversal in the priorities of military 
occupations between 1997 and 1998. In 1997, before the wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there were more personnel in the combat arms occupations, such as 
infantry and armoury divisions, than those in technology-based career fields, such as 
engineers and computer maintenance technicians. Between 1997 and 1998, there was a 
shift and technology-based occupations gained more personnel, while the combat arms 
professions lost members. There was an overall decrease in personnel after the Gulf 
War from 1995 to 1999. Even as the overall number of personnel was decreasing, the 
number of personnel in technology occupations increased. This is a sign of the shift in 
strategic culture of the U.S. military, in which there is now a higher-reliance on 
technology in conducting warfare.  
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As of 2013, the U.S. military continues in the direction of conducting warfare with 
technology while reducing the role of ground troops. The concept of doing more with 
less resources, mainly less people, with more emphasis on technology is the idea that 
leads the U.S. military forward (Sheehan 2007, 218). The 2012 DoD funding document 
specifically states:  
 
Looking past Iraq and Afghanistan to future threats, the force will not longer be 
sized for large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Instead, the DoD will focus 
modernisation on emerging threats, sustaining efforts to get rid of outdated Cold 
War-era systems so that we can invest in the capabilities we need for the future, 
including Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (Department of 
Defence Funding 2012, 78).  
 
The funding document specifies the necessity of resizing the military force in order to 
ensure “flexibility and balance” (Department of Defence Funding 2012, 77). Barbara 
Westgate, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programmes for the U.S. 
Air Force, believes the new strategic approach will be beneficial to the military. She 
argues, “we’re going to be a smaller, better equipped, more superb force. And I believe 
that. Because again, technology has changed the way we approach warfare” (Westgate, 
April 2012). The emphasis on unmanned or robotic technologies and the shrinking of 
the U.S. ground forces shows that the DoD is reshaping its resources for a new kind of 
strategic warfare. A warfare that is no longer based on the large-scale ground forces of 
the Napoleonic culture of warfare, but rather on advancing technologies that help win 
wars through superior reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, while placing U.S. 
personnel further away from the front lines.  
 
With the financial crisis of the current decade, the Department of Defence has had to 
revaluate their strategy, tactics and priorities. As Barbara Westgate posits:  
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I think the tenor of warfare is changing and while you have to meet the demands 
and commitments that you have now in Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa, wherever 
there are tensions, you have to be looking at the future. Rules of war are still the 
rules of war. It all comes down to technology (Westgate, April 2012).  
 
In order to successfully implement these ideas, the DoD has decided it is important to 
make “investments in high-priority programmes, such as unmanned surveillance aircraft 
and upgraded tactical vehicles, while terminating unnecessary and lower priority 
programmes…such as the Joint Strike Fighter at a reduced level” (Department of 
Defence Funding 2012, 77). This is an interesting shift in priorities because the DoD is 
taking away funding from a fighter jet that is hailed as the world’s most exceptional 
manned fighter jet, in order to obtain more funding for robotic aeroplanes. There have 
also been changes in personnel. In 2009, the Air Force announced that it would begin 
assigning more pilots to UAVs. In 2009, there were 450 UAV pilots and the Air Force 
announced that by 2012 it would have 1,100 UAV pilots. This increase “will make the 
size of the UAV pilot community second only to that of the F-16” (Mulrine 2009, 1). 
These shifts in funding and personnel numbers are a key indicator of the growing 
importance of robotic technology in U.S. warfare.   
 
The Army is also currently developing new body armour that will be more resistant to 
blasts from bomb explosions than current body armour. The Jacobs School of 
Engineering at the University of California San Diego has a three-year contract with the 
Army Research lab to develop nanofoam technology for stronger armour. They began 
in 2013 but hope the new technology “helps disperse the force of an impact over a 
wider area…They will appear to be less rigid but will actually be more resistant than 
ordinary foams” (Engineers Develop Nanofoams 2013, 1). An additional benefit of the 
nanofoam technology is that it is lighter-weight than the Army’s current armour. The 
new armour will be lightweight because “the nanofoams are made up of a honeycomb, 
or porous, structure and are very light - pores make up anywhere from 50 to 80 percent 
of the structure” (Engineers Develop Nanofoams 2013, 1). This means that body armour 
for soldiers will not only be more resilient, but will also be lighter to wear. This will 
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benefit female soldiers because the new armour would be a better fit for some women’s 
smaller stature than current armour in use by the Army.  
 
(ii) Effects of Technological Advancement  
The formal changes in U.S. strategic culture due to technology discussed above have an 
informal effect on the link between masculinity and war fighting because of changes in 
physical needs and exposure to combat. Men have historically been physically stronger 
than women and expected to be exposed to risk through combat in order to protect 
women. As was discussed in Chapter Three, one of the arguments against women in 
combat positions was their lack of physical strength.89 However, the U.S. has moved in 
a direction of technological-based warfare, in the search for ‘bloodless’ wars, therefore, 
these characteristics are less necessary overall in the military.  
 
The contemporary RMA has changed the meaning of soldiers ‘going’ to war. Singer 
argues that robotic technology is changing the definition of warrior in that, “while 
technology may not have ended the warrior’s trade, it certainly has affected our 
definition of the attributes soldiers must have when they go to war” (Singer 2009, 331). 
Physical weakness is no longer a limitation for this kind of soldier, instead it is more 
important for them to be technically competent. Singer believes that this move toward 
technology and the pursuit for bloodless wars is changing the military profession and 
the institution as a whole because many soldiers now experience killing in war without 
the risk of combat to themselves (Singer 2009, 362).  
 
With less emphasis placed on the need for physical strength, due to developments in 
body armour and increased use of drone technologies in the military, there are greater 
needs for personnel that are technically competent. Barbara Westgate points out that the 
technical skills of young military members, both men and women, are positively 
changing the military and recruiting skilled members is becoming increasingly 
important to the mission. She states, “these kids think in an electronic technical age                                                         
89 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 97 for further information on the argument against women in 
combat roles.  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because they’ve been doing all of these video games and stuff and they think of a totally 
different way in order to affect these repairs on our weapons systems” (Westgate, April 
2012). Michael Zwein, a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, and a current 
Programme Manager for technological development in the Air Force agreed with Mrs. 
Westgate. He said, “everything is about technology now. The military realises this and 
have changed their recruitment strategy. It is more important to go after the gamers 
rather than the high school football team” (Zwein, April 2012).  
 
This was supported by the interview and survey responses from female soldiers in 
which 69 percent of all respondents said they believed some technological competence 
was essential to be successful in the U.S. military in 2012. These numbers varied with 
the branches of service, as 87 percent of respondents from the Air Force and Navy 
believed technology was important, while 52 percent of the women interviewed from 
the Marine Corps and Army felt the same.  In comparison, only 23 percent of all 
respondents felt physical strength was important to be a good soldier. Only 9.6 percent 
of respondents from the Navy and the Air Force felt it was important, (all three 
respondents who felt it was important were from the Navy; no Air Force women 
thought strength was particularly important to be a soldier). On the other hand, 29 
percent of Marine Corps and Army respondents felt physical strength was a necessary 
requirement of soldiers. 
 
As evidenced above, attributes that were historically considered inherently masculine, 
such as physical strength, are no longer as necessary as they were when conducting 
warfare in the past. Also, historically, as shown in Chapter Three, women have been 
kept away from the risk of combat, but technological advancements have allowed for 
more U.S. soldiers to engage in combat without the exposure to risk. The possible effect 
of these aspects on the gender power structure of the military is discussed in the 
conclusion to this chapter. The U.S. military’s reliance on air power is not the only 
significant change in U.S. military strategic culture. The importance of 
counterinsurgency operations to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has also changed the 
military’s approach to warfare. This is discussed in the following section. 
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5.3 Power Relations: Counterinsurgency Operations 
In considering the U.S. military from a historical institutionalism perspective, and 
keeping in mind the importance of the hierarchical rank structure in which the military 
is based, power is an important aspect of the institution. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
historical institutionalism embraces “a power-political view of institutions that 
emphasises their distributional effects, and many of them explain institutional 
persistence in terms of increasing returns to power” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 7). 
Mahoney and Thelen go on to draw the conclusion, that if power relations play an 
important role in maintaining an institution, the shifts in gender power must also be an 
“important source of change” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 9). This section argues the 
changes in U.S. strategic culture, with the emergence on counterinsurgency strategy, 
also referred to as COIN, have changed the gender balance of power in which women 
are placed at less of a disadvantaged position than in the past. As described in the first 
section, as of 2013, the U.S. military has a masculine based culture.90 This culture has 
not disappeared; rather, the gender needs of the military evolved in response to new 
missions, difficulties and capabilities.  
 
The U.S. has not only developed more advanced weaponry that has changed its warfare 
tactics but the strategy of war fought is different. This section looks at the U.S. 
military’s shift toward peacekeeping operations and counterinsurgency and explores 
how these aspects opened up areas of change in gender power relations through the ‘soft 
spots’ between formal rules and informal norms. Urban warfare and counterinsurgency 
operations have become the models of modern warfare, as the U.S. operations in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan followed the COIN (counterinsurgency) doctrine developed by 
General David Petraeus. The doctrine, originally written as an Army field manual,  “has 
moved beyond simple Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the 
defining characteristic of the Army’s new way of war. In the American Army today, 
everyone is a counterinsurgent” (Gentile 2009, 5). This new warfare strategy changes 
the American approach to warfare and therefore the strategic culture. Instead of simply 
focusing on combat, “population-centric counterinsurgency equals nation-building”                                                         
90 Please refer to pages 133 in this chapter for further information on the masculine culture of the military. 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(Gentile 2009, 6). The basic principles of COIN mark a shift toward peacekeeping 
operations and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the general population.  
 
The shift in purpose of units of the military caused by the COIN strategy in Afghanistan 
and Iraq is an example of conversion. Conversion is a method of institutional change 
where instead of “dismantling old institutions” or developing new ones, existing 
institutions are used in different ways (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 18). According to 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual change discussed in Chapter Two,91 
conversion is more likely to occur when the actors, or ‘opportunists’ in this case, have a 
weak veto possibility and a high level of leniency in the interpretation of the formal 
rules of the institution. According to Mahoney and Thelen, the conversion of an 
institution also can re-align gender power relations (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 18). 
 
Although change in policy to COIN was a formal policy change from the leaders of the 
military, the implementation of the policy was carried out by U.S. military members in 
the field, in which they had discretion on how to implement policies in order to best 
meet the challenges in the warzone (Manning, April 2012). The U.S. military’s new 
mission of peacekeeping and rebuilding, brought about by the induction of COIN, is 
markedly different than the traditional role of the military in conducting war that did not 
take into account the need to win the ‘heart and minds’ of the civilian population. The 
formal policy change to COIN was another critical juncture that opened different 
opportunities for female soldiers to participate in the military. As discussed in Chapter 
Two,92 critical junctures “open up opportunities for historic agents to alter the trajectory 
of development” in institutions that are generally rigid and difficult to change 
(Katzenlson 2003, 8). The instability of the institution, caused by critical junctures 
allows actors within the institution more room to instigate change. Female Engagement 
Teams discussed in this section are one example of groups of female soldiers who 
worked as ‘opportunists’ through the opening provided by the critical juncture of COIN 
strategy, who enacted change.                                                          
91 Please refer to Chapter Two page 39 for further information on Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
change.  
92 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on critical junctures. 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(i) Female Engagement Teams 
Female soldiers were essential to the execution of the strategic shift to COIN. Female 
Engagement Teams, referred to as FETs, were developed first as security teams to 
search Muslim women in Iraq and Afghanistan when the U.S. military recognised the 
need for “culturally sensitive search methods,” in which male U.S. soldiers could not 
search Muslim women (Long, 2012, 4). The FETs were born out of necessity and the 
scope of their mission was widened when the U.S. realised that Afghani women were 
important to intelligence gathering and reconstruction efforts. Lorry Manning, a retired 
Navy Captain and a member of the Women’s Research and Education Institute, a 
lobbyist organisation working on issues for women in the military, describes why FETs 
are needed in the field. She explains, “you need them to interact with the locals, 
particularly many people don’t realise that so many Afghan men have been killed in 30 
years of fighting that there are a lot more women out there, particularly once you get 
into some of these rural areas” (Manning, April 2012). Female soldiers were needed to 
connect with Afghan women in the field, a task that would be nearly impossible for 
male soldiers. The FET programme “highlights the recognition that female soldiers 
possess a capability that male soldiers cannot - female soldiers can access a greater 
segment of the population (women, children, and men) in these culturally conservative 
regions” (Dharmapuri 2011, 60).  This gave female soldiers an important role in 
counterinsurgency operations and intelligence gathering, which is essential to the DoD 
strategy in Afghanistan.  
 
FETs were not only able to interact and work with more Afghan women, but have also 
made inroads in interactions with Afghan men. According to Manning, “the other thing 
that Special Forces have found with the tribal chieftains is that they are totally beguiled 
by the sight of a woman and it opens a door” (Manning, April 2012). Afghan men see 
the female soldiers’ purpose as being there to help them (Pottinger et al. 2010, 4). They 
instead: 
 
Show a preference for interacting with them [female soldiers] over U.S. men. 
Pashtun men tend to view foreign women troops as a kind of ‘third gender.’ As a 
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result, female servicewomen are accorded the advantages, rather than the 
disadvantages, of both genders: they are extended the respect shown to men, but 
are granted the access to home and family normally reserved to women 
(Pottinger et al. 2011, 2). 
 
The FETs have had success in facilitating communication with Afghan men and 
women, which has given them better access to information regarding what is needed by 
civilians. This knowledge played an important role in the population-centric strategy of 
COIN. In this case, gender was not used as a barrier, but rather provided women an 
opportunity to fill coveted roles based only on the basis of their sex. Female soldiers 
were then able to act as ‘opportunist’ actors to advance women’s standing in the 
military by performing successfully in the tasks they were assigned. Women became 
strategically useful for the U.S. military so their role was expanded from support 
positions. Women’s participation in the FETs has earned them the respect of the 
military and their male counterparts very quickly. There has also been continuing media 
coverage of the FETs and their accomplishments, which has garnered them greater 
support for participating in roles closer to the front lines. 
 
The success of the FET programme, led to specific training for female soldiers assigned 
to the FET teams. According to Manning: 
 
The FETs began to institutionalise and by that I mean they began to take it not 
just at the local command but began to work with the Marine Corps authorities 
to get some formalised training. The interesting thing it does - was initially the 
women just came from whatever units happened to be over there, they just asked 
for volunteers. Now there is actually a FET to which these women are assigned. 
The women go off… out in the field and do everything that the guys they’re 
assigned with do. And they get some weapons training, and there are tougher 
PT [physical training] standards (Manning, April 2012). 
 
Before the lifting of the combat ban on women, due to the FETs, the military also 
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discussed adding women to Special Forces groups, a step that has quickly been 
dismissed in the past. Manning asserts that the Navy Seals “are very enthusiastic about 
this. The Special Forces have found a great value added to having these women because 
the Special Forces do a lot of different missions. And even within the men themselves, 
they specialise” (Manning, April 2012). The skills female soldiers have gained from the 
FET missions could be useful to Special Forces teams in the feature as they continue to 
engage in COIN-based operations. This was a major step for women to be accepted into 
all combat roles, because the Special Forces groups of all branches, including the one 
percent of closed jobs in the Air Force, were closed to women before the lifting of the 
Ground Combat Rule (Manning 2010, 7).  
 
However, along with this success, the FETs have faced criticism on both mission 
aspects and theoretical considerations. From a mission perspective, when the FETs were 
first established, many of the women were not given adequate training and they were 
only allowed to stay in one location for a few weeks at a time (Long, 2012: 28). 
Therefore it was difficult for the women to build “enduring relationships with a core 
group of local women” (Long 2012: 28). The Special Forces and Marine Corps 
provided standardised training for the FETs to prepare them for the front lines, 
however, there was a lack of standardised training for Army FETs (Holiday 2012, 92). 
The Army FETs were only given training through their commander’s discretion, which 
was often not adequate to the problems they would face on the front line (Manning, 
April 2012).  
 
An unidentified member of Congress also raised an issue with the FETs because he 
believed their existence and operations violated the combat ban policy for women. The 
teams were suspended while Congress reviewed the operating procedures for the FETs 
and decided they were living too close to the front lines for extended periods of time 
(McBride & Wibben 2012, 209). The FETs were reinstated after several weeks, but 
began operating under different guidelines. They were only allowed to stay in the field 
for a maximum of 45 days and they were allowed only temporary stays at forward 
operating bases, where they were once living for months at a time (McBride & Wibben 
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2012, 209-210). The new guidelines made it more difficult for FETs to complete their 
mission of building relationships with the locals. It was also a rule change that was for 
formal show and not a significant change to the reality on the ground. The FET women 
were just as close to the front lines as they had been in the past, but their ability to do 
their job was hindered (Manning, April 2012).  Inconsistencies in rule interpretations 
and enforcement, the ‘soft spots’ between the formal rules and informal norms, such as 
this, are discussed further in the following section. 
 
Theoretical criticisms against the FETs have been focused on the stereotypical use of 
women for peacekeeping missions of which the FETs seem to embody. McBride and 
Webben argue that the use of women in counterinsurgency operations for peacekeeping 
plays into the dichotomy of men as violent and women as peaceful, which is an idea 
that is rejected by the equal-rights based feminists93 (McBride & Webben 2012, 199-
200). They also argue that the FET women are used to make the U.S. war in 
Afghanistan seem less like a war, and therefore easier to sell to the American public 
(McBride & Webben 2012, 200). There is a strong logic to both of these arguments. 
However, when looking at the reasons the FET teams were developed, the female 
soldiers were not placed in those positions because they were believed to be inherently 
more peaceful, but rather because, due to the Afghan patriarchal culture in which they 
are operating, the U.S. military saw that there was a gap in their interaction with civilian 
society, mainly women.  
 
The use of female U.S. soldier groups to address the gap discussed above is only logical 
when looked at from this perspective. The FETs received positive media coverage, as 
can be seen by articles with titles such as, “Female Engagement Team Bring Aid to 
School, Orphanage” and “Female Engagement Team Builds Bridges Into Afghan 
Society” (Pisacubbe 2011, 1; Davis 2010, 1). Due to this, there is a fair argument that 
they are being used to gain more support for the war from the American public. 
However, the teams were created out of necessity in the field, not by DoD Headquarters 
in Washington. Although, as was evidenced in Chapter Three, military necessity has                                                         93 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for further information on the feminist arguments.  
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been the cause of critical junctures that has provided opportunities for women to 
participate in the military, this also does not change the fact that the development and 
use of the FETs provided military women with more opportunities for front line duties. 
A strategic need of the U.S. military led to an unintended benefit for female soldiers to 
advance their standing in the gender power structure of the U.S. military.  
 
(ii) Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations on Gender Relations 
The widespread use of the COIN strategy by the U.S. military was a major shift in 
strategic warfare. McBride and Webben agree that, “technological innovations such as 
drones provide one clear way to signal that war and the military are being reinvented; 
gendering counterinsurgency is another way to demonstrate that the United States is no 
longer fighting its new battles with outmoded methods” (McBride & Webben 2012, 
200). The use of population-centric COIN opened a door for female soldiers to become 
more engaged in operations on the front lines in Afghanistan. Due to the need for 
interaction with the local population for the COIN strategy, women were needed to 
open doors in building relationships with Afghan women and even Afghan men.  
 
The reliance on female soldiers for the FET roles has affected the gender power 
structure within the U.S. military because female soldiers are being perceived as more 
useful and closer to the mission than in the past. As the President of the Special Forces 
Association, John Meyer, answered as to why women should be allowed to fill all 
combat roles, he said, “Why? Because female…Marines proved themselves in combat 
repeatedly in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Kovach 2013, 1). Another male soldier who served 
in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010 noted “I think that we quickly realised how effective 
these women were” (Penazola & Lawrence 2013, 1). Former Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta, who announced the lifting of the combat ban on women in 2013 stated after a 
trip to Afghanistan that “they're [men and women] fighting and they're dying together. 
And the time has come for our policies to recognise that reality.” (Cruise & Hardzinski 
2013, 1). The opportunity the women in the FETs had to show their abilities allowed 
female soldiers to work as ‘opportunist’ actors and highlight their successful 
participation on the front lines in conflict situations.  
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The successful use of the teams led to better and formalised training. The achievement 
of the FETs initially raised the discussion of adding women to Special Forces units, 
which was never considered before. Although female soldiers found more opportunities 
through their use in peacekeeping roles, which are stereotypically feminine, this does 
not discount the changes their involvement in Afghanistan have brought to the U.S.’s 
use of female soldiers. They were closer to the front lines than women had ever been 
before in the past.94 Although they were not there specifically for combat roles, the 
FETs have further blurred the DoD Ground Combat policy that governed their 
exclusion from combat roles.95  
 
5.4 Formal vs. Informal: Rule Interpretations and Enforcement 
One of the core factors of James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen’s theory of gradual 
institutional change is the level of discretion in interpretation/enforcement held by 
institutional actors.96 They argue that, “institutional change often occurs precisely when 
problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement 
existing rules in new ways” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4). This gap, or ‘soft spot’ in the 
actual rule and its implementation can be purposefully exploited by actors who want 
change or can be a new circumstance the institution is in, in which it must 
“accommodate a new reality” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 11). As discussed in the 
previous section, this process is referred to as conversion.97 The new interpretation and 
implementation of the original rule can then be used to instigate slow and incremental 
change in an institution. In the case of the U.S. military, this theory of change is tested. 
Separate from female soldiers’ involvement in the FET teams, other women were 
placed in ground combat roles before the development of the FETs, despite the DoD 
policy that banned women from ground combat. The new reality on the ground found in 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan was that it was difficult to separate the ‘front’ and                                                         
94 Please refer to Chapter Three, pages 66, 68, 89, 91, and 95 for information on women’s past experience 
in war.  
95 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 93 for the complete DoD Ground Combat policy. 
96 Please refer to Chapter One, page 39 for further information on Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of 
gradual change.  
97 Please refer to page 154 in this chapter for additional information on conversion. 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the ‘back’ lines of war due to the nature of insurgency warfare. The Marine Corps 
training manual stated that there were no ‘front’ lines in insurgency warfare because 
they were “against an enemy who hides among the sea of the people” (Nagl 2007, 2).  
 
(i) Attachment Policy for Women in Combat 
Female service members serving in combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan was initially 
made possible through an administrative loophole in policy. Before the Ground Combat 
Rule was lifted, the policy stated that women could not be assigned to direct combat 
units in Iraq and Afghanistan. They were instead assigned as attachments to infantry 
units. Therefore, although they could not technically serve in the infantry, in being 
administratively attached to those units they ended up physically serving with them. 
Their actual duties were determined by the commanding officer of the unit (Harrell et 
al. 2007: 3). A RAND study found that contractors were used as cooks, freeing women 
to carry out other duties assigned by their commander, which eventually put them into 
combat (Harrell et al 2007, 3). The shortage of military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan created a circumstance in which the military institution, to function 
properly, had to find a new way of implementing their own rule.  
 
The gap between the Ground Combat policy and its implementation gave female 
soldiers the opportunity to take on the role of ‘opportunist’ actors and demonstrate that 
they could be equal in combat and instigate change.98 Many female veterans believe 
they have proven themselves. A Marine Lance Cpl. deployed to Iraq stated, “If we keep 
doing our job well, then they will keep giving females the chance to do what we did” 
(Carnes 2007, 1). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first to show how female 
soldiers would react and work under the pressure of combat because they had not been 
allowed at the front lines with the ground units in the past. There was much speculation 
over how they would perform in combat situations but the female soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan showed they could handle the stressful situations without disrupting the 
bonding of units (Manning 2010, 10).  
                                                         
98 Please refer to Chapter Two, pages 40 and 42 for information on ‘opportunist’ actors.  
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The masculine-centric culture of the military is in place, as of 2013, as seen by evidence 
in the first section of this chapter on military culture,99 but it has moved in a positive 
direction to be more accepting of women in the military. Also, the views of many in 
American society have evolved to be more accepting of the idea of female soldiers. A 
Gallup poll conducted by telephone in 2003 showed that 38 percent of respondents 
believed women should fill combat jobs the same way as their male counterparts 
(Should Women Fill Combat Roles 2003, 1).100 While in 2012, a Rasmussen Reports 
telephone survey found that 54 percent of respondents thought women should serve in 
combat roles the same way as men (Should Women Fill Combat Roles 2012, 1).101  
 
Many of the women that served in Iraq and Afghanistan were in combat but did not 
receive credit for combat experience in their personnel files. Due to the fact that women 
could be assigned to a combat unit, when they were up for a promotion, their promotion 
board only saw the assignment that was on paper, not that the woman had served with a 
combat unit. Female soldiers were doing many of the same jobs as their male 
counterparts but they were not receiving the recognition necessary for their career 
advancement or to raise their status in the military (Harrel et al. 2007, 2). One female 
Army soldier said: 
 
I feel they need to recognise women are in combat instead of leading the public 
to believe they are not then using a backdoor or different way of doing it 
anyways. Whether they should or shouldn't be there becomes a mute point when 
they ARE there but you are giving your country the impression that doesn't 
happen. I can't tell you how many people think I am lying and could not have 
served in Iraq as a gunner because that simply is not allowed (Julia, October 
2012). 
 
The attachment policy was also a problem for female soldiers because they continued to 
be outsiders to the group they were attached to. Lory Manning equated the attachment                                                         
99 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples of the masculine military culture.  
100 Survey information is based on 1,004 U.S. national adults. 
101 Survey information is based on 1,000 U.S. national adults. 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of female soldiers to combat groups as being “the red headed step-child who drops in 
for Christmas and a month in the summer and you’re not really one of them” (Manning, 
April 2012). In order to correct these problems, women were fighting for the right to 
officially hold combat jobs. With the help of lobbyist groups and members of Congress, 
female soldiers pushed for all jobs to be opened to them and for the DoD to no longer 
make policy restrictions based on gender lines. They were successful and the Ground 
Combat policy was overturned in 2013, as was discussed in Chapter Three.102 With the 
gap between the implementation and the old combat policy, women were able to work 
as ‘opportunist’ actors and show they could perform the jobs the military had closed to 
them. They found a foothold that brought about change for female soldiers.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the gender power structure of the U.S. military by considering 
women’s experiences inside the institution. The data shows that female soldiers 
experience the military as a masculine-oriented institution. The informal roles discussed 
in the first section show how the masculine culture plays out in day-to-day military life. 
It permeates every aspect of life in the institution, from the very beginning in basic 
training to the soldiers’ career field and even into family life on the military base. The 
DoD has been careful to create gender equal policies, yet the culture of the organisation 
is not as easy to change as policies; this will be the focus of the following chapter.    
 
The analysis of gender roles of the informal culture of the military highlighted the 
difficulties of gender identity in the U.S. military. In analysing data from the interviews 
conducted with U.S. service women, it is clear that female soldiers feel they either must 
conform to the masculine culture to fit in and be accepted or they should conform 
because they believe the culture should be masculine-oriented. This is especially 
interesting because it raises the same question as the ‘ethic of care’ feminist argument in 
Chapter One as to whether or not women’s participation changes the gendered nature of 
                                                        
102 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 93 for information on how the Ground Combat Policy was 
overturned.  
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warfare.103 Warfare is tied to masculinity, there is a traditional link between the two and 
many female soldiers conform to the culture rather than change the gendered 
characterisation of the masculine, warrior role. As was shown through the interviews 
with military women, the services with weaker ties to combat, i.e. the Air Force and 
Navy are less hyper-masculine. Women’s militarisation does not completely change the 
traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity, as is supported by the interviews 
with military women. However, as was discussed in Chapter Four, women’s 
participation does confuse the traditional gender roles. The discussion of informal 
norms also showed how female members, in aspects of their daily lives, experience the 
privileging of masculinity in the military and what actions they take to either combat the 
masculine-centric culture or adapt to it.   
 
Although the military remains a masculine-centric institution, this does not mean that 
progress and change have not occurred. This chapter also analysed areas of institutional 
change and discussed specific examples of changes in the strategic culture of the U.S. 
military as well as informal and formal developments. As was argued in the second 
section, shifts in power can bring about changes in an institution and women’s 
participation in the FETs and combat roles helped to change their place in the military. 
Although it is not yet evident, the shift in strategic culture toward a greater reliance on 
technology and the weakening link between masculinity and warfare due to 
technological advancements could enable the gender power structure to evolve in the 
future. The technological jobs were open to women even before the new 2013 policy 
that ended all restrictions on women’s career choices, and they were not at a natural 
disadvantage based on physical strength for the ‘in demand’ jobs. This means more 
opportunities for female soldiers, and this could begin to shift the power structure in the 
military, which will be beneficial to women’s participation in the U.S. Armed Forces in 
the future. This is in line with the civic responsibility feminist argument that the roles 
and jobs women are already performing should be seen as just as important as combat 
jobs.  
                                                         103 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for further information feminist arguments.  
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This is not a change that will happen overnight, it is more likely to be a slow evolution 
of priorities. As General Jamerson answered when asked about technology changing the 
culture of the military, “Can that happen? Certainly it can. Can the culture change? It 
can. I think it should, I just don’t think it’ll happen overnight. I think that’ll be a really 
slow change for us” (Jamerson, April 2012). The change in which attributes are of 
greatest importance for a military member to have, with more of a focus on technical 
competency, and less on physical strength, could evolve the culture to place a higher 
importance on the members with technical skills, instead of the emphasis placed on the 
strongest soldier. Even with the advancements in technology, some jobs have a greater 
need for physical strength so it will likely remain a factor of importance for some career 
fields, such as Special Forces. 
 
Changing gender power relations has the ability to change the military institution. The 
combination of the development of revolutionary technologies and the importance of 
COIN to military strategy have provided women opportunities to serve in jobs closer to 
the front lines, and in doing so the ability to gain greater importance and respect in the 
eyes of male members and the DoD leadership. Although these changes have not made 
the culture lean toward the feminine, it has provided the opportunity to move the 
institution toward greater equality, which took an important formal step in 2013, with 
the repeal of the Ground Combat Rule. Change through the disparity in rules and their 
interpretation and implementation have also played a key role in women’s recent 
advancement in the U.S. military. Although the attachment vs. assignment issue was not 
awarding women their full credit of combat duty, it did give them the chance to prove 
themselves, a tactic which many of the female soldiers interviewed thought was a useful 
strategy to bring about change through discrediting stereotypes of females as weak and 
incapable.104 
 
In this chapter, the above examples emphasised the importance of agency to 
institutional change. Female soldiers worked as ‘opportunist’ actors by performing 
successfully in the jobs they were given by the military. This, in turn, opened greater                                                         
104 Please refer to Chapter Five, pages 134 for examples.  
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opportunities for female soldiers and has advanced women’s standing in the military 
institution. However, as was evidenced in the first section, the overall culture is 
masculine-oriented and some female soldiers have a difficult time enacting change 
internal to the institution. The U.S. military is a rigid institution with few mechanisms 
for internal change. As was discussed in Chapter Two, many actors in the military have 
weak veto capabilities of formal rules, and must instead find the ‘soft spots’ between 
the rules and their informal implementations.105 Therefore, women have found it 
beneficial to instigate change through the U.S. legal system and Congress.106 The major 
impediments to institutional change in the U.S. military will be discussed further in the 
following chapter. Chapter Six also considers why institutional change in the U.S. 
military has been slow and difficult by considering both informal norms and formal 
policies. It builds on existing theories to explain these areas of difficulty and discusses 
the case study of sexual harassment and assault in the military.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
105 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for explanation on Mahoney and Thelen’s theory.  
106 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 79 for examples of military women instigating change through the 
legal process.  
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Case Study: Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military 
Chapter Six 
Introduction 
Chapter Five discussed the gender power structure of the military and ways in which 
changes were brought about, while this chapter discusses impediments to institutional 
change and provide a case study of sexual assault in the U.S. military to show the 
internal resistance women have faced and what actions they took in response. The 
military is a constraining institution in that it has set rules, practices and norms that its 
members are expected to follow. It also has a strict, hierarchical structure, which makes 
change especially difficult. As Mahoney and Thelen theorise, actors’ weak veto 
capabilities restrain change in the institution (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 11). The U.S. 
military rewards those that fall in line and their commanders or peers often punish the 
outliers of the institution, whether formally or informally. In an institution such as this, 
there are many factors that impede actors and therefore the process of change.  
 
This chapter discusses and analyses the aspects of the institution that are particularly 
constraining to actors within the U.S. military. It argues that the primary obstacles that 
stand in the way of change are the informal norms of the institution. Chapters Four and 
Five discussed the informal norms of the military that are perpetuated by society, 
training and tradition and Chapter Three discussed former formal policies of ‘Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell’ and women’s exclusion from combat that have helped to 
institutionalise discriminatory practices.107 The DoD is moving forward and creating 
new policies that are not discriminatory, but there is a lag between well-intentioned 
policies and the culture and norms that are lingering in the institution.  
 
This chapter looks at how the institutionalisation of informal norms has impeded 
progress and employs the use of the ‘weberian construct’ model and problems of 
institutionalisation, based on path dependency theory to explain why the informal norms 
of the military are difficult to permeate and change. As discussed in Chapter Two, two 
                                                        
107 Please refer to Chapter Three, pages 97-99. 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constructs are employed to explain why informal norms are difficult to change.108 The 
first is Lynn Zucker’s idea of ‘cultural persistence’ and the second is Ingraham, 
Moynihan and Andrew’s ‘weberian construct.’ Zucker argues that institutionalisation of 
norms in an institution can impede change. The weberian model is complimentary to 
Zucker’s ideas and posits that strict hierarchy as well as institutional maintenance and 
the ‘neutrality of expertise’ all contribute to the difficulties of changing the informal 
norms of the military (Ingraham et al. 2008, 74).  
 
In order to take a more in-depth look at the tension between formal policies and 
informal norms, this chapter focuses on a case study of the problem of sexual assault in 
the U.S. military. It discusses how encompassing the problem of sexual assault is in the 
military through examples from service members.109 In order to illustrate the problems 
that have occurred because of the lack of changes, section 6.2 analyses Fiscal Year (FY) 
2011110 statistics on sexual assault and harassment in the military. It explains the 
intricacies behind the numbers, as the DoD reported 3,192 cases of sexual assault, but 
also estimated that the actual number of sexual assaults for FY 2011 was closer to 
19,000 (Panetta: Could be 19,000 Cases 2012, 1). The newly released estimate for FY 
2012 states that “using anonymous surveys and sampling research, [the DoD] estimated 
that 26,000 personnel experienced ‘unwanted sexual contact’” (Whitlock 2013, 1). 
While the number of perpetrators that were court-martialled for the crime in FY 2011 
was only 240.111 (The DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault for FY 2011 2012, 32).  
 
This chapter also discusses examples of significant cases of sexual assault that have 
been highlighted in the American media. One case involved a female cadet that was 
harassed by her classmates after reporting a case of sexual assault perpetrated by a 
popular cadet athlete. The other two examples involve military instructors assaulting 
and harassing female trainees. One of the scandals took place at Lackland Air Force                                                         
108 Please refer to Chapter Two, pages 44 for further information on ‘cultural persistence’ and the 
‘weberian construct.’ 
109 Examples have been taken from personal interviews and from published interviews.  
110 Fiscal Year refers to the government’s funding cycle: Fiscal Year 2011 is October 2011 through to 
September 2012.  
111 Annex A, Figure 5.6 further explains the statistics. 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Base and one at Aberdeen Proving ground. These two cases were well publicised in the 
media, and were used as examples by female soldiers to gain the support and interest of 
Congress. It looks at what formal changes and policies the DoD implemented in an 
attempt to combat sexual assault in its ranks. The case study shows how women and 
men who have been victims of sexual assault have had difficulties bringing about 
change or even reporting their assaults because of the constraints of the institution. The 
problem has worsened to a degree that victims have had to take their cases outside of 
the military and force change through lawsuits and Congressional action.  
 
In order to explicate the problem and explain how external actions have affected the 
military institution, the case study will look at a proposal by Representative Jackie 
Speier of the House of Representatives. The Bill developed by Representative Speier 
looked to take the reporting chain outside of the military altogether to ensure that each 
case would be handled without the constraints the informal norms of the military brings 
with it. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand picked up the ideas from Representative Speier’s 
Bill. Senator Gillibrand introduced a Bill to the Senate with the same goal of taking 
away commander discretion regarding cases of sexual assault (Fox 2013, 1). This 
chapter also discusses the lawsuit filed against the DoD by female and male soldiers 
that have been victims of sexual assault. They decided to take their case to court 
because they believed the DoD had not acted appropriately or quickly enough to protect 
them from sexual assault while serving in the military. These actions have forced 
change and the DoD will implement new policies in fiscal year 2013.  
 
The case study of sexual assault in the military is the most useful example to show the 
problems caused by the tensions between formal policies and informal norms because 
the DoD has strict policies against sexual assault, but they were not always 
implemented properly in the field. The gap between the implementation and the rule has 
allowed room for sexual assaults to occur at a rate higher than in civilian society. It was 
estimated that “one in three military women has been sexual assaulted, compared to one 
in six civilian women” (O’Toole 2013, 1). When comparing these numbers, it must be 
taken into account that the civilian rate is over a woman’s entire lifetime, while the 
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military rate is in a condensed time frame during their military service (Hynes 2012, 1). 
The comparison of these rates show that sexual assault is a significant problem in 
American society but is an even greater epidemic in the U.S. military. Until recently in 
2013, there had been few actions taken to fight the problem, causing a culture where 
sexual assault has been tolerated. Even with the progression of formal policies, the 
informal norms have been slow to change and match the formal rules.  
 
6.1 Formal Rules vs. Informal Norms 
It is essential to consider both informal norms and formal rules in an institutional 
analysis, as they both play a role in the development, functioning, and overall culture of 
the institution (Lowndes 1996, 193). Formal rules are more easily explicated because 
they are easier to identify and are formalised. Formal rules are “explicit rules that 
rely…on formal mechanisms (the state and organisation) for their monitoring and 
enforcement” (Nee & Ingram 1998, 19). Fiona MacKay argues that there has been a 
“tendency to privilege formal institutions such as rules” in previous empirical research 
(MacKay 2011, 756). However, if an institutional analysis were to focus on just formal 
rules it would “only capture one form of institution affecting society and public 
organisations” (Ingraham et al. 2008, 68). Therefore, in analysing the U.S. military, 
formal policies, rules and structures are important aspects of analysis, but more can be 
learned by also considering the informal norms. 
 
Informal norms “are rules of a group or community that may or may not be explicitly 
stated and that rely on informal mechanisms of monitoring, such as social approval and 
disapproval” (Nee & Ingram 1998, 19). They differ “from ‘rules of thumb’ in that they 
are recognised and shared by members of a community or society - they are not simply 
personal habits or preferences” (Lowndes 1996, 193). Previously, Chapters Three and 
Five discussed informal norms and formal policies of the U.S. military that affect the 
armed forces. However, this chapter focuses on the tension between the formal policies 
and informal norms of the military and how formal rules can change but the institutional 
culture may not if the informal norms do not follow.  
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Chapter Five discussed the different ways change has been brought about in the 
military. This chapter argues that informal norms can also be an impediment to change 
in the military. Several military women interviewed believed their actions were 
constrained by the informal norms of the military institution in response to cases of 
discrimination.  Out of the 64 female respondents, only one, an Army officer, said that 
she used the internal complaint structure of the military through the Equal Opportunity 
(EO) office to officially file a complaint of discrimination in an attempt to change the 
behaviour and benefit other military women and it, “resulted in absolutely no action” 
(Vicki, October 2012). This is a prime example of the overall prevailing attitude from 
the women interviewed. Many of them believed that there really was nothing they could 
do about the discrimination. One enlisted Marine said that she, “was still much lower-
ranking and there was nothing I could do about it” (Danielle, October 2012). A Navy 
enlisted woman added that, “there is no counteracting it, you are given orders, and you 
follow them” (Stephanie, October 2012). One Army Staff Sgt. pointed out that this issue 
was not necessarily the DoD’s fault. She said, “the military does have institutions in 
place if someone wanted to lodge an official complaint,” but the problem was that much 
of the discrimination was too subtle to report, so instead she, “pretended that I didn’t 
notice or didn’t care” (Alex, October 2012). These women felt like they had reached a 
wall in which they had no avenues for change and were affected by the informal norms 
of the military even when formal policies were in place to protect them.  
 
It is clear from the responses in the interviews and surveys, and from the history of 
women’s advancement in the military, that sometimes change is not possible internally 
because of the constraints imposed by the informal norms or formal rules of the 
institution. This is when actors move to the outside of the institution to bring about 
change. Mahoney and Thelen posit that, “actors disadvantaged by one institution may 
be able to use their advantaged status vis-à-vis other institutions to enact change” 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 9). Military women have done this in the past, and have 
recently in 2012 through legislation on sexual harassment and assault, by taking their 
cases of discrimination to the federal courts and Congress to enact change.112 This will                                                         
112 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 74 for examples. 
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be discussed further in the chapter.  
 
As was evidenced in Chapter Three, the U.S. military was built on a masculine-oriented 
culture and according to path dependency theory its original ideas and norms are 
difficult to change.113 As Margaret Levi argues, “the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Levi 1997, 
62). Changing the informal policies of an institution is complicated by the institution’s 
nature in which “once a path is chosen it is difficult to change it because the processes 
become institutionalised” (Trouve et al. 2010, 5). This applies to the informal norms of 
an institution as well. According to Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrews, “in studies of 
civil service systems we find the state bound by a set of formal defining rules, these 
rules, even when changed in a formal sense, prove exceptionally difficult to change in 
reality, ostensibly because the formal institutions are matched by especially durable 
arrangements” (Ingraham et al. 2008, 66). This is true in the case of the U.S. military 
institution.  
 
The DoD has established policies against sexual discrimination, harassment and assault 
in order to attempt to lessen the problem. However, as discussed further in the chapter, 
and mentioned previously, these formal policies do not stop a higher rate of cases of 
sexual assault from happening than in the civilian population. This is because there is a 
disconnect between the formal policies of the DoD and the informal norms followed by 
members of the military. It cannot be expected that the right formal policies will 
completely stop all cases of sexual assault from happening. However, it would show 
improvement, if the rate of sexual assaults in the military were comparable to the rate in 
American civilian society. As shown in examples from Chapter Two, women in the 
military have worked hard to formally gain equal rights, however, the informal norms 
of the military are rarely targeted. They “are usually in existence alongside formal rules, 
often ingrained in the values of organisations and society” and are therefore, more 
difficult to change (Ingraham et al. 2008, 68).                                                          
113 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 33 for further information on historical institutionalism path 
dependency. 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(i) Institutionalisation of Informal Norms 
In considering the ways change is brought about in the military, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, informal norms are more difficult to change because there is no formal structure 
or avenue for actors to pursue. It is difficult to distinguish what aspects of the culture to 
target that will bring about the desired change because informal casual mechanisms of 
change are opaque. In Chapter Four, female soldiers talked about how they hoped to 
change the masculine-centric culture of the military by performing well in their jobs and 
expelling stereotypes of women in the military. However, this approach is on an 
individual scale and it will take a long time to see results on an organisational level 
without a broader process of normalisation. This is because the emphasis and 
importance placed on masculine traits in the military has been institutionalised through 
years of the U.S. military being a ‘men only’ organisation. Gender stereotypes have 
been prevalent in the institution and the lines between the formal rules and the informal 
norms are blurred.  
 
In order to explain the problem above, as discussed in Chapter Two,114 the first specific 
framework based on path dependency theory employed is Lynne Zucker’s idea of 
‘cultural persistence’ and the second is Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrew’s ‘weberian 
construct.’ Lynne Zucker argues that institutionalisation of norms increase ‘cultural 
persistence’ and makes the norms more difficult to change (Zucker 1977, 83). Zucker 
outlines three aspects of persistence that drive cultural persistence in an institution. The 
first aspect is that of transmission. The informal norms have to first be passed down 
from previous members. She posits, “transmission from one generation to the next must 
occur, with the degree of generational uniformity directly related to the degree of 
institutionalisation” (Zucker 1977, 83). In the U.S. military this transmission is mainly 
carried out during training, which was discussed in Chapter Five.115 Those in charge of 
training new recruits and officers are always older service members that are tasked with, 
not only training the recruits in the basics of military service, but also in teaching them                                                         
114 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 44 for further information on ‘cultural persistence’ and the 
‘weberian construct.’  
115 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 137 for examples. 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the culture, values and norms of the institution they are entering. The values and norms 
of the institution are presented as facts by trainers. Zucker argues that this makes it 
easier to complete the transmission process. She posits, “social knowledge once 
institutionalised exists as a fact, as part of an objective reality, and can be transmitted 
exactly on that basis” (Zucker 1977, 726). For many recruits, basic training is their first 
introduction to the military and they must rely on their trainers for information.116 One 
female soldier interviewed supported this. She said, “You feel very isolated, cut off 
during training. You pretty much have to just trust what your sergeants are telling you” 
(Kate, October 2012). This process institutionalises the norms passed down from the 
trainers. As discussed further in the chapter, this can be problematic when the trainers 
are passing down discriminatory norms and not setting acceptable examples for new 
recruits to follow, as the informal norms transmitted often do not correspond with 
formal policies.  
 
Zucker’s second aspect for ‘cultural persistence’ is maintenance (Zucker 1977, 83). The 
maintenance process is continued throughout military members’ careers through war 
stories, specific job training and traditions passed down to new members by those 
already in their branch of service or career field117 and “each individual is motivated to 
comply because otherwise his actions and those of others in the system cannot be 
understood” (Zucker 1977, 726). Therefore, in order to assimilate, the majority of 
individuals accept and adhere to the norms of the institution. The final aspect is that of 
resistance to change. She posits that, “cultural persistence depends on the resistance to 
attempts to change, with the degree of resistance directly related to the degree of 
institutionalisation” (Zucker 1977, 83). If informal norms are successfully and strongly 
institutionalised, actors will be more opposed to changes in the culture of the institution. 
The military is an organisation in which its members are highly institutionalised and the 
military is a traditional organisation that rewards uniformity. This makes it more 
difficult to bring about change in the informal norms.  
                                                         
116 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 138.  
117 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 141 for examples.  
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Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrews explain a similar construction of why informal 
norms of institutions are especially difficult to change. They refer to it as the ‘weberian 
construct.’ Although this ‘weberian construct’ was developed outside of Zucker’s 
aspects of ‘cultural persistence,’ the two are complimentary and this chapter combines 
both to better understand the case of the U.S. military. For example, the first aspect of 
the ‘weberian construct’ is that of a hierarchy. They argue, “the rigid ordering of 
authority and expertise, or hierarchy” can make institutions particularly fixed and 
therefore more impervious to change (Ingraham et al. 2008, 72). The hierarchical 
structure of an institution constrains lower-ranking actors, so they then have weak veto 
possibilities (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 11). This idea is specifically applicable to the 
U.S. military because it has a strict hierarchical structure and lower-ranking personnel 
are often restricted, which makes it difficult for even large groups of actors in the 
institution to instigate change internally. This problem of the hierarchical rank structure 
is discussed further in this chapter.118  
 
The strict rules of adherence to the rank structure were developed out of operational 
necessity for combat in which it was dangerous for members to not follow orders and 
began with the origins of the U.S. military. General George Washington stated, 
“discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success 
to the weak, and esteem to all” (Allen 1988, 3). The importance of following orders 
from those higher ranking is reflected in the oath military members have to take. The 
oath states, “I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of 
the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice” (U.S.C. 502). The necessity of following orders and adhering to the 
hierarchical structure makes it difficult for lower-ranking actors to instigate change.  
 
The second aspect of the ‘weberian construct’ is the “resilience to change,” maintained 
by the “bounding of an organisation from the environment” (Ingraham et al. 2008, 73). 
Zucker’s second aspect of maintenance is similar, except that she posits the 
maintenance comes from inside influences, while Ingraham, Moynihan, and Andrews                                                         
118 Please refer to this chapter, page 189.  
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look at the problem differently. They posit that the norms of the institution are 
maintained through the isolation and dependence on the institution of their members. 
Zucker’s and Igraham, Moynihan and Andrew’s ideas are employed in this thesis 
because the military displays characteristics of both concepts. Maintenance of the 
informal norms is often transmitted internally through training and mentoring, as 
Zucker posits, but the bounding of an organisation from the environment can also be 
found in the military as those outside of the military are often painted as ‘others’ and 
military members are encouraged to bond with their units, often times more than their 
own families. Also, as was discussed in Chapter One, some military members have 
come to feel as though they are morally above civilians in their communities and this 
serves to isolate them further from the outside community.119 Military members also 
move regularly and rely on the base environment for their friends, daily errands and 
community. These aspects can effectively cut off service members from outside 
influence and environments, which in turn, helps to maintain the status quo.  
 
The last aspect of the ‘weberian construct’ is the “neutrality of expertise within the 
organisation” (Ingraham et al. 2008, 73-74). Those within the institution, have similar 
experiences, views and rules. They are promoted “within clearly specified boundaries” 
and promotions are often based on “core values” of the institution. (Ingraham et al. 
2008, 73-74). Neutrality of expertise in the organisation encourages uniformity in the 
group because the individuals are rated on similar criteria. Many military members 
share the same experiences and have worked and lived in the same places. There are 
also strict promotional guidelines that take into account the members’ adherence to the 
core values of the institution. This builds on Zucker’s aspect of resistance to change 
because the neutrality of expertise in the institution causes a lack of objectivity and few 
outside viewpoints. This encourages the status quo and makes the informal norms more 
difficult to change. Zucker’s ‘cultural persistence’ and Ingraham, Moynihan and 
Andrew’s ‘weberian construct’ are employed in this chapter to assist in explaining why 
the masculine culture of the military has been difficult to change even as formal policies 
and wider political and social culture become gender equal. The persistent problem of                                                         
119 Please refer to Chapter Four, page 105. 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sexual assault in the military is an in-depth example of how the tension between 
institutionalised informal norms and advancing formal policies create problems for 
female soldiers. The case described below will show how characteristics of the military 
institution, as described in the ‘cultural persistence’ construct and the ‘weberian 
construct,’ contribute to the persistence of the informal norms of acceptance of sexual 
assault in the U.S. military.  
 
6.2 Case Study Overview: Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military 
There are continuing problems of sexual harassment and assault of women in the U.S. 
military. Many military women fear that their careers will be negatively affected for 
reporting these crimes, as there has been a culture of negative attitudes by soldiers 
toward women if they accuse a man of harassment or assault. The DoD has enacted a 
formal policy that dictates sexual harassment training for all military and civilian 
employees but the problem persists and has been getting worse over the past ten years, 
due to the permissive culture (Mulrine 2012, 1). The lack of serious punishment for 
perpetrators has led to a culture in which sexual harassment and assault have been 
tolerated and written off as a show of masculinity (A Failure on Military Assaults 2013, 
1). One female soldier describes the problem of sexual assault in the military, she states: 
 
Leaders in the military are responsible to train and guide young soldiers, and 
help them earn rank and succeed. Instead, the leaders have disappeared and 
soldiers are left to either suck it up and drive on or suffer massive punishments 
and betrayals at the hands of the people, the soldiers, who swore an oath not 
only to our country, but to never leave a soldier behind. Some may not be left 
behind in war and combat, but we are left behind and practically left for dead by 
our fellow soldiers. In fact, we may have been raped by the soldiers who left us 
behind (Rachel, October 2012). 
 
Although many of the DoD policies discussed below are good in theory, they are not 
implemented in a way that takes into account the reality of women in the field and the 
pressures and constraints of the institution.  
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(i) Formal Policies 
The DoD has established policies against sexual assault, harassment and discrimination. 
In an attempt to prevent sexual assault and harassment, the DoD has put into place 
awareness programmes and classes that all military and civilian DoD employees have to 
complete when they are hired. The DoD has hoped to combat sexual assault by 
eliminating occurrences of sexual harassment in the ranks. They started by setting a 
clear definition for sexual harassment (DoD Sexual Harassment Policy 2009, 1). The 
DoD’s current definition of sexual harassment is: 
 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constituting sexual harassment when: 1.) An 
employment decision affecting that individual is made because the individual 
submitted to or rejected the unwelcome conduct; or 2) The unwelcome conduct 
unreasonably interferes with an individual’s work performance or creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or abusive work environment. (DoD Sexual Harassment 
Policy 2009, 1) 
 
If a service member is found guilty of sexual harassment or discrimination, they are 
generally dealt with administratively through a reduction in rank and pay or a letter of 
record attached to their file that can negatively affect their chances for further 
promotions (DoD Sexual Harassment Policy 2009, 1).  
 
There has been substantial evolution in sexual assault and harassment policies since 
women first entered the military. The beginning of the 1990s put a spotlight on sexual 
assault and harassment in the U.S. military. The main source of this was the Tailhook 
Scandal in September 1991.120 Another major scandal broke in 2003, but this time with 
the Air Force. It was brought to light by a female cadet at the Air Force Academy that 
the Academy had a large number of sexual assault cases that were neglected and never 
investigated. The Armed Services Committees of both the House and Senate appointed                                                         
120 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 131 for background on the Tailhook scandal. 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an independent panel to investigate the allegations against the Air Force Academy. 
Around the same time as this, Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, 
convened a panel of military and civilian personnel to evaluate the problem of sexual 
assault in the military.  The panel “found that existing policies failed to define sexual 
assault adequately and lacked systems for accountability” (Clemeston 2004, 1).  
 
In answer to pressure from Congress and the findings of the DoD panel, in 2005, the 
DoD increased medical and psychiatric support for sexual assault victims. They also 
developed a web site “designed to clarify that sexual assault was illegal and to help 
women report it” (Benedict 2007, 2) Also, the Sexual Assault and Prevention Office 
was created by the Secretary of Defense to coordinate reports and provide oversight for 
sexual assault and harassment policies (Benedict 2007, 2). Furthermore, there is also an 
anonymous hotline that women can use if they want to seek medical care but do not 
want to officially report the assault to the military. More recent changes were proposed 
for FY 2013, by the direction of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. He “moved the 
review of all sexual assault cases up the chain of command to more senior officers, 
colonels or navy captains, with the power to convene special court martials” to try to 
improve prosecution rates of sexual assault in the military (Rue 2013, 3). Special units 
to handle sexual assault cases are also going to be created. Both of these changes were 
mandated in the 2013 Defense Authorisation Act (Rue 2013, 3). These changes will be 
discussed in the last section of this chapter.  
 
Sexual assault and misconduct continue to be covered under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), therefore, it is a crime for which military members can be 
court-martialled. If they are convicted, they could spend time in jail, receive 
administrative punishments, such as reduction in rank and pay, or be dishonourably 
discharged from the military (Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault 
in the Military 2012, 32). However, commanders continue to have discretion over the 
cases reported and can decide whether or not to take action. As Representative Speier 
states, “commanders continue to have complete and total discretion over incidents of 
assault in their unit. A commander can choose to investigate a case or sweep it under 
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the rug” (Mulrine 2012, 2). There is no additional oversight of reported cases. Instead 
the case reports begin and can end with the commander. The Bill Representative Speier 
introduced in the House of Representatives looks to solve this problem by taking the 
power away from unit commanders regarding sexual assault reporting. This will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  
 
(ii) Current Standing and Statistics 
Despite these changes in formal policies, unfortunately, sexual assault has been an 
increasingly large problem for military women. In a study conducted by the Army, it 
was found that sexual assaults had increased 64 percent from 2006 to 2011 (Army 
Report on Sexual Crime 2011, 1). In the military as a whole, for the fiscal year of 
2011,121 a total of 3,192 cases of sexual assault were reported out of 207,308 female 
soldiers on active duty (The DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault 2012, 32). Secretary 
of Defense Leon Panetta said that the number of assaults, the majority of which went 
unreported, was probably “actually closer to 19,000” based on estimated rates of how 
many women do not report assaults and an anonymous survey conducted by the DoD 
(Mulrine 2012, 3). The following graph shows the total numbers of reports, and the 
numbers of restricted and unrestricted reports for fiscal year 2011. The total number of 
reports includes cases of “sexual assaults committed by and against Service members” 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 29). Therefore it includes 
all cases that were either committed by a military member or against military members, 
so the victim or the perpetrator could be a civilian. However, as the graph on the 
following page shows, 82 percent of assaults were known to be committed by a service 
member.  
 
The DoD report describes the difference between unrestricted and restricted reports. 
Unrestricted reports “of sexual assault can include one or more victims, one or more 
subjects, and one or more crimes” (DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the 
Military 2012, 29). Restricted reports, on the other hand, “by policy only involve one                                                         
121 Fiscal Years run from October to September the following year. FY 2011 numbers were the most 
recent reported. The DoD is currently in FY 2013.  
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victim reported per incident” and “no personally identifying information is maintained 
for alleged subjects” (DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 30). 
The restricted reports include victims that did not want to name their perpetrators.  
 
Figure 6.1 Total Number of Sexual Assault Reports Involving Military Members 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, page 33) 
 
The following chart shows the statistics for fiscal year 2011 of how the service member 
was involved in the sexual assault. These percentages are all based on the total 3,192 
reports to the Department of Defense. As shown in the graph on the following page, a 
military member did not perpetrate not all reported cases, nor were they all against 
service members. However, the majority of reports, 56 percent, were of a soldier 
attacking another soldier and the next highest percentage was of soldiers attacking 
civilians.   
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Figure 6.2 Unrestricted Reports of Sexual Assault by Service Member Involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 36) 
 
The total number of reported assaults also includes reports from both male and female 
victims, and includes cases with both male and female subjects. However, women are 
the vast majority of victims of sexual assault and men are the majority of subjects, as 
shown by the charts below.  
 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 Percentage of Male and Female Victims and Subjects 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 53-54) 
 
Not only are women more likely to be the victims of sexual assault, they are also more 
likely to be the lowest ranking and youngest members of the military. The lowest 
ranking members have less power in the hierarchical structure of the military, and often 
have fewer avenues for resistance because of their standing in the military organisation 
(Hynes, 2012: 1). This is one example of how the ‘weberian construct’ characteristic of 
a ‘strict hierarchical structure’ can make institutions more impervious to change. This is 
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supported in the graph below in which 63 percent of the women assaulted were 
perpetrated against those in the ranks of E-1 to E4, which are the entry-level, enlisted 
personnel. Women in those ranks are often times even more constrained in the actions 
they can take than other women in the institution because they are at the very bottom of 
the power structure of the military. This was evidenced also in Chapter Five, when one 
female soldier said she did not fight back against discrimination because she did not feel 
that she was high enough ranking in the hierarchical structure for her to stand up for 
herself.122 
 
Figure 6.5 Rank of Victims in Completed Investigations of Unrestricted Reports 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault for FY 2011, page 54) 
 
The following graph shows the overall rate of reports of sexual assaults by victims of 
each military branch. These numbers do not show that one branch is better than another 
as far as having fewer sexual assaults. The Marine Corps has the lowest rate of 
instances of sexual assault reports, however, the Marine Corps also has the lowest 
number of women in their ranks (Manning, 2010: 16) and, as discussed previously, 
women are vastly more likely to be victims of sexual assault than men. The Army, on 
the other hand has the highest number of female soldiers in their ranks, with 200,888 
women and they also have the highest rate of reports of sexual assaults (Manning, 2010: 
16; DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assaults for FY 2011, 35). 
                                                         
122 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 134 for example.  
  186 
Figure 6.6 Reported Rates of Sexual Assaults by Military Branch 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 35) 
 
The statistics above show that sexual assault has been a steady problem in the U.S. 
military. The rates of sexual assaults have increased from FY 2007 to FY 2011, even 
after the DoD enacted their policies to combat sexual assault in the military in 2005. 
The DoD is clear that it is illegal, against their policies, and is a continuing and 
worsening problem. However, their attempts at training service members to be aware of 
the problem have so far been ineffective. In this instance, the formal rules have not been 
able to drive changes in the informal norms of the military. There are problems in the 
reality of daily life in the military that affect the informal norms regarding sexual 
assault. These issues are discussed below.  
 
6.3 Realities in the Application 
The current policies are more conducive to the reality for military women in the field 
than prior policies, but many incidents continue to go unreported and women’s careers 
are often negatively affected. Women that report assault and agree to press charges are 
subjected to the entire investigation and trial while often still stationed where they were 
originally assaulted. This means they are with the same unit, and if their perpetrator was 
as well, the women will often face insults and discrimination from others in their unit 
for disrupting the bonds of the group. One female soldier reported that she was laughed 
at when she attempted to report the assault to those in her unit and they then intimidated 
her into silence (Lasker 2011, 1). Many women face cases of not being believed by their 
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commanders or co-workers and will then face discrimination from them as well. If the 
accusation is initially reported to the woman’s commanding officer, the commander can 
decide how far to take the allegations and the penalty involved. Reporting crimes of 
sexual assault and harassment have also been detrimental to women’s careers. They 
have been looked at as traitors to their unit and as causing problems (Lasker 2011, 1).  
 
(i) Culture Surrounding Sexual Assault 
Sexual assault has been a taboo topic for the military in the past. In the 2010 Workplace 
and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, released by the DoD, it found 
that 67 percent of female soldiers would feel uncomfortable about reporting a sexual 
assault, while 54 percent said they would fear backlash from their peers or the military 
if they reported a case of sexual assault. The survey also found that 46 percent of men 
and women believed cases of sexual assault were not important enough to be reported 
(DoD Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, 2010). This 
recent survey, conducted by the DoD shows that there is a problem with the culture in 
the institution surrounding cases of sexual assault. It shows that the informal norm of 
acceptance of sexual assaults has been institutionalised in the U.S. military and 
according to Zucker and Ingraham, Moynihan and Weber’s constructs outlined in the 
first section of this chapter, this makes the informal norm especially difficult to change. 
The statistics above are difficult to compare to civilian workplace statistics because 
military members often live close to their co-workers on bases. Many enlisted members 
live in the same dorms and this is not usually the case in a civilian workplace 
environment.  
 
One female soldier interviewed said that there is a culture of reprisal against women 
that report sexual assaults. She said, “the victim will be painted as a troublemaker or 
someone that disturbs unit cohesion. Until even that one fundamental thing changes, the 
military is not a welcoming place for women at all” (Tina, October 2012). One case that 
shows the reprisal victims can face is that of Stacey Thompson. She was a Lance 
Corporal in the Marine Corps stationed in Japan. While at a nightclub one evening, her 
Sergeant, a higher ranking enlisted member, placed drugs in her drink and assaulted her 
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on base before leaving her on a street in the city (LaVictoire 2013, 1). Instead of 
punishing her attacker, he “was allowed to leave the Marine Corps, but she was 
investigated by the military for drug use” (LaVictoire 2013, 1). Stacey’s case is an 
example of the Zucker’s idea of maintenance, in which the informal norms may need to 
be enforced to keep them institutionalised. Stacey was punished for going against the 
informal norm of acceptance of sexual assault and the bonding of her unit. She was 
punished by those in the institution who were looking to maintain the informal norms. 
She was eventually given an other-than-honourable discharge123 and therefore lost all of 
her benefits. Stacey’s case is another example of how the hierarchical rank structure of 
the military influenced the outcome of the situation. Due to her Sergeant’s higher rank 
and status, he held more power and this constrained the actions Stacey could take. 
Stacey’s case is one that has come before Congress in their discussions to amend how 
the DoD handles cases of sexual assault in the military. Congress’s actions will be 
discussed further in the chapter.  
 
There was one case at the U.S. Air Force Academy between two students that is an 
example of the reprisal culture discussed above, which exists even in the military 
universities. A female cadet had been out on the weekend and had drinks with her 
cousin. When she returned to her dorm, a male cadet member that was a popular athlete 
for the university attacked her. The female cadet had a rape kit carried out at the 
hospital and reported the crime to the university. However, instead of prosecuting the 
male cadet, she was written up for drinking and fraternisation and the university said 
they had misplaced the rape kit she had done at the hospital. After reporting the assault, 
male and female cadets harassed her, told her that she did not belong there, and many of 
her previous friends stopped talking to her. The female cadet decided to leave the 
academy after four months and transfer to a civilian university. She was not able to 
receive Veteran’s Assistance counseling when she transferred out of the Air Force 
Academy (Manning, October 2012; Elliot 2012, 1).  
                                                         
123 An other-than-honourable discharge takes away all education and health benefits that a member has 
earned during their time in the military.  
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The female cadet discussed above, came forward with several others “in January of that 
year [2012]…to say that when they reported being sexually assaulted, they were 
punished for minor infractions [such as] as drinking” (Elliot 2012, 1) This is an example 
of the effects from a ‘weberian construct’ characteristic in which members of the 
organisation are bounded from the outside environment. The victims in this case were 
cut off from outside support and were expected to adhere to the informal norms of the 
military institution that were already being enacted at the Air Force Academy. The 
informal norm in place with this characteristic is that members are not supposed to 
disrupt the bonds of their unit. When the female cadets decided to not adhere to the 
informal norms they were punished by those in the institution looking to keep the status 
quo of the unit. This reprisal, as discussed above, is an aspect of Zucker’s idea of 
‘cultural persistence’ in which those who go against the informal norms are punished in 
order to reproduce the same informal norms.  
 
One of the surprising aspects of the case discussed above was that female cadets were 
also unsupportive regarding the report of the assault. One female soldier in the military 
police, Jennifer, admitted that she would not be supportive of a women reporting sexual 
harassment or assault. She said, “I would have been angry at a female for reporting 
sexual harassment and making waves. And it wasn’t like anybody ever touched me - I 
wasn’t one of those women you could push around in that way” (Benedict 2009, 81). 
This is another example of the ‘weberian construct’ characteristic discussed on the 
previous page, in which members of military units are bound together and are expected 
not to disrupt the bonds of the unit. It is also an example of Zucker’s process of 
maintenance, in which victims face reprisal by others for breaking the informal norm. 
These two aspects contribute to the broader cultural problem of sexual assault in the 
military in which the victim is punished and blamed for the assault, not only by her 
male co-workers, but her female counterparts as well.  
 
Jennifer, who was quoted above, had an incident happen to her, which she decided not 
to report because she did not want to disrupt the status quo in her unit. A Sergeant in her 
unit made unwelcome advances towards her for months. Eventually, as a social 
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gathering for her unit, he publically announced that he was in love with her and he was 
going to kill himself if she would not be with him. She called a Military Police unit to 
watch him for the weekend to make sure he would not hurt himself. However, after the 
incident he became angry with her. He was in control of the promotions for her group 
and he made sure hers was always denied (Benedict 2009, 80). She did not report him 
because she “wanted to fit in, and you can’t fit in if you make waves like that. You rat 
somebody out, you’re screwed. You’re going to be a loner until they eventually push 
you out” (Benedict 2009, 80). She did not feel as though she had an avenue to report the 
problem and have it taken seriously and eventually solved. Instead, women reporting 
sexual assaults are not only seen as disrupting unit bonds and making waves, but many 
are also not believed.  
 
One enlisted female soldier had been sexually assaulted three times over her 22-year 
career in the military and all three perpetrators had been officers. She said, “sexual 
assaults happened to me several times in my 22 years in the military, a couple times that 
succeeded, I got even with them in my own way, but I never reported them because 
nobody believes you” (Benedict 2009, 81). One enlisted female soldier respondent said 
that she “filed a report of rape against an army member and it was not taken seriously” 
(Cynthia, October 2012). She felt as though her assault was a joke and no action came 
from her reporting the crime. This is an example of how the tension between the 
informal norms of the institution and the formal policy in place to combat sexual assault 
causes serious problems for female soldiers. The informal norm of the military is 
accepting of sexual assault, yet the formal policy in which the crime is supposed to be 
taken seriously and perpetrators should receive a punishment is not carried out properly 
because the informal norm of acceptance dictates the behaviour of those in charge of 
carrying out the formal policy. Once victims of assault are aware of this pattern, they 
are less likely to report assaults because they do not trust the system, as described above 
by the enlisted female soldier. 
 
Commanders and unit members not taking reports of sexual assault seriously, or not 
believing victims, can happen for many reasons. In some instances, the accused subject 
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is a well-known and well-liked member of a unit. As Lory Manning states, “the guy 
might be their best whatever [sic] or somebody who is seen as a general overall good 
guy with 18 years in” and then there is an attitude of “why would you screw up his 
retirement or why would you leave his wife without support? [By reporting him]” 
(Manning, April 2012). Manning also points out that sexual predators are often smart 
about how they choose their victims, and they will go after those women that they 
believe they can get away with hurting. She argues: 
 
Some of these cases are two 19 year olds getting drunk but some of them involve 
a sexual predator who knows how to pick his victim and he picks ones who are 
[sic] already tarnished for some reason. Maybe she’s not the strongest team 
player or maybe she has gotten herself in trouble once or twice drinking. So they 
know how to pick them and then it becomes my best guy versus this woman who 
has got a ding or two and who are they going to believe? (Manning, April 
2012).124  
 
The concern that they may not be believed or taken seriously stops some women from 
reporting instances of sexual assault, and is partially the reason for 3,192 cases reported 
out of an estimated 19,000 cases (DoD Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 1). 
 
(ii) Rank and Command Climate 
The attitude of the commanding officers of a unit is especially important for cases of 
sexual assault because the majority of the power lies with them in deciding what cases 
to take forward to prosecution. This is another area in which the ‘weberian construct’ 
idea of the strict hierarchal culture of the military is especially important. The 
hierarchical structure provides some actors with more power and others with less and 
this can be detrimental if those with more power are unwilling to change the informal 
norm of acceptance of sexual assault in the military. According to Manning: 
 
                                                        
124 This contributes to the problem of the victim being blamed for the assault instead of the perpetrator.  
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I would say probably 75 to 80 percent of commanders out there probably do 
make the right call but it’s the ones that don’t and there are a lot of reasons why 
they don’t. None of them see themselves as protecting a rapist, they see 
themselves as the steward of the command mission or you know, she’s not 
reliable anyway…and they don’t want to be bothered or it scares them or 
they’re afraid they’ll be blamed because there is a rape in their unit and you’re 
the commander so you must be [doing something wrong] (Manning, April 
2012). 
 
The argument of Representative Speier and her team working on pushing through 
legislation that would take away commanders’ purview regarding sexual assault cases is 
that sexual assault cases are not a commander’s job to be dealing with. Their job is 
focused on the military functioning of their unit, while the prosecution of sexual assault 
cases should be handled by people with the proper training and knowledge to be dealing 
with such cases (Connelly, April 2012). This will be discussed further in the following 
section.  
 
One female soldier interviewed believed that if commanders were going to continue 
their role in sexual assault cases, they should be better trained. She said: 
 
Commanders and First Sergeants need to be better trained to be more 
understanding with their soldiers, both because of sexual harassment of both 
male and female soldiers, but also from PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] 
both from combat and from betrayal by their fellow soldiers. Too many of these 
soldiers have been basically shoved out of the military with less than honourable 
discharges. I think education needs to start with the command level. Too many 
commanders have the General G.S. Patton attitude towards mental traumas and 
just about everything else (Ann, October 2012). 
 
The General G.S. Patton attitude Ann mentions is the belief that soldiers need to ignore 
mental traumas and continue fighting.  
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Commanders can also help foster an environment that is safer for female soldiers by 
taking reports of sexual harassment, discrimination, and assault seriously. Eli, an 
enlisted female soldier, felt let down by her commanders in this area. She said a young 
enlisted girl told her that a higher-ranking enlisted male soldier said he wanted to have 
sex with her anally. Eli reported the threats to her First Sergeant and he said, “tell her to 
walk with her back against he wall” (Benedict 2009, 89). Eli filed a complaint against 
her First Sergeant for his attitude but the only outcome was that her group had to take a 
sexual harassment class that most of the soldiers took as a joke (Benedict 2009, 89). In 
this case, the acceptance of sexual assault by those in power of her unit set the climate 
and informal norm of acceptance for others in her unit.  
 
One female soldier respondent believed that her commanders did not take the risk to 
their female soldiers seriously and were not willing to help her prevent sexual assaults. 
She said: 
 
The Department of Defense is understandably very concerned with sexual 
attacks on females, but when I requested certain things that would protect my 
small group of women and pre-empt any of those types of actions, my concerns 
were blown off. I suggested installing code locks on our B-hut125 because a 
colleague of mine expressed fear about sleeping at night with unlocked doors. 
My male superiors told me it couldn’t be done, with no good reason, giving the 
impression that we didn’t have anything to worry about. I even volunteered to 
have a friend buy equipment and send them to us to install these. If the Army is 
really concerned about protecting us, they need to understand that…we do need 
extra concessions to stay safe (Nancy, October 2012).  
 
Instances, such as the one described by Nancy above foster the belief that military 
commanders do not take the possibility of sexual assault seriously and are not willing to 
go out of their way to protect female soldiers. As Lori Manning noted, these are not the                                                         
125 A B-hut is a plywood shack soldiers live in while deployed in Afghanistan. 
  194 
majority of commanders, but as shown by the examples above, commander discretion is 
part of the problem in protecting female soldiers from sexual assaults and prosecuting 
those involved.  
 
The hierarchical structure of the military, as noted in the ‘weberian construct’ above is 
part of what constrains military members. Those in lower ranks have a more difficult 
time being heard in the organisation and have been preyed upon. As described by 
Jennifer, her career was negatively affected by a male service member that was higher-
ranking than her and was able to block her promotions because of his privileged 
position. This has been an ongoing problem for the military. Some female soldiers “say 
they were preyed upon by men higher in the chain of command, crimes military women 
call ‘rape by rank’” (Rape by Rank 2008, 1). This is especially problematic because 
women must report rape through their chain of command. There have been two major 
scandals of military trainers taking advantage of recruits under their command, one at 
Lackland Air Force Base and one at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland.  
 
The Lackland Rape Scandal, taking place at the Air Force training camp at Lackland 
Air Force Base in Texas, has been the most recent case of this nature. All Air Force 
recruits must go through basic training at Lackland Air Force Base. The training 
program “has about 475 instructors for about 35,000 airmen who graduate each year. 
While one in five recruits is female, most instructors are male” (Air Force Instructor 
Sentenced 2012, 2). The investigation has found 59 military recruits were assault, two 
victims were male (Scope of U.S. Air Force Sexual Assault Case 2013, 1). In the 
investigation “so far eight drill sergeants have received disciplinary action for sexual 
misconduct, nine have been charged and are facing court-martial and 15 are still under 
investigation” (Scope of U.S. Air Force Sexual Assault Case 2013, 2). Staff Sgt. Luis 
Walker was one of the main perpetrators and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his 
actions (Air Force Instructor Sentenced 2012, 2). It was found that in only four months, 
Walker had had improper sexual contact with a minimum of ten female recruits. The 
women who testified against him said they were scared about coming forward because 
they thought they would be kicked out of the Air Force for making a complaint. They 
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also said that he had threatened their careers if they did not cooperate with him (Air 
Force Instructor Sentenced 2012, 3-4).  
 
Staff Sgt. Donald Davis was another drill sergeant at Lackland Air Force Base accused 
of sexually abusive contact with a female trainee. The trainee reported Davis’s 
inappropriate behaviour and testified that he and another drill sergeant, identified as 
Jordan, began retaliating against her and another female recruit she had confided in by 
calling them names during training and threatening failure that would make them have 
to re-take the training course (King 2012, 2). A higher-ranking instructor told her that, 
“if I knew what was best for me, that I would keep my mouth shut about this whole 
incident” (King 2012, 2). It was found during the investigation that Jordan had sent a 
message to Davis that read, “I need some dirt on (the victim). I’m trying to laterally 
transfer her” (King 2012, 2). These incidents were clearly not just a ‘few bad apples’ as 
the Air Force had hoped at the beginning of the allegations (Lackland Sex Scandal 
2013, 3). The Air Force found that the allegations and complaints had not made it up the 
chain of command, but had been stalled with lower commanders (Lackland Sex Scandal 
2013, 3-4). One victim of assault at Lackland testified that the breakdown in command 
reporting was especially frustrating. She said, “in my eyes, that means, OK, 
commander, you’re the judge, jury and executioner. In the military we have one person 
that may or may not help you” (Scope of U.S. Air Force Sexual Assault Case 2013, 2). 
The Air Force is not the only branch to have this abuse of power, as a similar case took 
place at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, a training base for the Army, in 1996. 
 
The scandal at Aberdeen included 56 female recruits and 12 drill sergeants. Twenty of 
the 56 recruits said they had consensual sexual relationships with their trainers. The 12 
drill instructors were charged with allegations from inappropriate relationships and 
adultery to rape (Bowman 1997, 1). It was found that there was a culture of impropriety 
at Aberdeen. Some of the drill sergeants played a ‘game’ in which they competed to 
sleep with the most recruits (Wilson & Bowman 1997, 2). However, one drill sergeant, 
Staff Sgt. Simpson, was charged with 54 criminal counts, including 19 rape charges 
(Wilson & Bowman 1997, 1). Simpson was found guilty of raping 6 women and 
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sentenced to 25 years in prison (Spinner 1997, 2). It was found that the command 
reporting structure had also broken down in this case and Capt. Scott Alexander, 
Simpson’s commanding officer at the time, testified that many of the complaints never 
made it to his office (Wilson &Bowman 1997, 1). Capt. John Gillespie, another 
company commander stationed at Aberdeen, said that, in response to the scandal, they 
are being more careful to enforce rules that were already there to make Aberdeen safe 
for recruits, such as not allowing drill sergeants to visit recruits without another soldier 
present (Spinner 1997, 2).  
 
The examples discussed above show the importance of commander decisions regarding 
sexual assault and expose the weaknesses of the system regarding accountability and 
punishment. The power commanders and supervisory soldiers have over those of lower 
rank is substantial and has become part of the problem of sexual assault in the military. 
It is clear from looking at the cases at both Lackland Air Force Base and Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds that the low-level commanders were not properly reporting cases of 
sexual assault up the chain and therefore no serious action was taken. This missing link 
is part of the problem of low prosecution rates that is discussed in the following section.  
 
 (iii) Prosecution and Support 
Inside the institution, a variation in penalties and a lack of serious prosecution has been 
a problem. Although the formal policy is set against sexual assault, cases of sexual 
harassment are often treated with a slap on the wrist, with administrative action, or a 
negative letter in a soldier’s file being the only actions taken. It is also not uncommon 
for an investigation to find the allegations unverifiable and therefore, no action is taken. 
Sexual assault cases have had the same problem. There are no set policies on what 
punishment a soldier should receive if found guilty. They could be sentenced to jail 
time, but this does not always happen. In 2011, only six percent of attackers spent any 
time in jail (Rue 2013, 2). However, generally, those soldiers found guilty of sexual 
assault are ultimately dishonourably discharged from the military. In 2011, six percent 
of attackers were discharged from the military with no other action taken (Rue 2013, 3). 
However, if the soldier is not found guilty they are often placed back in their original 
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unit. This means that the woman who brought charges is forced to be once again close 
to her attacker.  
 
Another problem regarding prosecutions and the hierarchical rank structure of the 
military that have recently come to light in 2013 is the issue of commanders overturning 
convictions of sexual assault. As discussed earlier in this chapter, commanders have 
discretion regarding the handling of sexual assault cases in their unit. There were two 
high profile cases in which commanders overturned sexual assault convictions of 
personnel under their command. In one case, Lt. Gen. Susan Helms, the first U.S. 
military women in space, pardoned an Air Force Captain after he was convicted by a 
jury of sexual assault. Her only explanation for the decision was that she reviewed the 
evidence and found the Captain’s testimony “more credible” (Whitlock 2013, 1). The 
general’s promotion is currently, as of June 2013, held up by Congress in order to 
review her decision in this case (Whitlock 2013, 1). In a similar case, Lt. Gen. Craig 
Franklin pardoned an F-16 fighter pilot, Lt. Col. Wilkerson, convicted of sexually 
assaulting a woman in his home while his wife and child were asleep. A military jury 
found him guilty in November 2012. He was then put up for promotion (Whitlock 2013, 
1). His commander, Lt. Gen. Franklin, stated it was overturned because he “concluded 
that the entire body of evidence was insufficient to meet the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt” (Montgomery 2013, 1). In both cases, neither of the generals had 
been present at the trials (Whitlock 2013, 1).  
 
In reference to Annex E, figure 6.7, the flow of sexual assault cases through the DoD 
justice system can be seen. This chart, with data from fiscal year 2011, shows that out 
of the 3,182 cases reported, 489 cases (15 percent) were taken to a court-martial, but not 
necessarily prosecuted, while 187 cases (5.8 percent) were given only non-judicial 
punishments. These could include a number of punishments, such as loss of pay or rank 
but no jail time. While 48 cases (about 1.5 percent) were given an administrative 
discharge, which means the perpetrator was believed to be guilty but was simply 
allowed to leave the military. While 67 attackers (2.1 percent) were only given adverse 
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administrative actions such as a letter of reprimand in their service files (DoD Annual 
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 32).  
 
This is a very poor rate of punishment for sexual assaults in the military. One female 
soldier respondent said, “I think that how the military handles sexual assaults plays a 
huge role in how women are perceived and vice versa” (Mary, October 2012). She 
believes that the low prosecution rate gives service members the impression that sexual 
assaults are not taken seriously and are therefore not important. This in turn perpetuates 
the informal norm of acceptance of sexual assault in the military. This is in comparison 
to greater U.S. society where 37 percent of rape cases were taken forward for 
prosecution (University of Kentucky 2011, 2). Representative Jackie Speier and Senator 
Kristen Gillibrand tackled this problem in the legislation they introduced to Congress. 
This is discussed further in the following section.  
 
6.4 Action Outside of the Military 
Support after sexual assaults have taken place has also been an area of contention. 
Many female soldiers that have reported cases of sexual assault feel as though they did 
not receive adequate treatment for the mental trauma. One female soldier respondent 
suggested that there should be “sexual assault survivor groups. But that would mean 
[admitting] that it does happen” (Laura, October 2012). As will be discussed in the last 
section, Secretary Panetta recently instated a policy to create new units that will make 
sure victims of sexual assault in the military will receive the counseling and help they 
need (Rue 2013, 3). It is yet to be seen if the new units will be more effective in treating 
victims than policies of the past. American military women have taken their fight 
against sexual assault outside of the military institution to instigate change because they 
were constrained by the institution. As was evidenced earlier in this chapter, female 
soldiers who attempted to counter cases of discrimination they experienced, felt that the 
internal, formal complaint structures did not work as they were intended, rather the 
informal norm of acceptance prevailed over formal policies. Instead female soldiers 
have had to act as ‘insurrectionary’ actors and move externally to the institution in order 
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to instigate change, as they had done in the past.126 Current legislation and a lawsuits 
regarding sexual assault in the military are both looking to bring about a greater changes 
in the way assault cases are handled.  
 
(i) Lawsuits 
On February 15, 2011, Susan Burke filed charges for 17 plaintiffs, 15 women and two 
men, with the Federal District Court for the Eastern District in Virginia against the 
Department of Defense for “failure to make measurable progress and marked 
improvement to the Pentagon’s abysmal record that appears to tolerate sexual abuse and 
rape” (Domi 2011, 2). The majority of the plaintiffs reported that they were assaulted by 
a superior officer or enlisted member and were also “discouraged from reporting the 
crime” (Maze 2011, 2). One plaintiff said she did not report the crime because her past 
experience in the military, as an investigative agent for the Army, had made her believe 
her attacker would not be punished. While another enlisted female Marine soldier said 
that instead of investigating her case, the military threatened that she would be charged 
with inappropriate behaviour for drinking in the barracks and she was forced to live in 
the same barracks for another two years with her accused rapist (Maze 2011, 2). One 
plaintiff said that the way her case was handled made living with the attack more 
difficult. She said: 
 
The problem of rape in the military is not only service members getting raped, 
but it’s the entire way the military as a whole is dealing with it. From survivors 
having to be involuntarily discharged from the service, the constant verbal 
abuse, once a survivor does come forward your entire unit is known to turn their 
back on you. The entire culture needs to be changed (Domi 2011, 2). 
 
All of the plaintiffs in the case above believed that taking their case to the courts would 
be the best way to force change in the military (Domi 2011, 2). This lawsuit was 
dismissed because it was decided that, “the judiciary had to defer to military decisions 
                                                        
126 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 79 for examples.  
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on command and discipline” (Tucker 2012, 2). However, the decision is in the process 
of being repealed (Tucker 2012, 2).  
 
The same litigator, Susan Burke, filed a second lawsuit in March of 2012 on behalf of 
eight female soldiers, both current and former members of the Navy and Marine Corps. 
The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court in Washington and accused the Department 
of Defense of tolerating sexual offenders in their ranks while fostering a culture that 
blames victims (Tucker 2012, 1). One of the plaintiffs, after reporting threats and 
harassment while deployed in Iraq said a superior told her “that this happens all the 
time” (Tucker 2012, 1). Their goal in filing the lawsuit was to have their cases heard in 
the hope of bringing attention to the issue (Maze 2011, 1).  
 
(ii) Legislation 
Military members have also turned to Congress to provide more oversight and change 
DoD policies. Congresswoman Jackie Speier of California has been their advocate in 
the House of Representatives and has authored two Bills meant to increase prosecution 
rates and protect victims of sexual assault. Representative Speier introduced the first 
Bill, H.R. 3435, also known as the Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention or 
STOP Act, in November 2011. The STOP Act looks to create an outside council to 
oversee cases of sexual assault in the military that would take away the responsibility 
from commanders (HR Bill 3435, 2011, 1). The Bill proposes the creation of an 
independent office in Washington D.C. comprised of both military and civilian 
personnel to investigate cases of sexual assault (HR Bill 3435, 2011, 1).  
 
Representative Speier first became interested in the problem of sexual assault in the 
military when she attended a hearing on the subject several years prior to 2011, and she 
heard rhetoric that sounded as though people were blaming the victims instead of the 
perpetrators. She “got the sense that this was kind of going back to the 50’s” (Connelly, 
April 2012). She decided to meet with victims from the lawsuit discussed above to hear 
their stories and see how she could help. She heard the story of one female enlisted 
Marine soldier that was told to “take and aspirin and go to bed” when she reported to 
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her commander that she was assaulted (Speier 2011, 1). Speier said, “when that’s the 
prescription by the military to one of its soldiers that has been a victim of assault or rape 
- take an aspirin and go to bed - we’ve got a problem” (Speier 2011, 1). Representative 
Speier was concerned that nothing seemed to be changing within the DoD. She said, 
“over the years, the responses have varied but in the end the message has always been 
the same, [to soldiers] don’t push this complaint” (Speier 2012, 1). This made her 
decide that she wanted to look for the crux of the problem.  
 
Representative Speier and her staff found that the command discretion over sexual 
assault cases is at the base of the problem. Speier’s legislative director, Josh Connelly 
argued: 
 
We really do think it is this command discretion, chain of command issue, and 
circumventing that we think is vital. We think that is so important because, one, 
some commanding officers do a great job - we’re not painting everyone with the 
broad brush, but we think that inherently there is this conflict of interest 
problem. Whether it’s a commanding officer not wanting a bunch of rapes that 
get court-martialled on their record or it’s the fact that these are the most 
complicated cases they’re going to come across and they probably don’t have 
the expertise or training that these require (Connelly, April 2012). 
 
They found that the hierarchical structure of the military was placing too much power 
over sexual assault reporting and prosecution with commanders who could decide to 
either enforce the formal policies or the informal norms with little oversight. The 
council they propose would take care of the conflict of interest regarding commanders 
and give the job to professionals that are trained to handle cases of that nature.  
 
The second problem Representative Speier hopes to address with the Bill is to increase 
prosecution rates. Her and her staff members believe this could help the overall culture 
of the military. Connelly argues, “I think the biggest thing we can do to change the 
culture is to hold those perpetrators accountable” (Connelly, April 2012) and show 
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serial offenders that they cannot get away with assault in the military. They believe with 
proper prosecution, those perpetrators that are repeat offenders will be taken out of the 
military and properly punished (Connelly, Interview, April 2012). In order to change 
the norms of the military, changes must be made from the top commanders down 
through the ranks. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Zucker’s idea of 
transmission, in which informal norms are passed down from one generation to the next 
generation, can both develop and can maintain the norms of that institution. In the case 
of the U.S. military, because the commanders hold power over the sexual assault 
prosecutions and reporting for their units, the cultural changes must start with 
commanders passing down the appropriate values and teaching the younger generations 
that sexual assault will not be tolerated by properly prosecuting cases and not blaming 
the victim.  
 
Representative Speier was also concerned about the victims of sexual assault and the 
blame she often saw placed on them. This concern, spurred by the Scandal at Lackland 
Air Force Base, motivated her to introduce a second Bill, H.R. 430, to the House of 
Representatives. H.R. 430, or The Protect Our Military Trainees Act, was introduced in 
January of 2013 and looks to “require the military justice system to acknowledge the 
power imbalance between trainer and trainee and strictly penalise any instructor who 
engages in sexual acts with a trainee during the time of instruction and for 30 days 
afterward” (Rep. Speier Demands Protection 2013, 1). This Bill was introduced in the 
hope of preventing future instances of assault by instructors after the significant 
problems at both Lackland Air Force Base and Aberdeen Proving Grounds came to 
light. Both of the Bills have been referred to committee, but Legislative Director 
Connelly said that he does not believe the STOP Act will make it out of committee. He 
said, “the chain of command is sacrosanct” but they would continue trying (Connelly, 
April 2012).  
 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced a similar bill to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in which the commander’s discretion to prosecute sexual assault cases 
would be taken away and given to civilians trained in the handling of sexual assault 
  203 
cases. She said, “the victims tell us they do not report because of the chain of 
command…they see that the chain of command will not be objective” (Dolan 2013, 1). 
Her legislation was replaced by Senator Carl Levin’s that “would keep prosecution of 
sexual assault cases with the chain of command, as the military wants” but “would 
require a senior military officer to review decisions by commanders who decline to 
prosecute sexual assault cases” (Steinhauer 2013, 1). Senator Levin’s legislation was 
passed in the Senate Armed Forces Committee with a vote of 17-9 (Dolan 2013, 1). 
Senator Gillibrand and others feel that this action will not be sufficient and she is 
planning to reintroduce her legislation later in the summer of 2013 (Steinhauer 2013, 1).  
 
If any of the Bills discussed are passed through Congress, the DoD will be forced to 
abide by the provisions laid out in the Bill. Congress could add provisions into the 
Defense Authorisation Act, which provides the DoD with its yearly operating budget. 
The DoD would then change their policies to reflect the legislation. As Jeremy Herb, a 
Washington D.C. columnist, argues, “measures to force the military to deal with the 
issue are almost certain to become law - partly because Congress almost never fails to 
approve the annual Pentagon authorisation bill” (Herb 2013, 1). As was discussed in 
Chapter Three, many of women’s advancements in the military have been made through 
the help of Congressional legislation.  
 
6.5 Actions Taken by the Institution 
(i) DoD Policy Changes 
In 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced significant changes to the way 
sexual assaults are to be handled in the military in the future. The new initiatives look to 
address the problems outlined above. In order to address the problem of command 
discretion, Secretary Panetta has proposed the Special Court-Martial Convening 
Authority that will be signed into law by an executive order. This will take all cases of 
sexual assault to a separate group of senior-ranking officers. He believes taking the 
reports outside of unit command discretion will raise the prosecution rate, as was argued 
by Representative Speier and Senator Gillibrand (Daniel 2012, 1). Secretary Panetta 
said:  
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There is no silver bullet when it comes to this issue. But what is required is that 
everyone, from the secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the 
way down, at every command level, be sensitive to the issue. The most important 
thing we can do is prosecute the offenders, deal with those who have broken the 
law and committed this crime (Hlad 2012, 1).  
 
Also to help with prosecution rates, Secretary Panetta proposed the creation of Special 
Victim Units. Each service branch will have their own unit and will be specially trained 
in the investigation and prosecution of sexual assaults. The DoD has established more 
funding for training in these areas that will also be charged with tracking the progress of 
all sexual assault cases with a total increase of $9.3 million over a course of five years 
(Parrish 2012, 1).  
 
In order to address the issue of command climate, Secretary Panetta ordered a review of 
how commanding officers and senior enlisted members are trained “on sexual assault 
prevention and response” in order to see what gaps the DoD can fill to strengthen the 
training they receive (Parrish 2012, 1). By addressing the training weaknesses, the DoD 
hopes commanders can be more aware of the climate they create in the prevention of 
sexual assault in their units. New training requirements were also created for all military 
personnel, requiring them to have a briefing on sexual assault policies during their first 
two weeks in the military (Defense Secretary Panetta Announces Initiative 2012, 1).  
 
The DoD has addressed victim safety and recovery. Secretary Panetta announced that 
the DoD will establish a certification programme in order to ensure victim advocates are 
certified to the national standard and victims receive the highest standard of care 
possible (Parrish 2012, 1). In order to address problems of safety and the victims 
continued exposure to the attacker, there will be a new policy that allows victims that 
report a case of assault to be transferred from their unit quickly. This transfer request 
policy requires the victim’s command to respond to their request within 72 hours. If the 
request is denied, they can repeal to a higher-ranking officer (Parrish 2012, 1).  
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Representatives of Congress and advocates for victims of sexual assault have welcomed 
the changes. Representative Loretta Sanchez of California said that when she entered 
Congress in 1997, military leadership did not “see sexual assault as a problem. To have 
Panetta and Dempsey say they want to do something about it is in itself a big change in 
the culture” (Hlad 2012, 1). Anu Bhagwati, a former female Marine and an advocate for 
sexual assault victims, agreed that these initiatives were significant. She said, “this is 
hugely radical and extremely necessary for the military” (Ellison 2012, 2). Secretary 
Panetta and General Dempsey worked with both sides of Congress to outline the 
initiatives and receive support for the DoD’s recommendations to be included in the 
DoD Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2013 (Parrish 2012, 2). 
 
Secretary of Defense Panetta closed his introduction of the new policy initiatives by 
addressing those military members that had been victims. He said, “I deeply regret that 
such crimes occur in the U.S. military. And I will do all I can to prevent these sexual 
assaults from occurring in the Department of Defense. I’m committed to providing you 
the support and resources you need and to taking whatever steps are necessary to keep 
what happened to you from happening to others” (Parrish 2012, 1). The new policy 
changes introduced by Secretary Panetta clearly took into account the main problems 
that plague the system of sexual assault reporting and prosecution in the U.S. military. 
By removing the cases from unit-level commanders, the DoD is allowing a more 
objective group to handle the cases that will receive the proper training and funding for 
dealing with highly complicated cases. Medical care, both physical and psychological, 
will also be given greater attention and more resources than it has received in the past. 
The new policies show that the DoD no longer wants the problem of sexual assault to be 
ignored, but rather taken seriously to improve the problem.  
 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the case study of sexual assault in the military that informal norms are 
an important aspect to consider when analysing institutional change. As seen with DoD 
policies on sexual assault in the past, formal policy changes forced by Congressional 
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legislation do not necessarily mean a change in practice for those in the organisation. 
Instead, informal norms can be isolated and resistant to change as described through 
Zucker’s institutionalisation and the ‘weberian construct’ in which transmission of 
norms through the rank structure is often impervious to outside ideas, as military 
members are often expected to bond with their units and are sometimes isolated from 
outside influence. Informal norms are often more difficult to change and not specifically 
targeted by formal policies. In the case of sexual assault in the military, the symptoms 
of the tension between the advancing formal policies moving toward greater gender 
equality and the masculine-oriented informal norms have increased overtime and 
military members that once tried to take action inside the institution were forced to take 
their grievances and stories to other institutions externally, as described in Mahoney and 
Thelen’s theory of change. In the case of these particular actors, their weak veto 
possibilities and disadvantaged status inside the institution, due to the strict hierarchical 
structure, forced them to work through congressional and judicial institutions where 
their rank or position in the military was not an issue. The action outside of the military, 
by victims, through lawsuits and working with Congress to pass new legislation, has led 
to new DoD policy initiatives to target informal norms. 
 
Several main informal problems behind sexual assault in the military were identified in 
this chapter. The command climate plays a significant role in how reports are handled in 
terms of prosecution and also how victims are treated if they choose to report the 
assault. Also, due to the rank structure and the ‘cultural persistence’ transmission 
process, commanders are supposed to uphold the values of the institution. If 
commanders undervalue reports of sexual assault, this sends a message to lower ranking 
officers and enlisted personnel that they should also not take it seriously. The new DoD 
initiatives to target training for commanders is designed to ensure all commanders take 
reports of sexual assault seriously, instead of belittling the complaints and responses as 
has been done in the past. Sexual assaults continue to be a problem because their effects 
have been diminished and victims have been blamed for disrupting unit cohesion and 
bonding. This is an example of the ‘cultural persistence’ concept of maintenance. Those 
  207 
who wish to maintain the current informal norms of the institution often punish those 
who report sexual assaults for breaking the informal norms.  
 
Low prosecution rates have exposed a culture that has not made prosecuting sexual 
predators a priority but has preferred to keep the status quo. Representative Jackie 
Speier’s Bill was designed to increase prosecution rates and therefore, hopefully change 
the informal norms around sexual assaults where cases are not taken seriously or 
perpetrators are not brought to justice. Although Representative Speier’s Bills have not 
yet been passed, the DoD has acted to in the future remove complete discretion from 
commanders in the handling of sexual assault cases. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee also passed legislation in order for the DoD to implement a structure in 
which all cases where a commander has decided not to prosecute a case of sexual 
assault must be reviewed. Many of the new policies and initiatives put forth by the DoD 
for fiscal year 2013 have not yet been activated. However, the fact that the problems of 
the informal norms of sexual assault are being targeted shows that institutional change 
is moving in a positive direction in this area. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter Seven 
Introduction 
This thesis has evaluated the formal gender policies and the informal norms of the U.S. 
military institution in order to answer the prime question proposed in Chapter One,127 
which was: (1) To what extent has the gendered institutional culture of the U.S. Armed 
Forces evolved?  This thesis also looked at how changed has occurred and why it 
sometimes has not. The main hypothesis was that that even though positive formal 
changes have occurred for women, the informal norms of the U.S. military are 
especially resistant to change and they play an important role in the structure of the U.S. 
gender regime. Therefore, the gendered institutional culture has evolved to be more 
inclusive of women than ever before in the past but informal norms have continued to 
privilege masculinity. In order to answer the proposed question and prove the 
hypothesis, Chapter Three provided a historical context of women’s participation in the 
U.S. Armed Forces. It also highlighted emerging patterns of how and why women were 
able to make substantial inroads into the military. Chapter Four discussed the character 
of the gender regime and the connection between the military and society.  It provided 
examples from female soldiers of the masculinised culture of the military and its impact 
on informal norms.  
 
Chapters Five looked at the masculine culture of the military and it provided examples 
from female soldiers. There have been significant changes to women’s involvement in 
the U.S. military over the past 20 years. Chapter Five also explored how recent changes 
in U.S. strategic culture affected the link between masculinity and war fighting. Chapter 
Six explained the institutionalisation of norms in the U.S. military. It provided a case 
study of the problem of sexual assault and how actors have worked to change the 
discriminatory practices. Although female soldiers have made substantial progress, as 
can be seen from the recent lifting of the combat ban policy on women in February 
2013, the masculine-centric informal norms have lagged behind formal changes and 
symptoms of this, specifically with sexual discrimination and assault, remain.                                                          
127 Please refer to Chapter One, page 8 for main questions of the thesis.  
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This thesis argued that there have been many positive changes in DoD policies for 
women in the U.S. military yet masculinity remains privileged in the institution. It is 
important to look at the masculine-oriented informal norms for answers to this puzzle. 
Chapter Five illustrated that many women felt the U.S. military culture was masculine-
centric and discussed examples of why and how they believe this is the case, such as the 
continued informal use of denigrating the feminine during military training.128 As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the profession of soldier in Western society was traditionally 
male and many of society’s constructed gender identities were built around the 
traditional idea of Jean Beth Elshtain’s ‘just warriors’ and ‘beautiful souls.’ The usage 
of the ‘beautiful soul’ role has evolved, due to Western women’s greater participation in 
the workforce and in the military, to now include women in Afghanistan.129 While 
‘beautiful souls’ is still applicable to some Western women as well, military women 
have emerged as a third gender in some instances.130  Although the ‘beautiful soul’ role 
has evolved, the traditions built on the original model continue to affect women’s 
participation in the military in 2013.  
 
The following two sections analyse the findings of this thesis in order to make 
conclusions regarding the evolution of the gender power structure of the U.S. military. 
In order to ensure the validity of this study, it was essential “to acquire valid and 
reliable multiple and diverse realities” (Galofshani 2003, 603). As was discussed in 
Chapter Two, this study analysed data derived from participant interviews and surveys, 
as well as data from formal government policies, polls, and academic literature on 
women in the military. Johnson argues that triangulation between different methods and 
sources of qualitative research ensure greater validity in the research paradigm. He 
argues that it is essential to “use investigator triangulation and consider the ideas and 
explanations generated by additional researchers” (Johnson 1997, 284). Triangulation 
between the different data sources mentioned above was used in order to establish 
validity to the arguments made throughout the thesis.                                                          
128 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 137 for examples.  
129 Please refer to Chapter Four, page 156 for examples.  
130 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 156 for explanation on female soldiers as the third gender. 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The research in this thesis looks to add knowledge to the field of new institutionalism 
theory in regards to institutional change and the gendered nature of the U.S. military. In 
order to accomplish this goal, the issue of generalisability must be addressed. Nahid 
Galofshani argues that, “the quality of research is related to the generalisability of the 
result” (Galofshani 2003, 603). However, generalisability in qualitative research must 
be approached differently than quantitative research, as the methods and goals of the 
research are different. Cuba and Lincoln argue that “generalisations are impossible 
since phenomena are neither time nor context free (although some transferability of 
these hypothesis may be possible from situation to situation, depending on the degree of 
temporal and contextual similarity” (Cuba & Lincoln 1982, 238). Therefore, this 
research cannot draw conclusions on human nature; rather it is confined to the context 
of institutions that have similar characteristics to the case study of this thesis, the U.S. 
military.  
 
As shown in new institutionalism theory, the processes of change can be applicable to 
other institutions that have similar characteristics. This is supported by the theoretical 
framework applied in this study that is based on historical and sociological 
institutionalism as well as Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of change. Their theory is an 
effective framework for this study because it focuses on slow and incremental change, 
which has occurred in the gender power structure of the U.S. military. Their theory also 
identified disparate characteristics of various institutions that produce distinct methods 
and actors of change.  Mahoney and Thelen’s theory is also especially useful for this 
case because it accounts for aspects of both agency and structure. It provides a 
framework to explore how institutional actors are constrained by institutional norms, 
rules and characteristics.  
 
As female soldiers in the U.S. military institution are constrained by many of the same 
factors as their female co-workers, it is possible to draw some generalisations from the 
interview and survey data collected for this research. There was a representation of 
respondents from all branches of the military services as well as respondents from both 
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enlisted and officer ranks. This ensured different levels of rank were represented,131 
which was important in this case study, as women’s place in the rank structure can 
affect their experience in the military. As was described in Chapter Five, each branch of 
service has their own separate sub-culture, so it was important to have representative 
respondents from each branch of service to produce more reliable information that can 
be generalised to the greater institution. In comparison to the 156,000 female soldiers in 
the U.S. military, 64 total respondents is a small number, therefore, it is not possible to 
draw exact conclusions that state the absolute nature of the U.S. military. However, it is 
possible to draw general conclusions that are based on and supported by the knowledge 
and experiences of the women interviewed and surveyed.  
 
This thesis provides original research into the study of women’s participation in the 
U.S. military as well as new and feminist institutionalism research. It is original in that 
interviews and surveys were conducted to collect new data from participants in order to 
produce new knowledge. This research also approached the subject of change in the 
gender power structure of the U.S. military from a feminist institutionalism perspective 
based on new institutionalism theory, which has not been done in the past. Feminist 
institutionalism theory is a developing field and the U.S. military has not yet been used 
as a case study. The following two sections apply the concepts from new 
institutionalism theory to draw conclusions based on evidence gathered on the gender 
power structure of the U.S. military. The third section discusses possible future 
implications for women’s status in the military and society and the final section 
provides an overview of how the research from this thesis relates to the field of new 
institutionalism.  
 
7.1 Formal Rules vs. Informal Norms 
In order to explain how the formal policies and informal norms have come together to 
form the gender power structure of the U.S. military, and have either helped to cause or 
impede change, this section first provides an overview of the main points argued in this 
thesis regarding formal rules and informal norms in the case of the U.S. military. It then                                                         
131 Please refer to Annex A, pages 232-233.  
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explains both the negative and positive effects of the gaps between formal policies and 
informal norms on women’s status in the military institution. Stagnant informal norms 
have held back women’s progress in the U.S. military but there are also instances in 
which informal norms in relation to the previous Ground Combat Rule were beneficial 
to women.  
 
(i) Overview 
According to path dependency theory, as was discussed in Chapter Two, the original 
formal policies of an organisation sets the values, norms and policies for the institution. 
The original framework is perpetuated by the initial institution and is difficult to 
change.132 In the case of the U.S. military, the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 
instilled discriminatory policies into the framework of the institution. The original 
formal policies set forth in the Bill laid the groundwork for the institution to be skewed 
toward masculinity. As was discussed in Chapter One, Carol some feminists argued that 
by not allowing women to participate in the core jobs of the military (combat roles), 
femininity was placed as less than masculinity in the military institution. This thesis 
agrees with this argument and accepts that women’s underprivileged status in the 
military was perpetuated because of their lack of participation in combat roles.133 The 
lingering effects of the Armed Forces Integration Act, which first constrained women’s 
participation in varying roles of the military, persisted in formal policy until the lifting 
of the DoD Ground Combat Rule in 2013.  
 
As was evidenced in Chapter Three, the U.S. military was not developed with the 
consideration of gender equality. Military necessity and operational effectiveness took 
precedence. Women were allowed to enter the military only when they were needed to 
fill personnel needs. Women worked for over 60 years for equal policies for both 
genders and the lifting of the Ground Combat Ban in 2013 ended the last constraining 
formal policy that discriminated based on gender. Although all formal gender 
                                                        
132 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 33 for further information on Path Dependency Theory.  133 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for further information on feminist arguments.  
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discriminatory policies were lifted, they continue to affect the informal norms of the 
military, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
The informal norms of the military were developed from past formal policies and the 
initial military culture. The formal policies and informal norms of the military come 
together to create the gender power structure of the U.S. military. Past formal policies 
are important because they set women at a disadvantaged position to men. The informal 
norms of an institution are more difficult to change than formal policies because often 
there is no formal avenue for actors to work through to enact change and informal 
norms are rarely targeted in regards to institutional change. Also, once norms are 
institutionalised, they are more impervious to change.  
 
As was discussed in Chapter Six, the masculine culture has been institutionalised134 in 
the U.S. military. Chapters One and Six135 discussed Lynne Zucker’s theory of ‘cultural 
persistence’ and Ingraham, Moynihan and Andrew’s ‘weberian construct’ to explain 
why it is particularly difficult to change the informal norms of an institution and how 
norms become institutionalised. Between these two ideas, they suggest that the informal 
norms of an institution are especially difficult to change if there is a process for 
transmission and maintenance of the cultural ideas, if actors in the institution are 
resistant to change and have similar experiences, and if there is a strict hierarchy in 
place.  
 
The military has all of the qualities laid out by the two above constructs. As was 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, initial training, such as basic training and Officer 
Training School (OTS), serve as the transmission process for new recruits to learn the 
formal rules and the informal norms of the military.136 Career field training and 
                                                        
134 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 44 for theory behind the institutionalisation of the masculine 
military culture.  
135 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 44 for further information on ‘cultural persistence’ and the 
‘weberian construct.’ 
136 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 137for further information on basic training.  
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continuing education and leadership classes137 as well as mentoring programmes from 
senior ranking officers can serve as maintenance for the institutions ideas. As was 
evidenced in Chapter Six, with the cases of sexual assault, maintenance also occurs 
when actors informally or formally punish those who they believe broke an informal 
norm.138 The military is also an institution built on traditional practices and customs and 
those are passed down to new members during training periods. The hierarchical 
structure makes the institution less permeable because the few at the top hold 
significantly more power than the actors at the bottom. Those in the military are taught 
to conform to the group and bonding is encouraged through subjecting members to 
similar trials and experiences. All of these factors combine to make the culture of the 
institution more resilient to change because individual actors are taught the customs and 
traditions and are expected to uphold them as well as conform to the norms they have 
been taught. This, along with the strict hierarchical structure, makes it difficult for 
individual actors to question or act against the informal norms they have been taught.  
 
The gap between the formal policies and the informal norms of the U.S. military affect 
the current gender power structure. As of 2013, as mentioned above, all formal policies 
that placed femininity at a disadvantage to masculinity had been lifted. This is clear 
evidence that the gender institutional culture has changed significantly since women’s 
first official conclusion in 1948. However, as was evidenced in Chapter Five, the 
military culture is still masculine-oriented and women continue to be placed at a 
disadvantage because femininity was formally considered inferior in the past policies of 
the military institution. This inferiority of femininity and privileging of masculinity is 
consistently seen in the informal norms of the military, as was evidenced in Chapter 
Five. There were formal avenues for actors to push change in favour of gender equality 
in the U.S. military, but women could only work for changes in the informal norms of 
the institution through informal actions. Many of these actions, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, were carried out on an individual basis when female soldiers tried to change the 
                                                        
137 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 141 for further information on developmental education in the 
military.  
138 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 174 for further examples of maintenance. 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stereotypes of women in the military through their own actions.139 The formal avenues 
that are in place for service members to report instances of informal discrimination 
often do not work, as we evidenced by female soldiers responses in Chapter Six.140  
 
The informal norms of the U.S. military lag behind positive changes in formal policy in 
regards to gender equality because the informal, masculine norms were institutionalised 
through the years of masculine-oriented history and tradition of the military and there is 
no effective formal avenue for actors to force change in the informal norms. The past 
formal policies and the masculine-oriented informal norms of the U.S. military, come 
together to form a gender power structure in which masculinity is privileged, yet 
formally women are allowed participation.  
 
As discussed in Chapter One,141 although there are multiple masculinities and not all 
male soldiers fit the ideal characteristics, as was demonstrated by the narrative of Andre 
Shepherd in Chapter Four,142 femininity inherently sits at opposition to the reigning 
military hegemonic masculinity. Although masculinities fall along the masculinised 
spectrum in relation to the reigning hegemonic masculinity or the ‘just warrior’ 
characteristics of the military, women automatically fall to the opposite end of the 
spectrum. In other words, female soldiers often have a more difficult time achieving the 
hegemonic masculinity or ideal ‘just warrior’ characteristics simply because they are 
women. Female soldiers feel as though they have to adopt traditional masculine 
characteristics in order to fit in to the institution and advance in their careers.143 The gap 
between formal policies and the informal norms of the military have had both positive 
and negative affects on women’s status in the institution. Although informal norms in 
relation to the previous Ground Combat Rule benefitted women, overall the informal 
norms of the military, due to their masculine-oriented nature, have held women back. 
The negative and positive effects are outlined in this section.  
                                                         
139 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 134 for further examples.  
140 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 185 for examples.  
141 Please refer to Chapter One, page 12 for a further explanation of masculinities.  
142 Please refer to Chapter Four, page 122 for the narrative on Andre Shepherd. 
143 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples. 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(ii) Negative Effects 
Significant symptoms of the lack of women’s full acceptance into the military are the 
issues of sexual harassment and assault. These particular problems were found in the 
tension areas between informal norms and significant formal policy changes in favour 
of women. In order to better clarify this tension, two main positive changes in formal 
policy that were introduced in Chapter Three will be discussed in this section. They are: 
the lifting of the DoD Risk Rule and women’s admittance into the military academies. 
The lifting of the DoD Risk Rule is considered rather than the lifting of the DoD 
Ground Combat Rule because the latter change was made so recently that it is difficult 
to effectively explicate the effects on women in the military.  
 
The prevalence of sexual harassment and assault is an indicator that, although women 
were accepted into the institution formally, they were not fully accepted into the 
masculine-based culture. Masculinity continues to be privileged because this was the 
idea on which the military was established and the hierarchical and closed nature of the 
military institution has made the informal norms more impervious to change. Each of 
the significant positive changes in policy mentioned has been negatively marked by 
cases of sexual harassment and assault. In considering the opening of ‘traditionally 
male’ career fields to women, such as pilot slots, the Tailhook scandal discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four144 is an example of when the formal policy of allowing women 
to fly aircraft was at tension with the informal cultural norms of the Navy pilot career 
field. The cultural stereotype was that Navy pilots were particularly hyper-masculine 
because they landed aircrafts on ships. The Tailhook scandal, in which many Navy 
pilots were accused of sexually harassing and assaulting hundreds of women, many of 
them Navy pilots as well, showed how female pilots were not informally accepted into 
the traditionally masculine career field. Also, the subsequent handling of the Tailhook 
cases, in which high-ranking male officers in the Navy and the DoD initially ignored 
women reporting the incidents, showed that there was a cultural acceptance of the 
sexually harassing behaviour. This acceptance of the masculine informal norms is why 
                                                        
144 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 131 for further information on the Tailhook scandal.  
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greater change has not occurred in the gendered institutional culture of the U.S. 
military.  
 
The expansion of women into more roles also meant the integration of women into co-
ed boot camp training. The same institutionalisation of hyper-masculine ideas as 
mentioned above was found in basic training.145 Drill sergeants often used denigration 
of the feminine to motivate male cadets into better performance.146 Although it was a 
positive change that women were able to fill more jobs in the military and therefore 
participate in the same training programs as men, they were still not informally 
accepted. The traditional hyper-masculine culture was persistent and caused serious 
problems in the gender regime. There were several major cases of sexual harassment 
and assault that took place in training camps by multiple male drill sergeants against 
female trainees. One major scandal took place at the Marine Corps training camp of 
Aberdeen Proving Ground.147 While another far-reaching scandal took place at 
Lackland Air Force Base, where the Air Force conducts basic training.148  
 
There were also similar problems after it was determined that women were allowed to 
attend military academies. Chapter Six discussed specific cases of major scandals of 
sexual assault and harassment at the military academies. The Air Force Academy had 
several high-profile cases because it was found that reports of sexual assault from 
female cadets were often ignored and no action was taken by the university on behalf of 
the victims to prosecute the offenders.149 In one specific case discussed, the female 
victim was eventually forced to transfer schools because she was socially condemned 
by her male and female classmates for reporting the assault. In Chapter Five, several of 
the female military members who had attended a military academy said sexual 
harassment and jokes that denigrated women were commonplace and their best option 
                                                        
145 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 137 for information on military training.  
146 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 139 for examples.  
147 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 192 for further information on the cases at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground.  
148 Please refer to Chapter Six, pages 192 for further information on the cases at Lackland Air Force Base.  
149 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 140 for further information on cases of sexual assault and 
harassment in the U.S. Air Force Academy. 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was just to ignore them.150 Although women have come a long way to be included in 
the academies, the incidents discussed in this thesis show that informal norms of those 
institutions have lagged behind the formal policy changes in the acceptance of female 
cadets. The academies were a training ground for military cadets and the masculinised 
nature of the institution was emphasised in training, as discussed in Chapter Five.151 
 
Part of what perpetuated the problem of sexual assault and harassment and affected the 
informal norms of the institution was the low prosecution rates for sexual assaults in the 
military. Chapter Six discussed the different possible reasons for this, but it also shows 
that, by not properly punishing perpetrators to the full extent of the formal policy, there 
was some informal acceptance of the problem in the military. This can also be seen in 
the responses from female interviewees from Chapter Five, in which many said that 
harassment and discrimination based on their gender was expected and something they 
had to accept to be a part of the institution.152 This idea is discussed further in the third 
section of this chapter, which looks at possibilities for gender relations in the future. 
Although the informal norms have been detrimental to female soldiers in the cases 
discussed above, they have benefitted from some informal norms. 
 
(iii) Positive Effects 
The gap between formal policies and informal norms of the military does not always put 
women at a disadvantage. In some cases, the policy placed women at a disadvantage 
and the informal norms opened opportunities for them that they would not have been 
afforded by policy. For example, until early 2013, female soldiers were governed by the 
Ground Combat Rule, which barred women from pursuing careers in ground combat 
positions.153 As was discussed in Chapter Five, the role of the U.S. military has evolved 
to include counterinsurgency and peacekeeping missions as well as combat operations. 
With these missions came a need for different skills. For example, women became 
essential members of peacekeeping and intelligence teams through the Female                                                         
150 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 141 for quotes from female military members on their experiences 
at the military academies.  
151 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 139 for information on masculinity during military training.  
152 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 141 for examples.  
153 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 97 or further information on the Ground Combat Rule.  
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Engagement Teams154 (FETs) because they were able to better access the female 
population in Iraq and Afghanistan. With this need, a critical juncture occurred and a 
role opened up for women to be closer to the front lines and contribute to combat 
missions through intelligence gathering. Also, as discussed in Chapter Three, the front 
lines and back lines of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were often blurred, so by 
women engaging in the forward operating areas in FETs and by other avenues as 
discussed below, many have found themselves in combat. A critical juncture occurred 
in this case due to military necessity. Operations in the field drove the need to bring 
women into intelligence-gathering teams. The change started at the bottom of the 
institution, with soldiers in the field, and eventually moved up to influence decisions by 
DoD leadership.  
 
FETs were examples of Thelen and Mahoney’s theory of gradual change in which the 
conversion of the purpose of an institution, such as the military also gaining 
peacekeeping and counterinsurgency roles, opens up areas for actors or ‘opportunists’ to 
bring about change. In the case of the FETs, although the Ground Combat Rule was in 
place, women were allowed to fill ground roles that were close to combat and in 
forward operating locations. They used the opportunity the FET jobs provided to act as 
‘opportunist’ actors and prove that they were able to contribute and be successful in 
forward operating roles. This method of change is discussed further in the following 
section.  
 
The gap between the formal and informal also allowed female military actors to bring 
about change in the case of women’s attachment to combat groups, as discussed in 
Chapter Five.155 The loophole attached female soldiers to combat ground combat units 
although they could not be formally assigned to them. In many cases, the women would 
end up in combat by filling roles their commander assigned them to. This was unfair to 
female soldiers because many were in combat but were not receiving credit from the 
military for their time. One female soldier in Chapter Five said that many people would                                                         
154 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 155 for further information on FETs.  
155 Please refer to Chapter Five, pages 161 for information on the attachment policy.  
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not believe her when she said she had been in combat. However, much like the FETs, 
the attachment policy gave women the opportunity to become ‘opportunist’ actors and 
prove that they could successfully perform in combat. As was argued in Chapter Five, 
their successful performance helped to convince leaders to lift the last remaining ban on 
combat jobs for women and therefore raise their status in the U.S. military institution.156  
 
What is particularly interesting about women’s advancement in the military through 
these different areas is that they progressed because they moved closer to what are 
considered the most masculine jobs in the military. In the case of the FETs, women are 
performing peacekeeping and intelligence roles, roles that were traditionally considered 
feminised, particularly peacekeeping roles. However, they gained ground in the military 
through the FETs because they were closer to combat, or the most masculinised roles in 
the military. This supports both the equal-rights based and civic responsibility 
arguments that women must be allowed to participate in all jobs of the military to find 
equality. The same is true in the case of the attachment policy. Female soldiers 
progressed because they were closer to combat. As can be seen in Chapter Three, 
historically, women have made progress in gaining more rights in the military by filling 
gaps or needs in the institution during wartime. They were able to take advantage of the 
opportunities to participate in limited military positions and eventually expand their 
rights. They also gained rights during periods of major institutional change in which 
there were a shortage of personnel, such as wartime.  
 
It is especially interesting that women gained rights during wartime because war is 
considered a masculine activity and yet women benefitted through greater equality in 
the Armed Forces. In analysing women’s involvement from a historical institutionalism 
perspective, this is an example of the theory of change of ‘critical junctures.’157 Areas 
were opened up in the institution for limited periods of time because of outside 
circumstances that allowed them to change the institution. In the case of the U.S. 
                                                        
156 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 97 for further information on the lifting of the DoD Ground 
Combat Rule.  
157 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 39 for further information on ‘critical junctures’. 
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military, wars created critical junctures that allowed for change. This model of change 
is discussed in the following section. 
 
The importance of the hierarchical power structure of the U.S. military in the treatment 
of women was also discussed in Chapter Six. The assertion that overall, women are 
disadvantaged in relation to their male counterparts does not ignore the issue of rank. 
The assertion is generalised based on data and literature collected from female 
representatives from all ranks of the military. Rank is a factor in how much power an 
individual actor is likely to have but does not necessarily mean that the larger group has 
a higher status based on the individual actor. For example, if a female or male 
commander has power over a unit and implements gender-equal practices and informal 
norms, than the women in that unit will likely not be disadvantaged to their male 
counterparts. Also, some women who hold high ranks will likely have more power and 
status than those in lower ranks. However, this thesis is concerned with an overall, 
general picture of the gender power structure.  
 
The negative and positive affects of the interaction between formal policies and 
informal norms of the U.S. military, as outlined above, create the current gender power 
structure of the U.S. military. They show that significant changes have occurred to 
move the military toward a more equal gender institutional culture but that informal 
norms of stagnated major cultural changes. As the branches of service enact their plans 
to open all jobs to women, formally, women and men will be equal in the institution. 
However, informally, this is not the case. Although, as discussed above, some informal 
norms have been beneficial to women’s status in the military, overall the informal 
norms hold women’s advancement back and place femininity as less than masculinity in 
the gender power structure of the U.S. military. This is evidenced in Chapter Five, in 
which women said that the military prefers masculinity to femininity.158 Therefore, they 
feel they must act in a masculine way in order to be included in the military. As the U.S. 
military moves towards greater usage of technology in order to remove personnel from 
risk, the link between masculinity and war fighting is likely to weaken more than it                                                         
158 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for examples.  
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already has. This could advance women’s standing in the gender power structure in the 
future. However, as of 2013, female soldiers continue to be valued less than their male 
counterparts by the military institution.  
 
7.2 Evolution of the Institution 
This thesis looked at theories and areas of institutional change and how they relate to 
the U.S. military institution, such as Mahoney and Thelen’s ideas of conversion and 
historical institutionalism’s ‘critical junctures.’ From analysing the changes in the 
gender regime of the institution through these theories, it can be seen that institutional 
change has occurred but that the masculine-oriented change lags behind. The changes in 
formal policy that affect gender, such as the lifting of the combat ban on women, are 
positive signs that the military is moving away from the idea that all soldiers must be 
male. As discussed in Chapter Five, there were also significant changes to U.S. strategic 
culture and mission priorities over the past 20 years in which there is now a greater 
reliance on technological skills and less on physical strength for many soldiers. This 
change has placed women at less of a disadvantage than in the past because women 
were limited by their physical strength.  
 
Greater U.S. society has also evolved to be more accepting of women in the workplace 
and public sphere. From the research included in this thesis, it can be seen that the 
military institution has changed and women are playing a more significant role. This 
section discusses why and how the military institution has become more accepting of 
women and the strong link between masculinity and war fighting has been weakened. 
The overall gendered institutional culture of the military has been skewed, but there has 
not been a major shift away from a masculine-oriented culture.  
 
Changes in the gender power structure of the military have occurred in two main ways. 
Change was enacted internally, based on military necessity and the actions of 
‘opportunist’ actors or externally by ‘insurrectionary actors’ and societal factors. One 
major theme of change that was explicated throughout the thesis was a bottom-up 
approach in which informal norms and practices developed in response to military 
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necessity and brought about change from the soldier level up to DoD leadership. First 
an external event or situation, most often the U.S.’s participation in a war, would open a 
critical juncture that lessened the institutional constraints on women’s participation in 
the military. This would create a gap between the informal norms of the military and the 
formal policy, such as with the FET units and the combat ban. Then, women, working 
as ‘opportunist’ actors, would perform well overall in the tasks they were given. Once 
their participation was seen as successful in the positions they were given, DoD 
leadership often opened more positions to women. In other words, informally, women 
would participate in new roles because the military needed personnel and after their 
successful performance, the formal rules would then be changed to reflect the realities 
on the ground in the military. This was done several times throughout the 20th century. 
This model of change occurred after every war, beginning with World War II. It also 
occurred after the end of conscription in 1973.159 This supports Mahoney and Thelen’s 
theory of gradual change in which institutional change can occur when ‘soft spots’ are 
created by the improper implementation of formal rules (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4).  
 
‘Insurrectionary’ actors, who had been too constrained in the institution to work as 
‘opportunist’ actors, often instigated the second main approach. Their lack of progress 
internal to the institution, forced them to pursue other institutions outside of the military 
through the judicial or legislative branches. The ‘insurrectionary’ actor would bring a 
formal court case against the military to displace a specific policy. Members of 
Congress lobbying for changes to be made to the military were also considered 
‘insurrectionary’ actors because they worked external to the military and looked to 
completely displace formal policies. The formal policy change would then be forced 
from the top down from Congress or the U.S. court system ruling against the military. 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the DoD was then forced to change their policy, or 
the DoD would change the policy before an actual court ruling was enacted or piece of 
legislation was passed. This approach was used consistently throughout women’s 
participation in the military. Most recently however, victims of sexual assault used this 
                                                        
159 Please refer to Chapter Three, page 74 for examples.  
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model in order to force change in how the DoD handles prosecutions of sexual assault 
cases.160 
 
Although women have worked their way into a higher status in the military, and there 
was a weakening of the link between masculinity and war fighting, the military culture 
continues to be masculine-oriented and women are not fully accepted. As was discussed 
in the first section, and is discussed further in the following section, this is due to the 
institutionalisation of the masculine norms of which the military institution was 
originally built on. Until recently, in 2013, combat jobs were limited to men’s 
participation only. Therefore, the link between combat and masculinity remained intact. 
As was discussed in the literature review section in Chapter One, many feminist 
researchers believe that women’s exclusion from combat roles caused them 
discrimination from men in the institution and stood in the way of their ability to be 
viewed as full and equal members of the military.161 This thesis agrees with this 
assessment, as of 2013 the combat jobs are considered the core career fields of the 
military. Women need to be able to fill those jobs if they want to be considered as 
important and equal to male soldiers. Chapter Five posited that this could change in the 
future as technological jobs may start to be considered the ‘core’ jobs of the military. 
This evolution can already be seen because U.S. strategic culture shows a greater 
reliance on technologies that move soldiers away from risk. If this is the case in the 
future, it will not be as important for women to serve in combat rules to be considered 
equal members.162 
 
7.3 Possible Future Impact for Women  
(i) Women in the Military 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta lifted the last 
policy in place restricting women’s participation in combat jobs at the beginning of 
2013.163 Overcoming the last major obstacle in formal policy to women’s full                                                         
160 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 198 for examples.  
161 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for these arguments.  162 Please refer to Chapter One, page 23 for civic responsibility argument.  
163 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 97 for information on the lifting of the Ground Combat Rule.  
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involvement in the military was a major positive accomplishment for female soldiers. 
They are no longer restricted from career fields because of their gender. Now that the 
formal obstacles for women’s participation in the ‘core’ jobs of the military are gone, 
what does this mean for the future of women in the U.S. military? As mentioned above, 
this research posits that female soldiers must be able to participate in all combat jobs in 
order to gain equality in the military. However, this is not something that will happen 
instantaneously. The masculine cultural norms are thoroughly imbedded in the 
institution and women’s participation in all combat jobs may not overcome the 
masculine culture on its own.  
 
The military will stay a masculine centric culture if femininity is continuously 
denigrated in training and in the academies. Women should not have to act in a 
masculine manner in order to feel they are accepted.164 The ‘ethic of care’ feminists 
argue that women adapting to the masculine culture hurts feminism.165 Although this 
thesis does not agree with this argument, this research showed that women’s acceptance 
of the culture and discriminatory practices impedes positive gender institutional change. 
The military has a formal ‘zero-tolerance’ policy against sexual harassment and 
discrimination. This means that anyone who displays these actions should be punished 
quickly and sternly. However, from the data collected from female interviewees, the 
policy is not universally enforced. Many of the women interviewed said it was a 
consistent problem from the time they were in the military academy or basic training to 
throughout their careers. The women who had attended the academies in particular said 
it was an accepted practice and they learned to ignore it. If it is accepted in the 
academies, which are supposed to be training young officers and future military leaders, 
it will continue to be accepted as they progress through the ranks. Until this overall 
informal norm of acceptance of sexual harassment and discrimination is addressed 
through members reporting incidents and their command taking strict actions, women 
will not be able to be equal members in the U.S. Armed Forces.  
                                                         
164 Please refer to Chapter Five, page 133 for quotes from female military members.  165 Please refer to Chapter One, page 25 for ‘ethic of care’ argument.  
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Due to the issues discussed above, this research posits that changing the masculine 
centric culture of the military will be a slower and a more difficult process than it was 
for the formal discriminatory policies against women to be lifted. The lifting of the 
combat ban on women is an important first step toward equal treatment, as it formally 
places women as equal members. However, as was shown in this thesis, the informal 
norms do not always follow changes in formal policy. In order for the masculinised 
culture to change, the culture of acceptance of sexual harassment and assault must 
change. The ideas from Representative Speier’s and Senator Gillibrand’s legislations to 
remove sexual assault reporting and prosecuting power from the chain of command 
could go a long way in ensuring cases are no longer ignored and help improve 
prosecution rates. This could in turn show that sexual assaults will not be tolerated and 
change the current culture of acceptance.  
 
It must also be addressed that the attack is not the fault of the victim. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, some victims feel as though they are blamed for their own assault. As was 
the case with Stacey Thompson, victims that report assaults feel they have then been 
targeted for lesser charges in retaliation for their report and as a way to place blame on 
them instead of the perpetrator.166 Many women have also felt that after reporting an 
assault they were ostracised by their own unit and friends, including both male and 
female soldiers and punished for breaking the informal norm of acceptance of sexual 
assault. Command climate and leadership can help address this issue. In the past, sexual 
assault reports have negatively affected the career of a commander and are a negative 
mark against a unit. It is often seen as a blemish on the unit’s record.167 This has led to 
the feeling that the report of a sexual assault disrupts the bonds of the unit. Therefore, it 
is important that when a case of sexual assault does occur, that the commander of the 
unit is clear that it is not the victim’s fault for reporting the case. Due to the hierarchical 
structure of the military, the transmission of informal norms occurs from commanders 
and officers passing down norms to others in the military. A commander, or high-
                                                        
166 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 185 for further information on Stacey Thompson’s case.  
167 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 189 for further information on commanders and sexual assault 
reports.  
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ranking officer can set the tone for their unit by passing down the appropriate response 
to cases of sexual assault and harassment.  
 
There is hope of the problems of sexual assault and harassment lessening in the future 
because Congress has started forcing change. Congress enacted one significant and 
positive change to the rule of commander’s discretion in June of 2013. As was 
discussed in Chapter Six,168 commanders had the power to overturn guilty convictions 
of sexual assault. There were two cases in 2013 that garnered significant media 
attention in which two generals overturned the guilty verdict for male officers in their 
units after a jury found the officers guilty.169 Congress took notice of these cases and on 
June 5, 2013, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee passed a bill that stripped 
“commanders of their longstanding authority to reverse or change court-martial 
convictions” (Cassata 2013, 1). The same Bill also required for anyone found guilty of a 
“sex-related crime” to “receive a punishment that includes, at a minimum, a dismissal 
from military service or a dishonourable discharge” (Cassata 2013, 1). The Bill is 
expected to be included in the Defence Authorisation Act for FY 2014, discussed 
below.  
 
A recent report regarding the Defence Authorisation Act, that must be passed every year 
by Congress to provide funding to the DoD, stated that ways to counter sexual assaults 
in the military are to be an important discussion in the passing of the Defence 
Authorisation Act for FY 2014. It said, “broad, bipartisan outrage over the problem has 
built up after a series of embarrassing incidents and a report that found 26,000 assaults 
last year - an increase of more than a third from 2011” (Herb 2013, 1). Although the 
problem has had to become severe for lawmakers to take notice, it is a positive sign that 
it is now receiving notice not only from lawmakers, but from the public as well. When 
military victims were not able to instigate change inside the institution, they took their 
                                                        
168 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 195 for further information on commanders’ ability to overturn 
sexual assault convictions.  
169 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 195 for further information on the cases.  
  228 
fight outside to federal courts and Congress. The publicity they have received may be 
able to enact greater structural changes to the reporting chain of sexual assaults.170  
 
As described above, there have been significant positive formal policy changes for 
women in the U.S. Armed Forces. Although there have been formal changes, many of 
the masculine-oriented informal norms of the military institution have not followed the 
formal policy, but have instead been at tension with it. Although the formal combat ban 
against women was lifted and I posited that this would need to be done to ensure 
women equality in the military, this informal change will not happen instantaneously. 
The masculine-oriented informal norms will likely continue to hold women back until 
the institution no longer denigrates the feminine, while privileging the masculine. This 
will likely be a longer process of change than it was to make the formal policies of the 
military not discriminate against women. A positive attitude toward femininity and 
intolerance for sexual assault and discrimination by unit commanders could help 
transmit more positive informal norms to young military members and eventually help 
to change the existing masculine-oriented informal norms. The Section 7.4 goes into 
greater detail as to what these findings of the case study of the U.S. military means for 
the study of new institutionalism theory. 
 
(ii) Women in Society 
Chapter One provided main feminist arguments for and against women’s participation 
in the U.S. military.171 In Chapter Four, this thesis showed that in American society, the 
U.S. military and its members enjoy a privileged position. The military has been a path 
to full citizenship and greater civic participation. Due to this, it is important for women 
to participate in the military institution as it can provide a path of greater civic 
participation for women. The opening of combat jobs to female soldiers not only helps 
the status of those in the military, but can also help the status of women in American 
society to be seen as fully contributing members to the protection of the country and 
national security.                                                          
170 Please refer to Chapter Six, page 198 for further information on Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s Bill.  171 Please refer to Chapter One, page 21 for full arguments.  
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Although this research showed that female soldiers tend to adapt to the masculine-
centric culture of the U.S. Armed Forces instead of changing it, as was a fear of the 
‘ethic of care’ feminists, this does not mean that women should not participate in the 
institution. Female soldiers’ participation has confused stereotypical gender roles of 
greater American society. As was shown in Chapters Three, Four and Five, female 
soldiers and those advocating for them consistently challenged traditional ideals of 
appropriate roles and jobs for women, and this is beneficial to the advancement of all 
American women. Although many women have conformed to the military masculine 
culture, many have also tried to change stereotypes by positive performance, while 
others have challenged policies through the judicial system and congress. As there is a 
link between the U.S. military and society, as discussed in Chapter Four, these 
advancements made by military women also positively change perceptions and 
stereotypes that affect women and their roles in greater society.  
 
7.4 Broader Findings of the Thesis 
This thesis focused on the gender regime of the U.S. Armed Forces and particularly 
women’s participation in the military. However, it also serves as a case study for new 
institutionalism theory, particularly feminist institutionalism and aspects of institutional 
change. The key point of this thesis was to explain how the interplay between the 
formal policies of an institution and its informal norms are essential in understanding 
institutional change and persistence. The gendered aspect of this research was necessary 
to determine the intricacies and effects on the gender institutional culture of an 
institution.   
 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual change, as well as past studies in historical 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, have explained the importance and 
value in considering both formal rules and informal norms in the study of institutions.172 
As this thesis was concerned with institutional change, they were both necessary for a 
full understanding. This study found was that formal rules and policies, in a democratic                                                         
172 Please refer to Chapter Two, page 40 for full discussion. 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society such as the U.S., are easier to change. Actors have a formal avenue to pursue 
change and even if they are stymied by a strict institutional structure or social code, they 
are still able to pursue their goals outside through other institutions. This is a significant 
point in the structure vs. agency debate because it shows that actors can break through 
the constraints of an institution and force change in formal policies from the outside. As 
was discussed in Chapter Two, in the agency vs. structure debate, actors are constrained 
by the institution in which they are members. However, the evidence here has 
demonstrated that the few who choose to move outside of the institution can bring about 
formal change more quickly than actors acting as ‘opportunists’ operating inside the 
institution.  
 
The informal norms of an institution are more difficult for actors to change, particularly 
when the actors are taught to conform to the pre-existing norms. It is also particularly 
difficult for changes to culture to be made by actors working outside of the institution; 
rather, ‘opportunists’ working on the inside to slowly erode stereotypes may be more 
beneficial. However, from a gender perspective, the expectation that women’s presence 
will simply make the military, or any institution, less masculine and more feminine is 
false. Those that want to fit in to an institution will most likely follow the informal 
norms taught to them and try to conform in order to be accepted, as shown in the case of 
women in the military. However, this depends on the agency of the individual actors 
and the actions they decide to take. The informal norms are more important than I had 
originally anticipated, in both positive and negative ways.  
 
From a negative perspective, positive formal policy changes for women are not enough 
to change how an institution treats female members. The culture will take longer to 
change than the formal policies. This means that when an institution is looking to make 
formal policy changes in favour of women, they must also address cultural concerns as 
well. One way to do this is by ensuring those in power who transmit and maintain the 
informal norms, teach the correct and anti-discriminatory norms. For example, the 
military is particularly impervious to informal change because of its hierarchical 
structure and the power of commanders. If the commanders in power are not promoting 
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the appropriate institutional norms, then the structure of the institution should be 
changed to lessen their hold over the informal norms. Another tactic that supports this 
idea is for those in power to effectively enforce the formal anti-discrimination policies 
that are in place. The case study of the U.S. military has shown that, in order to address 
informal norms, the structure of how the military handles sexual assault cases may have 
to be amended.  Structural changes such as this would likely need to come from outside 
institutions if there are weak veto opportunities for those with less power in the 
institution (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 19). 
 
From a positive perspective, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, informal norms can 
update an institution’s formal policies to better reflect reality. In the case of the U.S. 
military, women were participating in ground combat through their participation in the 
FETs, as well as through the loophole in the attachment policy for women to combat 
units. The informal norms that developed out of the reality on the ground were 
eventually able to update an old formal policy that banned women from ground combat 
roles. The formal policies of an institution may be antiquated and discriminate against 
women; however, if actors can find the ‘soft spots’ and gaps, such as in this case, 
between the formal policies and the norms followed in the institution, they can create 
opportunities for change internal to the institution through positive participation.  
 
In considering institutional change from a gendered perspective, it is essential to 
consider both formal rules and informal norms to have a full understanding of the 
institution and the changes taking place. They are also both vital when analysing an 
institution’s gender regime. An institution may appear gender-neutral or equal from its 
formal policies alone, but the inclusion of informal norms will provide a clear picture of 
the intricacies involved in the gender power structure of the institution.  
 
Conclusion 
This research showed that there have been progressive changes for women’s acceptance 
in the U.S. military over the past 20 years. A substantial change, the lifting of the 
combat ban on women, took place in early 2013 and ended the formal policy limiting 
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women’s participation in the U.S. Armed Forces, 65 years after women’s official 
entrance into the U.S. military. Around 2005, informal norms developed in response to 
the reality on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan that allowed women to participate in 
combat and showed they could be successful in career fields from which they were 
banned. This was another example of military necessity opening a critical juncture in 
which women had greater opportunities to participate in more career fields in the 
military. Female soldiers worked as ‘opportunist’ actors and proved they could operate 
successfully in the combat environment. Their successful participation, combined with 
the reality on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, eventually changed the minds of 
policymakers and the formal policy was updated to match the reality on the ground. 
 
Although there have been positive changes in formal policies in the military, the 
masculine-centric culture of the institution remains intact and women are not fully 
accepted members. Masculinity continues to be privileged in the military institution. 
The lack of informal change can be seen through the prevalence of sexual assault and 
harassment in the military. Formal policy states that women are to be treated equally in 
the military; however, the informal norms promote a culture of acceptance of sexual 
harassment and assault. By not combating the cultural norms that allow these problems 
to exist, women are placed at an unfair disadvantage in the institution. Many female 
soldiers also feel that they have to conform to the masculine culture in order to be 
accepted in the institution. Therefore, the masculine culture of the military has not 
evolved as quickly as the institution’s formal policies. The masculine culture of the 
military is difficult and slow to change. There is a strong tradition of masculinity tied to 
the military and women’s presence alone will not change this traditional tie. However, 
as masculinity is closely tied to jobs closest to combat, this could slowly evolve as all 
military members are moved further away from combat by technological advancements. 
It could also evolve as more women move into newly opened combat career fields by 
2015.  
 
By 2013 women have earned full rights to participation in the U.S. military. The lifting 
of the combat ban on female soldiers was an essential step to move the military towards 
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greater gender equality. There is more work that needs to be done on the existing 
masculine centric culture in order for female soldiers to be truly equal. The problems of 
sexual assault and harassment must be fully addressed through both formal policies and 
in the informal norms of the institution. Without addressing the cultural problems, 
masculinity will continue to hold greater power in the gender regime of the military and 
women will be less valued than their male counterparts.  
 
In order to address the informal norms, the military must start making changes from the 
top of the hierarchy down to lower-ranking soldiers. Due to the hierarchical structure of 
the military, commanders set the tone for their personnel and pass down the informal 
norms of their unit to its members. Therefore, it is important that military commanders 
take reports of sexual assault and harassment seriously and, if Congress does not take 
away commanders’ purview over cases of sexual assault, they must prosecute the 
perpetrator while not blaming the victim for reporting the case. This is more likely to 
happen than in the past because the problems of sexual assault and harassment in the 
military have been given greater attention than ever before. However, those in 
commander positions are already indoctrinated into the institutional norms of the 
military, so they must make a conscious effort to change their practices. One way to 
help make this happen is for the DoD to continue to place focus on the problem and not 
begin to overlook it again as other issues arise.  
 
This thesis demonstrated that it is essential to consider both formal policies and 
informal norms when analysing institutional change. They both play important roles in 
the evolution of an institution and change cannot be fully explained by only analysing 
one aspect. It was also necessary to look at both formal policies and informal norms 
when considering the gender regime of an institution. By analysing both aspects this 
study was able to explore different areas and develop a clear picture of the extent to 
which the gender institutional culture of the U.S. military has changed. The interaction 
between the formal policies and informal norms can also explain areas of institutional 
change that would be difficult to analyse by only looking at policies or the culture. It 
was only by examining both formal policies and informal cultural norms, as well as the 
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interaction between them across different themes, that this research was able to analyse 
the changing patterns of the gender power structure in the U.S. military, and therefore 
draw conclusions regarding the gendered institutional culture and processes of change.  
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Annex A: Respondent Data 
 
Figure A.1 Status of Total Respondents 
Status Government 
Official/Flag 
Officer 
Military 
Officer 
Military 
Enlisted 
Member 
Total 
Number of 
Interview 
Respondents 
5 15 33 53 
Number of 
Survey 
Respondents 
0 7 9 16 
Status of 
Respondents 
Elite Status Non-Elite 
Status 
Non-Elite 
Status 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 Branch of Service of Respondents173 
Branch Civilian Army Navy Marine 
Corps. 
Air 
Force 
Total 
Number of 
Interview 
Respondents 
1 25 9 2 16 53 
Number of 
Survey 
Respondents 
0 9 2 1 4 16 
TOTAL 1 34 11 3 20 69 
 
Figure A.3 Years of Service of Respondents 
Years of 
Service 
0-5 
 
6-10 11-15 16-20 21+ Total 
Number of 
Interview 
Respondents 
18 16 8 2 9 53 
Number of 
Survey 
Respondents 
7 5 2 1 1 16 
TOTAL 25 21 10 3 10 69 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
173 The Elite respondents who have an affiliated military branch are categorized under their respective 
branch.  
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Figure A.4 Respondents’ Deployment Status (Includes Military Only) 
Deployment 
Status 
Have Deployed Never Deployed Total 
Number of 
Interview 
Respondents 
32 16 48 
Number of 
Survey 
Respondents 
11 5 16 
TOTAL 43 21 64 
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Annex B: Military Rank 
 
Figure B.1 Enlisted Personnel 
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Figure B.2 Military Officers 
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Annex C: Statistical Data on Sexual Assault Reporting 
 
 
(DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 2012, 32) 
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Annex D: Information Sheet for Respondents 
 
The Effects of Military Culture on Women’s Position in the 
U.S. Armed Forces 
 
Information Sheet For Interviewees 
 This leaflet is to inform you of the nature of the research project and to ask you if you would like to participate in the study.   
The aim of the project: This research considers the different, gendered, aspects of U.S. military culture and how the culture affects policies for military women. It will consider women’s experiences in analyzing the informal and formal rules and norms of the military as an institution. Women’s experiences inside the military are particularly important when considering the informal norms that construct the institutional culture. This research looks to provide data and a thorough analysis that could be used to shape Department of Defense gender policies to ensure the advancement of U.S. military women stationed in the continental United States and overseas. It could also help to provide insight into possible limiting cultural factors to consider as Congress moves towards reconsidering women’s exclusion from combat roles in the U.S. Armed Forces. 
 
This project has three main questions: 
< (1) How does the interplay of formal and informal norms, values and rules affect 
gender power relations in the U.S. military? 
< (2) Has the institutional culture evolved? If so, why and how has change 
occurred? 
 
Who is doing the study? The study  is based at  the Department of Politics at  the University of York and  is being conducted by Nicole Brunner.   
 
What will I be asked to do? 
I would like to interview you about your experiences working for the Department of 
Defence or in the Armed Forces. I would also like to discuss your experiences, views 
and opinions of current policies and legislation and how they have affected your 
service.  I expect that the interview will take about one hour.  I would like to tape record 
the interviews and I will ask you about this before we start.  If you would prefer not to 
be tape recorded, I will only take notes. 
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Why should I take part in the project? By participating  in  this  project  you will  help  to  inform my  analysis  of  your  own experiences  in  the military. This  information will help  in analyzing both positive and  negative  aspects  of  U.S. military  culture.  It  can  help  show what  policies  are working  and which  could benefit  from  change.    By doing  this,  I  hope  that  in  the future, there will be a greater equality in women’s participation in the U.S. Armed Forces.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
If  you  decide  not  to  take  part,  that’s  OK.    If  you  do  decide  to  take  part  and  later change your mind, you can withdraw at any time.  You do not have to give a reason.    
What will happen to the information? 
All of the information you give me is confidential.  I will not discuss what you have told 
me with anyone except for my supervisors and I will not disclose to anyone that you are 
taking part if you prefer to remain anonymous.  Reports from the research will not 
identify anyone who has taken part unless you give your specific consent for your name 
or direct quotes to be used.  
When I have completed the transcription of your interview, I will provide you with the 
ability to strike anything you wish from the record. You will not be provided with a 
final copy of my analysis unless you specifically request a copy. Then one can be 
provided to you after completion of my project.  
 
What happens next? If you choose to take part, I will provide you with a consent form to sign and date for my records.  If  you would  like  to get  in  touch with me at anytime, please  feel free  to  contact  Nicole  Brunner  (email:  nmb508@york.ac.uk)  or,  tel.+44(0) 1423770987 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